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The first part of this thesis is an analysis of the virtual large cardinals, being critical
points of set-sized generic elementary embeddings where the target model is a subset
of the ground model. We show that virtually measurables are equiconsistent with
virtually strongs, and that virtually Woodins are virtually Vopěnka. We separate
most of these large cardinals, but show that such separations do not hold within
core models. We define prestrong cardinals, being an equivalent characterisation of
strongs, but which in a virtual setting are strictly weaker than virtually strongs. We
show that the existence of this separation is equivalent to the existence of virtually
rank-into-rank cardinals in the universe, and that virtually Berkeley cardinals can
be characterised in the same fashion with On being virtually pre-Woodin but not
virtually Woodin, answering a question by Gitman and Hamkins. Building on the
work of Wilson, we show that the virtual version of the Weak Vopěnka Principle
is equivalent to a weakening of virtually pre-Woodins. We end the first part with
several indestructibility results, including that a slight strengthening of the virtually
supercompacts is always indestructible by <κ-directed closed forcings.
The second part is concerned with connections between the virtual large car-
dinals and other set-theoretic objects. We analyse cardinals arising from a certain
filter game, for various lengths of the game. When the games are finite we show
that this results in a characterisation of the completely ineffable cardinals, and at
length ω we arrive at another characterisation of the virtually measurable cardi-
nals. At length ω + 1 the cardinals become equiconsistent with a measurable car-
dinal, and at uncountable cofinalities the cardinals are downward absolute to K
below 0¶. The results in this section answer most of the open questions raised
in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018]. We also introduce the notion of ideal-absolute prop-
erties of forcings, being properties such that generic elementary embeddings can
be characterised by ideals in the ground model. We show that several properties
are ideal-absolute, which includes an improvement of an unpublished theorem of
Foreman. This also results in another characterisation of completely ineffables.
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1.2 Gödel-Bernays class theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Large cardinals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 Small large cardinals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.2 Large large cardinals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.3 Inconsistent large cardinals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Core model theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 The core model K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.2 Constructing K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.3 Properties of K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.4 Coiterations of mice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Forcing lemmata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.1 Lifting criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.2 Countable embedding absoluteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.3 Preservation of sequence closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Virtual large cardinals 22
2.1 Strongs & supercompacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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Gödel proved his Incompleteness Theorems in [Gödel, 1931], one of which showed
that to every consistent sufficiently strong1 theory there would be statements which
the system can neither prove nor disprove; we say that such a theory is incomplete
and say that the statement in question is independent of the theory. Of notable
importance is ZFC, the established foundational theory of Mathematics. Mathe-
maticians at the time were generally disinterested in his result, as they considered
the statement he constructed in his proof to be “unnatural” and therefore have no
real consequence to mathematical practice.
Proceeding Gödel’s proof of the consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis in
[Gödel, 1938], which was also the first problem that appeared on Hilbert’s famous list
of 23 problems in Mathematics published in year 1900, Gödel proposed a program in
[Gödel, 1947], the goal of which was to “decide interesting mathematical propositions
independent of ZFC in well-justified extensions of ZFC.” His result had shown the
“first half” for the Continuum Hypothesis, namely that ZFC cannot disprove it.
The second half of the proof that the Continuum Hypothesis is indeed in-
dependent of ZFC came about roughly two decades later, when Cohen used his
newly developed notion of forcing in [Cohen, 1964] to prove the consistency of the
negation of the Continuum Hypothesis, showing that there are natural statements
which are independent of ZFC.
Today, many others have followed in Gödel’s footsteps and have made great
efforts to analyse the nature of these natural independent statements. This organ-
ically led to the development of large cardinal axioms, being axioms that extend
ZFC in terms of consistency strength and seem to be the canonical such axioms, in
that all natural theories found “in the wild” have been shown to be equiconsistent
with a known large cardinal axiom.
A notable phenomenon is that for “natural” theories T and U , if T has smaller
consistency strength than U then the Σ0ω consequences of T are also Σ0ω conse-
quences of U – so by climbing this large cardinal hierarchy we in fact uncover
more truths about the natural numbers. The theory of the reals also attain this
1Being able to prove PA counts as “sufficiently strong”.
vii of 130
Introduction
monotone behaviour as long as one has moved sufficiently far up the hierarchy,
namely past the existence of infinitely many so-called Woodin cardinals. This
phenomenon also occurs for the theory of certain sets of reals.
Now, it has been found that large cardinals having the strength of at least
a measurable cardinal can be characterised in terms of elementary embeddings,
enabling a uniform analysis of these cardinals. The large cardinals below the
measurables have historically not had such uniform characterisations, but recently
the notion of a virtual large cardinal was introduced in [Schindler, 2000a] and
[Gitman and Schindler, 2018] that essentially reflects a lot of the behaviour of the
larger large cardinals down to the lower realms. Here Cohen’s method of forcing is
in full force, as the definition of a virtual version of a large cardinal characterised by
elementary embeddings is essentially stating that we can force such an embedding
to exist, rather than postulating their existence in the universe.
A motivation for studying these virtual large cardinals is that they allow us to
utilise our current elementary embedding toolbox in more diverse contexts: we will
see that all the virtual large cardinals are very weak in terms of consistency strength,
which makes it possible to use methods from the theory of elementary embeddings
to study weak theories of interest. Examples of these include the following:
Theorem 0.1 ([Schindler, 2000a] and [Schindler, 2004]). The following are equicon-
sistent:
• There exists a virtually supercompact cardinal;
• The theory of L(R) cannot be changed by proper forcing;
• The theory of L(R) cannot be changed by semi-proper forcing.
Theorem 0.2 ([Wilson, 2019a]). The following are equiconsistent:
• There exists a virtually Vopěnka cardinal;
• ZF + pΣ12 is the class of all ω1-Suslin setsq+ Θ = ℵ2.
Theorem 0.3 ([Schindler and Wilson, 2018]). The following are equiconsistent:
• There exists a virtually Shelah cardinal;
• ZF + pevery universally Baire set of reals has the perfect set propertyq.
The study of the virtuals can also be used to analyse the opposite side of the
large cardinal spectrum, namely the ones lying beyond the inconsistency border.
The virtual versions of these are still consistency-wise very weak, allowing us to get
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a glimpse into the nature of exotic large cardinals such as the Reinhardt and Berke-
ley cardinals, which are both inconsistent with ZFC (but it is currently unknown
whether they are inconsistent with ZF).
This thesis is an extensive analysis of this virtual phenomenon. The thesis
naturally splits into two parts, with the first part being an analysis of the virtuals
in isolation and the second part being how these virtuals relate to commonly used
set-theoretic objects. Chapter 2 covers the first part, and Chapters 3 and 4 the
second.
In the first part we examine how the virtual large cardinals relate to each
other, and highlights how they differ from their non-virtual counterparts. A crucial
difference between the virtuals and the standard large cardinals is that we do not get
a Kunen inconsistency for the virtuals. One consequence of this is that the property
that j(κ) > θ always holds when κ is a θ-strong cardinal with j : V →M being the
associated elementary embedding, does not always hold in the virtual world. This
leads us to define prestrong cardinals as the cardinals not having this property, and in
Theorem 2.10 we characterise the virtual θ-prestrong cardinals into either virtually
θ-strong cardinals or virtually (θ, ω)-superstrong cardinals. One consequence of
this is that virtually measurable cardinals are equiconsistent with virtually strong
cardinals, without being equivalent. Another consequence is Corollary 2.53, that
“virtualised Kunen inconsistencies”, being the existence of virtually rank-into-rank
cardinals, happen exactly when we can separate the virtually prestrong cardinals
from the virtually strongs.
The virtual large cardinals also differ from the standard large cardinals by
how they interact with structures closed under sequences. We first see this differ-
ence in Theorem 2.4, due to Ralf Schindler and Victoria Gitman, who showed that
the virtually strongs are equivalent to the virtually supercompacts. This is expanded
to virtually Woodin cardinals in Proposition 2.16, yielding a plethora of characterisa-
tions of these cardinals, as well as in Theorem 2.22, where we show that the Woodin
cardinals and the Vopěnka cardinals are also equivalent in the virtual world. These
two results are joint with Stamatis Dimopoulos and Victoria Gitman.
We next delve into a weak version of the Vopěnka principle, denoted WVP,
which originates from category theory. Trevor Wilson has shown that WVP is
equivalent to On being a Woodin cardinal, and we show that this equivalence only
holds in the virtual world if we work with pre-Woodin cardinals, in analogy with
the prestrongs mentioned above, as well as not explicitly requiring the target model
to be well-founded. This result is joint with Victoria Gitman.
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Since there are no Kunen inconsistencies in the virtual world, this allows us
to study the virtual versions of the Berkeley cardinals in ZFC. We introduce these
and show that in Theorem 2.43, the virtual Vopěnka principle implies that On is
Mahlo exactly when there are no virtually Berkeley cardinals, improving on a result
by Victoria Gitman and Joel Hamkins.
We furthermore show that the virtually Berkeley cardinals exist exactly when
On is virtually pre-Woodin without being virtually Woodin, which parallels the
result for the rank-into-rank cardinals mentioned above. This also hints at Berkeley
cardinals being a natural large cardinal notion.
The virtual large cardinals all require the target model of the generic elemen-
tary embedding to be a subset of the ground model, and if we remove this condition
then we get the faint large cardinals. We show in Corollary 2.52 that the virtuals
and faints are consistently distinct notions. We provide further separations in Theo-
rem 2.50, this theorem being joint with Victoria Gitman. However, in Theorem 2.46
we show that in L, L[µ] as well as in the core model K below a Woodin cardinal,
the two notions are equivalent.
The first part ends with an analysis of indestructibility properties of the faints,
which is joint with Philipp Schlicht. We work with a strengthening of the faintly
supercompact cardinals in which the target model is closed under sequences in the
generic extension and not just in the ground model. We show that these cardinals
enjoy many indestructibility properties, including under<κ-directed closed forcings
and Add(ω, κ). In an attempt to understand how strong these cardinals are, we
show that no such cardinals can exist in neither L nor L[µ]. Using the stationary
tower we can show that a proper class of Woodin cardinals is an upper bound, but
a recent unpublished result by Toshimichi Usuba shows that, surprisingly, virtually
extendibles also provide an upper consistency bound for these cardinals.
The second part is split into two chapters. The first chapter explores filters
and games and has been published in [Nielsen and Welch, 2019]. We perform a
thorough analysis of certain Ramsey-like cardinals introduced in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018],
defined using filter games, in which player I plays set-sized structures Mα and
player II has to follow up withMα-filters on the cardinal κ in question.
They focused on the case in which player I does not have a winning strategy,
where they showed that this results in a large cardinal notion characterised by ele-
mentary embeddings between set-sized structures. Our main focus is when player
II does have a winning strategy, and we answer almost all of the open questions in
[Holy and Schlicht, 2018] regarding these.
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When the games are of finite length we show in Theorems 3.21 and 3.23
that the resulting large cardinal notions form a strict hierarchy via the use of inde-
scribability properties, and characterise in Theorem 3.30 the completely ineffable
cardinals with these games.
As we move to infinite games this is when we reach the connection to the
virtual large cardinals. Indeed, Theorem 3.31 shows that the faintly θ-measurable
cardinals can be characterised in terms of a slight weaknening of the ω-length ver-
sion of these games. Theorem 3.33 shows that this weakened game is equivalent to
the original game in L, and is related to the above-mentioned separation- and core
model results. These two theorems are joint with Ralf Schindler.
Taking one more step, to games of length ω + 1, our consistency strength
suddenly dramatically increases to measurable cardinals, as shown in Theorem 3.47.
For these countable length games we show that our resulting large cardinals can
be characterised in terms of indiscernible games from [Sharpe and Welch, 2011].
We also include proofs due to Philip Welch and Ralf Schindler that the cardinals
corresponding to the ω1-length games are measurable inK below 0¶ and a Woodin
cardinal, respectively.
The last case is when the games have length of uncountable cofinality, where
we show that the resulting large cardinals are downward absolute to K below 0¶,
the sharp of a strong cardinal. We also show how the cardinals relate to the strongly-
and super Ramseys introduced by Victoria Gitman.
The other chapter in this second part asks the question of when these cardi-
nals characterised by generic elementary embeddings can equivalently be charac-
terised by the existence of ideals in the ground model. To organise our results we
define a poset property to be ideal-absolute if this holds for forcings having that
property. We show in Theorem 4.7 that distributivity properties are ideal-absolute
and Theorem 4.9 and the subsequent Corollary 4.12 show that (κ, κ)-distributive
<λ-closure is also ideal-absolute, for λ ∈ [ω1, κ+]. This main result is an improve-
ment of the proof of an unpublished result due to Matthew Foreman, Theorem 4.8.
Building on these results, we give in Corollary 4.13 another characterisation
of the completely ineffables, in terms of ideals, and in Theorem 4.15 and Corol-
lary 4.16 we show that <λ-closure is also ideal-absolute. This ties in with the
above-mentioned weakening of the games, also showing that these games charac-
terise the <λ-closed faintly- and ideally measurables.
We end with a final chapter containing a range of open questions, continuing




We will denote the class of ordinals by On. For X,Y sets we denote by XY the set
of all functions fromX to Y . For an infinite cardinal κ, we letHκ be the set of setsX
such that the cardinality of the transitive closure ofX is strictly less than κ. ZF− will
denote ZF with the Collection scheme but without the Power Set axiom, following
the results of [Gitman et al., 2015]. We write GBC for Gödel-Bernays class theory
with the Axiom of Choice, and GB for GBC without the Axiom of Choice. The
symbol  will denote a contradiction and P(X) denotes the power set of X . We
will sometimes denote elementary embeddings π : (M,∈) → (N ,∈) by simply
π : M → N . Generally, α, β, γ, ζ will denote ordinals and κ, λ, θ, δ cardinals.
We will always assume elementary embeddings to be non-trivial unless otherwise
stated, meaning that the elementary embedding in question is not the identity. We
will sometimes abuse notation and denote a generic extension V [g] by simply V P,




This chapter will give a rough overview of concepts that will be used in subsequent
chapters. We start with briefly recalling properties regarding filters and elementary
embeddings that we will be employing, as well as describing GBC Gödel-Bernays
class theory. We then spend some time on large cardinal theory, as it plays a promi-
nent role in understanding how the virtual large cardinals in Chapter 2 compares
to the other large cardinals.
We will also routinely be working with the core model K throughout this the-
sis, so we include a section that will give a high-level overview of what K is and
which key properties it has. The last section in these preliminaries will cover some
results related to working with elementary embeddings in different forcing exten-
sions, which tend to not be covered in standard textbooks. In the interest of brevity
we will provide references rather than proofs of most of these results.
1.1 Filters and elementary embeddings
When we are dealing with elementary embeddings between set-sized structures,
we will usually be interested in structures of the following form:
Definition 1.1. For a cardinal κ, a weak κ-model is a setM of size κ satisfying
that κ + 1 ⊆ M and (M,∈) |= ZFC−. If furthermore M<κ ⊆ M, M is a
κ-model.1 ◦
A proto-typical example of a weak κ-model is any κ-sized M ≺ Hκ+ , as it is well-
known that Hκ+ satisfies ZFC−. We can get a κ-model from this by closing off M
under <κ-sequences while maintaining being an elementary substructure of Hκ+ .
Note that this only works if 2<κ = κ however, as otherwise the resulting structure
would be too large.
1Note that our (weak) κ-models do not have to be transitive, in contrast to the models consid-
ered in [Gitman, 2011] and [Gitman and Welch, 2011]. Not requiring the models to be transitive was
introduced in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018].
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Embeddings between these weak κ-models can equivalently be phrased in terms
of ultrafilters, or measures. Recall that µ is anM-measure if
(M,∈, µ) |= pµ is a κ-complete ultrafilter on κq.
Some common properties of such measures are the following:
Definition 1.2. For a weak κ-modelM, anM-measure µ is...
• weakly amenable if x ∩ µ ∈M for every x ∈M with CardM(x) = κ;
• countably complete if
⋂ ~X 6= ∅ for every ω-sequence ~X ∈ ωµ. ◦
Weak amenability can equivalently be phrased in terms of a property concerning
only the embedding.
Proposition 1.3 ([Kunen, 1969]). Let M be a weak κ-model, µ an M-measure
and j :M→N the ultrapower embedding. Then µ is weakly amenable iff j is
κ-powerset preserving, meaning thatM∩P(κ) = N ∩P(κ). 
We will also be employing the following well-known result regarding set-sized em-
beddings:
Lemma 1.4 (Ancient Kunen Lemma). Let κ be regular,M,N weak κ-models, θ ∈
(κ, o(M)) a regular M-cardinal, and π : M → N an elementary embedding
with critπ = κ and HMθ ⊆ N . Then for every X ∈ HMθ with card
M(X) = κ
it holds that π X ∈ N .
Proof. Let f : κ→ X , f ∈M, be a bijection and note that π(x) = π(f)(f−1(x))
for all x ∈ X , so it suffices that f, π(f) ∈ N , which is true since f ∈ HMθ ⊆ N . 
1.2 Gödel-Bernays class theory
As we will often find ourselves working with proper classes, we need to be able
to work rigourously with these. We formalise this in second-order Gödel-Bernays
class theory, GBC. In the following we will use the standard convention of using
uppercase letters for classes and lowercase letters for sets.
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Definition 1.5. The axioms of Gödel-Bernays set theory with Choice, GBC, are
as follows.
(i) ZFC;
(ii) (Class extensionality) Two classes are equal iff they have the same elements;
(iii) (Class replacement) Every class-sized function restricted to a set is a set;
(iv) (Class comprehension scheme) For classes Y1, . . . , Ym and every formula
ϕ(v1, . . . , vn, V1, . . . , Vm) that only quantifies over sets it holds that
{(x1, . . . , xn) | ϕ[x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Ym]}
is a class;
(v) (Global choice) There is a class function G such that, for every non-empty set
x, G(x) ∈ x. ◦
Theorem 1.6 (Cohen-Kripke-Solovay; [Cohen, 1966]). GBC is conservative over ZFC,
meaning that if σ is a first-order sentence and GBC`σ then ZFC`σ as well. In-
tuitively speaking, GBC does not add new information about sets. 
1.3 Large cardinals
Since large cardinals came into existence in the beginning of the 20th century, a
vast zoo of different types of such have appeared. The aim of this section is to act
as a reference for the definitions of these as well as the relations between them.
Large cardinals are roughly split into two “sections”: the small ones and the large
ones. This distinction is a bit blurry and varies from set theorist to set theorist, but
here the distinction will be made at the point where global elementary embeddings
enter the picture, which starts at the measurable cardinals.
We will start from the bottom and only cover the large cardinals that we will
be dealing with in this thesis. See Figure 1.1 for an overview of these.
1.3.1 Small large cardinals
The first large cardinal lies at the very bottom of the hierarchy: the inaccessibles.
Definition 1.7. A cardinal κ is regular if cof κ = κ; i.e. that there is no ordinal
γ < κ with a cofinal function f : γ → κ. κ is a strong limit if 2λ < κ for all
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cardinals λ < κ. If κ is both regular and a strong limit then we say that it is
(strongly) inaccessible. ◦
Every other large cardinal is either inaccessible or implies that there exists an in-
ner model with an inaccessible cardinal. The following shows that inaccessible
cardinals transcend ZFC:
Proposition 1.8 (Sierpiński-Tarski-Zermelo; [Kanamori, 2008] 1.2). If κ is an inac-
cessible cardinal then (Vκ,∈) |= ZFC. 
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem from [Gödel, 1931] then shows that ZFC
can prove neither the existence of any inaccessible cardinals nor the mere consis-
tency of inaccessible cardinals existing. This is the foundation of the large cardinal
hierarchy. We say that a large cardinal is stronger than another large cardinal if
the former proves the consistency of the latter, so that the same application of the
Incompleteness Theorem shows that the weaker large cardinal theory can never
prove the consistency of the stronger one.
Taking a tiny step further, we arrive at the (inaccessible) Σn-reflecting cardinals.
Definition 1.9. For n < ω, an inaccessible cardinal κ is Σn-reflecting if it holds
that Hκ ≺n V . ◦
Note that it is also common to not require inaccesibility of Σn-reflecting cardinals,
in which case they are simply equiconsistent with ZFC by the Reflection Theorem.
But as all our Σn-reflecting cardinals will be inaccessible in this thesis we include
this in the definition.
Proposition 1.10 (Folklore). For n ≥ 2, every Σn-reflecting cardinal is a limit of
inaccessible cardinals.
Proof. Let κ be Σn-reflecting. Note that the definitions of both regularity and
strong limit are Π1-formulae, making inaccessibility Π1 as well. But now we get
that, for every ξ < κ, V |= ∃λ > ξ : pλ is inaccessibleq. This statement is a
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Σ2-sentence, so since we in particular have that Hκ ≺2 V it holds that
Hκ |= ∃λ > ξ : pλ is inaccessibleq.
We can therefore define a sequence of inaccessible cardinals 〈λα | α < κ〉 with λ0
being the least inaccessible below κ, λα+1 being the least inaccessible cardinal in
(λα, κ), and λγ being the least inaccessible cardinal in [supα<γ λα, κ) for γ < κ a
limit ordinal. These exist by regularity of κ and since a cardinal λ < κ is inacces-
sible iff Hκ |= pλ is inaccessibleq by Σ1-reflection. 
Next, we move a handful of steps up the large hierarchy ladder and introduce
the weakly compact cardinals. These have a multitude of different equivalent
definitions which we will not cover here, but instead define them in terms of a
combinatorial colouring relation. We need a definition.
Definition 1.11. For any function f : A → B, a subset H ⊆ A is homogeneous
for f if f H is a constant function. ◦
We may think of f in the above Definition 1.11 as being a colouring function that
colours elements of A in colours taken from B. For H ⊆ A to be homogeneous
would then mean that everything in H has the same colour.
Definition 1.12. An uncountable cardinal κ is weakly compact if to every function
f : [κ]2 → {0, 1} there is a H ⊆ [κ]2 of size κ which is homogeneous for f . ◦
Again, thinking in terms of colourings, κ is weakly compact if whenever we colour
pairs of ordinals below κ in two colours, then we can find a large (i.e. of size κ) set
of such pairs all of the same colour.
The following result then shows that the weakly compact cardinals are indeed
stronger than the inaccessibles:
Theorem 1.13 (Erdős-Tarski; [Jech, 2006] 9.9). Every weakly compact cardinal is
a limit of inaccessible cardinals. 
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Moving a tiny step further, we introduce two strengthenings of the weakly compacts:
the ineffables and the completely ineffables.
Definition 1.14. An uncountable cardinal κ is ineffable if there to any function
f : [κ]2 → 2 exists a stationary H ⊆ [κ]2 which is homogeneous for f . ◦
Ineffable cardinals are weakly compact by definition, and the following theorem
from [Friedman, 2001] shows that they are strictly stronger:
Theorem 1.15 (Friedman). Ineffable cardinals are weakly compact limits of weakly
compacts. 
A way of improving ineffability is to “close under homogeneity”, in the sense that
if H is homogeneous for f : [κ]2 → 2 and g : [H]2 → 2 is any function, then there
is a subset of H which is homogeneous for g. To formalise this notion we use the
concept of a stationary class.
Definition 1.16. For X any set, a set R ⊆P(X) is a stationary class if
• R 6= ∅;
• Every A ∈ R is a stationary subset of X ;
• If A ∈ R and B ⊇ A then B ∈ R. ◦
Definition 1.17. An uncountable cardinal κ is completely ineffable if there is a
stationary class R ⊆ P(κ) such that for every A ∈ R and f : [A]2 → 2 there
exists a H ∈ R which is homogeneous for f . ◦
As suspected, these completely ineffable cardinals are indeed strictly stronger than
the ineffables, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 1.18 ([Abramson et al., 1977]). Completely ineffable cardinals are ineffa-
ble limits of ineffable cardinals. 
The next kind of large cardinal involves elementary embeddings. To motivate the
definition we note the following characterisation of the weakly compact cardinals:
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Theorem 1.19 ([Hauser, 1991]). An uncountable cardinal κ is weakly compact if
and only if for every A ⊆ κ there exist weak κ-modelsM,N with A ∈ M and
an elementary embedding π : M→N with critπ = κ. 
We would arrive at a natural strengthening of this characterisation if we require
more agreement betweenM and N , leading to the following definition:
Definition 1.20 ([Gitman, 2011]). An uncountable cardinal κ is 1-iterable if to every
subset A ⊆ κ there exists a weak κ-modelM such that A ∈ M and there exists
a weakly amenableM-measure µ on κ such that Ult(M, µ) is wellfounded. ◦
In the same paper, Gitman shows that these large cardinals are indeed consistency-
wise stronger than the completely ineffables.
Theorem 1.21 ([Gitman, 2011]). Every 1-iterable cardinal is a limit of completely
ineffable cardinals. 
Lastly, the Ramsey cardinals are natural strengthenings of the weakly compacts.
Definition 1.22. An uncountable cardinal κ is Ramsey if there to every function
f : [κ]<ω → {0, 1} exists a subset H ⊆ [κ]<ω such that, for every n < ω, H ∩ [κ]n
is homogeneous for f [κ]n. ◦
See Figure 1.1 for an overview of all the large cardinals covered in this section.
1.3.2 Large large cardinals
Moving on to the higher reaches of the large cardinals, these are more uniformly
defined and all involve elementary embeddings. Our first type of large large car-
dinal is the measurable cardinal, being the first cardinal witnessing an elementary
embedding from the entire universe. We formalise this in GBC, defined in Section
1.2.
Definition 1.23 (GBC). An uncountable cardinal κ is measurable if there exists a
transitive classM and an elementary embedding j : (V,∈)→ (M,∈) with critical
point κ. ◦
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The measurable cardinals were the first cardinals shown to “transcend” Gödel’s
constructible universe L.2 This was proven by Dana Scott and has now become
known as Scott’s Theorem.3
Theorem 1.24 (Scott’s Theorem; [Kanamori, 2008] 5.5). L, Gödel’s constructible
universe, has no measurable cardinals. 
Given this result, it is not surprising that the measurables then exceed the strength
of the previous large cardinals.
Proposition 1.25. Measurable cardinals are completely ineffable limits of com-
pletely ineffable cardinals.
Proof. (Sketch) If j : V → M is a non-trivial elementary embedding then the
derived ultrafilter µ ⊆ P(κ) on κ := crit j is defined as X ∈ µ iff κ ∈ j(X).
Section 5 in [Kanamori, 2008] shows that it is indeed an ultrafilter and that its ul-
trapower Ult(V, µ) is wellfounded. A reflection argument then shows that we can
simply take R := µ. 
Moving even further, we strengthen the definition of measurable cardinals to arrive
at the strong cardinals.
Definition 1.26 (GBC). An uncountable cardinal κ is strong if there to every cardi-
nal θ > κ exists a transitive classMθ satisfying that Hθ ⊆Mθ , and an elementary
jθ : (V,∈) → (Mθ,∈) with critical point κ. We say that κ is θ-strong if the
property holds for a specific θ. ◦
Proposition 1.27 (Gaifman, [Kanamori, 2008] 26.6). Strong cardinals are measur-
able limits of measurable cardinals. 
One property of the strong cardinals that we will get back to in the next subsection
and which will be important in Chapter 2 is the following:
2For more information about L, see e.g. [Schindler, 2014]
3The measurables are not the weakest large cardinals with this property, however. For instance,
the Ramsey cardinals enjoy this property too, but none of the other large cardinals described in the
previous subsection enjoys this property.
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Proposition 1.28 ([Kanamori, 2008] 26.7). If j : V →Mθ witnesses that κ := crit j
is a θ-strong cardinal then j(κ) > θ. 
We can strengthen the strongs even more by requiring sequence closure rather than
only containing an initial segment of the universe.
Definition 1.29 (GBC). An uncountable cardinal κ is supercompact if there to
every cardinal θ > κ exists a transitive classMθ satisfying that <θMθ ⊆Mθ , and
an elementary jθ : (V,∈)→ (Mθ,∈) with critical point κ. ◦
To get an intuition of why the sequence closure is a lot more powerful, note that
bits of the elementary embedding itself are now elements ofMθ , so thatMθ can
now start reasoning about large cardinals and, jθ being elementary, these facts will
then be carried back into the universe. Here is an example of such an argument.
Proposition 1.30. If κ is supercompact then
Vκ |= pThere exists a proper class of strong cardinalsq. (1)
Proof. (Sketch) By noting that the restrictions of the supercompact embedding is
an element of the target model by supercompactness, κ is strong up to j(κ) in the
target model, so that a reflection argument shows (1). 
[Magidor, 1971] introduced the following equivalent definition of supercompact-
ness4:
Definition 1.31. A cardinal κ is supercompact iff for every regular θ > κ there is
a θ̄ < κ and an elementary embedding π : Hθ̄ → Hθ with π(critπ) = κ. ◦
Another way of strengthening the strong cardinals is by restricting the behaviour of
what the elementary embedding can do on certain sets.
Definition 1.32. Let A be any (potentially proper) class. An uncountable cardinal
κ is A-strong if there to every cardinal θ > κ exists a transitive classMθ satisfying
4See Theorem 22.10 in [Kanamori, 2008] for a proof.
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that Hθ ⊆ Mθ , and an elementary jθ : (V,∈) → (Mθ,∈) with critical point κ,
such that A ∩Hθ = j(A) ∩Hθ .5 ◦
These A-strong cardinals are not used much in practice, but the following Woodin
cardinals are immensely useful and can be seen as a “local” version of a proper
class of A-strongs for every class A:
Definition 1.33. An uncountable cardinal δ is a Woodin cardinal if there to every
subset A ⊆ Hδ exists a cardinal κ < δ such that (Hδ,∈, A) |= pκ is A-strongq. ◦
Woodin cardinals can equivalently be defined in terms of functions instead of the
A-strong cardinals.
Theorem 1.34 (Woodin; [Kanamori, 2008] 26.14). The following are equivalent for
an uncountable cardinal κ:
(i) κ is a Woodin cardinal;
(ii) For any f : κ → κ there exists α < κ such that f [α] ⊆ α, a transitiveM
with Vj(f)(α) ⊆ M and an elementary embedding j : (V,∈) → (M,∈)
with crit j = κ.
Our last large cardinal in this section is ostensibly completely different from the
others. It originates from category theory, and according to [Pudlak, 2013] was orig-
inally proposed by Petr Vopěnka as a “bogus large cardinal property” which he
believed was inconsistent with ZFC, but a proof of this never appeared.
Definition 1.35 (GBC). Vopěnka’s Principle (VP) postulates that to any first-order
language L and proper class C of L-structures, there exist distinctM,N ∈ C and
an elementary embedding j : M→N . ◦
Definition 1.36. An uncountable cardinal δ is Vopěnka if (Vδ,∈;Vδ+1) |= VP. ◦
Perlmutter showed that the Woodin- and Vopěnka cardinals are closely connected,
with Woodin cardinals relating to Vopěnka cardinals in the same way that strong
cardinals relate to supercompacts.
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Theorem 1.37 ([Perlmutter, 2015]). Vopěnka cardinals are equivalent to cardinals
δ that are “Woodin for supercompactness”, meaning that to any subset A ⊆ Hδ
there is a cardinal κ < δ with (Hδ,∈, A) |= pκ is A-supercompactq.6 
See Figure 1.1 for an overview of all the large cardinals covered in this section.
1.3.3 Inconsistent large cardinals
In these highest reaches of the large cardinal hierarchy we encounter large cardinals
whose existence are inconsistent with ZFC. The reason why these are still interest-
ing to us is because none of them have yet been proven inconsistent with ZF. The
first such cardinal is the following:
Definition 1.38 (GBC). An uncountable cardinal κ is a Reinhardt cardinal if there
exists an elementary embedding j : (V,∈)→ (V,∈) with crit j = κ. ◦
This was shown to be inconsistent in [Kunen, 1971].
Theorem 1.39 (Kunen inconsistency; GBC; [Kanamori, 2008] 23.12). There is no
non-trivial elementary j : (Vλ+2,∈) → (Vλ+2,∈) for any uncountable cardinal
λ. In particular, there is no Reinhardt cardinal.
The proof of Proposition 1.28, which stated that j(κ) > θ always holds for strong
cardinals κ, relies heavily on the Kunen inconsistency. When we are going to
deal with the virtual large cardinals in Chapter 2 we do not have such a Kunen
inconsistency and we will show that in that case the property j(κ) > θ is a highly
non-trivial assumption.
There is also the following strengthening of the Reinhardts, in analogy with the
strong cardinals:
Definition 1.40. An uncountable cardinal κ is super Reinhardt if for all ordinals
λ there exists an elementary embedding j : (V,∈) → (V,∈) with crit j = κ and
j(κ) > λ. ◦
6Here κ is, in analogy with Definition 1.32, A-supercompact if there to every cardinal θ > κ
exists a transitive classMθ , closed under <θ-sequences, and an elementary jθ : (V,∈)→ (Mθ,∈)
with critical point κ, such that A ∩Hθ = j(A) ∩Hθ .
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We can improve this even further by defining a notion corresponding to Woodin
cardinals. If we define κ to be A-super Reinhardt for a class A to be a super
Reinhardt cardinal with
⋃
α∈On j(A ∩ Vα) = A, in analogy with the A-strong
cardinals, then we define the totally Reinhardts as follows.
Definition 1.41. An inaccessible cardinal κ is totally Reinhardt if for eachA ⊆ Vκ
it holds that
(Vκ,∈;Vκ+1) |= pThere exists an A-super Reinhardt cardinalq. ◦
The last large cardinals that we will introduce are the Berkeley cardinals. These
were introduced by Woodin at University of California, Berkeley around 1992. Sim-
ilar to the Vopěnka cardinals, these were introduced as a large cardinal candidate
that would “clearly” be inconsistent with ZF, but such as result has not yet been
found. They imply the Kunen inconsistency and are therefore at least inconsistent
with ZFC, but that is as far as it currently goes.
We start with a preliminary definition.
Definition 1.42 (GB). An uncountable cardinal δ is a proto-Berkeley cardinal if
to every transitive setM such that δ ⊆ M there exists an elementary embedding
j : (M,∈)→ (M,∈) with crit j < δ. ◦
To see that these indeed imply the Kunen inconsistency, note that we in particular
get an elementary embedding π : Vγ+2 → Vγ+2, which is inconsistent by Corollary
23.14 in [Kanamori, 2008].
Note that if κ is a proto-Berkeley cardinal then every λ > κ is also proto-
Berkeley, which makes it quite an uninteresting notion. But we can isolate the
interesting cases, leading to the definition of a Berkeley cardinal.
Theorem 1.43 ([Cutolo, 2017] 2.1.14). If δ0 is the least proto-Berkeley cardinal then
we can choose the critical point of the embedding to be arbitrarily large below δ0.

As this property is clearly not preserved upwards, this makes for a good candidate
for the large cardinal notion.
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Figure 1.1: A subset of the large cardinal hierarchy, with lines indicating relative
consistency implications.
Definition 1.44 (GB). A proto-Berkeley cardinal δ is Berkeley if we can choose the
critical point of the embedding to be arbitrarily large below δ. If we furthermore
can choose the critical point as an element of any club C ⊆ δ then we say that δ is
club Berkeley. ◦
In [Cutolo, 2017], the author furthermore mention that, among the above-mentioned
cardinals, the non-trivial relative consistency implications currently known are the
following:
Theorem 1.45 ([Cutolo, 2017] 2.2.1). Berkeley cardinals are consistency-wise strictly
stronger than Reinhardt cardinals. 
Theorem 1.46 ([Cutolo, 2017] 2.2.2). Club Berkeley cardinals are consistency-wise
strictly stronger than super Reinhardt cardinals. 
See Figure 1.1 for an overview of all the large cardinals covered in this section.
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1.4 Core model theory
As we will be utilising the core model at various points throughout this thesis, we
give here an idea of what we mean by the core model. A convenient feature of core
model theory is that most of the technical details regarding the construction is not
needed for applications; it suffices to know only its abstract properties. That being
said, we will provide a glimpse of the construction at the end of this section. To see
the full construction we refer the interested reader to [Nielsen, 2016], [Zeman, 2001]
and [Jensen and Steel, 2013].
1.4.1 The core model K
The core model7 K of a universe is roughly speaking the subuniverse that strikes
a balance between retaining the complexity of the universe while being as simple
as possible. The problem is then making all of this precise. Some aspects of the
definition is agreed upon by most researchers:
(i) We choose to define the complexity of a universe by its large cardinal struc-
ture. This is based on the empirical fact that large cardinals seem to capture
the strength of every “naturally defined” hypothesis, and gives us a convenient
yard stick. For instance, a universe containing a measurable cardinal is more
complex than L, as Scott’s Theorem 1.24 shows that L cannot contain any
measurable cardinals (or any large cardinals stronger than measurables);
(ii) We further postulate that L is the simplest universe there is, and the sim-
plicity of a universe should therefore be measured in terms of how much it
resembles L. We will be more precise about what it means to “resemble L”
below, but with this intuitive notion is should at least be clear that, say, L is
simpler than L[µ].
Even though (i) captures what we mean by complexity, it leaves much to be desired.
For instance, as the structure of the large cardinal hierarchy can only be verified
empirically, we might end up in an unfortunate situation where we simply do not
know whether a given universe is more complex than another one8. The famous
example of this is the current situation with the superstrong and strongly compact
7K is short for Kern, meaning core in German.
8It might also be the case that the large cardinal hierarchy is not linear at all.
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cardinals, that we simply do not know which one is stronger9. Thus, given a
universe whose strength corresponds to that of a strongly compact and another one
at the level of superstrongs, we would not be able to say which one is more complex.
To remedy this situation, we choose instead to define the complexity of a uni-
verse in terms of an intermediate property. A universe satisfying this property
should then entail that it inherits the large cardinal structure of its surrounding uni-
verse. All the intermediate properties currently being used are all instances of a
general phenomenon called covering. The intuitive idea is that every set in the uni-
verse can be “approximated” by a set in the subuniverse, and arose from a seminal
theorem of Jensen, see [Schindler, 2014, 11.56], stating that 0] exists if and only if
strong covering fails for L, defined as follows.
Definition 1.47 (Jensen). We say that strong covering holds for universes U ⊆ V
if to every α < o(V) and X ∈PV(α) with CardV(X) ≥ ℵV1 there exists A ∈ U
such that X ⊆ A and CardV(X) = CardV(A). ◦
We can then interpret Jensen’s result as saying that, if the complexity of the sur-
rounding universe V is below the strength of 0] then L is a good candidate for K .
In a complex universe we would therefore be looking for the core model among
subuniverses more complex than L, and it turns out that also requiring strong cov-
ering to hold in such models is too much to ask; the current definition of covering
has thus been weakened to the following:
Definition 1.48. We say that (weak) covering holds for universes U ⊆ V if
cofV(α+U ) = CardV(α+U ) holds for any ordinal α with α+U ≥ ℵV2 . ◦
This statement might seem very distant from the strong version, but one can think of
weak covering as saying that U “knows” the true cofinality of its successor cardinals
κ ≥ ℵV2 within the error margin ε := κ+U − CardV(κ+U ). More concretely, we
could equivalently define weak covering as U containing all cofinal maps f : γ → κ
in V for every γ ∈ CardV(κ), making it closer in spirit to the strong covering
property.
9Although the general consensus is that the strongly compact cardinals should be equiconsistent
with the supercompacts, making them stronger than the superstrongs.
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Figure 1.2: Weak covering property
When it comes to (ii) we have to define what we mean by “resembling L”.
Ultimately this boils down to the current working definition of a mouse and is still
a work in progress. If our universe is no more complex than the strength of a
Woodin cardinal however, then we know what the correct definition of a mouse is,
and hence also what “resembling L” would mean in this context. The definition of
mice along with the assumption of covering then turns out to imply that the core
model will indeed inherit the large cardinal strength of the universe10.
To construct the core model one could then take a bottom-up approach, starting
with L and then carefully include the complexity of the universe while remaining
similar to L11. Alternatively, a top-down approach would be to define a structure
which has all the complexity of the universe, and then showing that this structure
indeed exhibits these L-like properties12.
10To show this one first uses covering to show thatK is universal, i.e. that it wins every coiteration.
With universality at hand, a comparison argument with any L[ ~E]-model containing a large cardinal
will then show that K will have an inner model with the large cardinal in question.
11This strategy has a long history and current leading figures following it are Steel and Sargsyan.
12Woodin is pursuing this path.
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1.4.2 Constructing K
The standard construction of K takes the bottom-up approach. The first step to-
wards this is the construction ofKc,13 which we build by recursion on the ordinals.
We start with Kc0 := ∅ and at every successor ordinal α we do one of two things:
(i) If there exists a “nice” extender indexed at α then we put it onto the extender
sequence of C(Kcα), where C(X) is the transitive collapse of a certain hull of
X ;14
(ii) Otherwise we let Kcα := J (C(Kcα−1)), with J (x) := rud(trcl(x ∪ {x}))
being the usual operator we use to build L with Jensen’s hierarchy.
In other words, we are essentially building L with extenders attached onto it in a
canonical fashion. Taking cores at every step will ensure that the initial segments
will be sound, which ultimately is what guarantees iterability of Kc. The fact that
we put on all the relevant extenders from V is what will ensure the covering prop-
erty of the model. It turns out that Kc is not exactly what we want however, as it
relies too much on the surrounding universe, in contrast with L whose construction
procedure builds the exact same model in every universe. To attain this canonicity
we are again taking certain “thick” hulls of Kc (again, think of it as removing the
noise). The resulting construction almost gives us what we want and is dubbed
pseudo-K. The problem with this is that the technicalities of the construction uses
certain properties of a fixed cardinal Ω, so to build the true core model we “glue”
these pseudo-K’s together.
The takeaway here is that whenever we are working with an initial segment
of K then that segment will be built using the recursive steps (i) and (ii) above,
carefully including extenders from V . For more details, see [Jensen and Steel, 2013]
or [Nielsen, 2016].
1.4.3 Properties of K
In terms of applications of core model theory, the properties of K are usually
what matters. We touched on the weak covering property above, but for com-
pleteness we state most of the properties usually employed when working with K .
13The “c” stands for certified, as the extenders we put on the sequence was historically called
certified extenders.
14Think of C(X) as “removing the noise of X”.
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In [Jensen and Steel, 2013] they isolate a set of properties of K which leads them to
define K as the structure satisfying the conjunction of these properties. These are
as follows.15
(i) K is a transitive proper class premouse satisfying ZFC;
(ii) K is Σ2-definable;
(iii) K has a Σ2-definable iteration strategy Σ;
(iv) K is generically absolute, meaning that KV = KV [g] and ΣV [g] V = ΣV
for any V -generic filter g ⊆ P for a set-sized forcing notion P;
(v) K is inductively defined, meaning that K|ωV1 is Σ1-definable over Jω1(R);
(vi) K satisfies weak covering as in Definition 1.48.
On top of these properties, we will also employ the following property, which is
proven in Lemmata 7.3.7–7.3.9 and 8.3.4 in [Zeman, 2001]:
Theorem 1.49 (Zeman). Assume 0¶ does not exist. If µ is a countably complete
weakly amenable K-measure then µ ∈ K . 
1.4.4 Coiterations of mice
One of the crucial lemmata in the theory of mice, of whichK is a special case, is the
comparison lemma. Intuitively, it says that any two miceM,N can be compared,
in the sense that we can transformM andN into new mice M̂ and N̂ , respectively,
such that either M̂ is an initial segment of N̂ or vice versa. Such a transformation
is called a coiteration, which can be thought of as being successive applications
of measures in the mice, forming iterative ultrapowers. For more details regarding
mice and coiterations, see [Steel, 2010] or [Nielsen, 2016].
Lemma 1.50 (Comparison lemma). Let θ be an uncountable regular cardinal or
θ = On. LetM and N be sound mice of size ≤ θ. Then there are iterations T
and U ofM and N having last models M̂ and N̂ , respectively, such that either
(i) M̂E N̂ and there is an elementary embedding π : M→ M̂; or
(ii) N̂ E M̂ and there is an elementary embedding π : N → N̂ . 
15See [Steel, 2010] for definitions of premice, iteration trees and iteration strategies.
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1.5 Forcing lemmata
In this section we will cover a few results that we will need when working with
elementary embeddings in different forcing extensions. These are the lifting crite-
rion, which characterises when we can lift an elementary embedding to a forcing
extension, countable embedding absoluteness, which allows us to “transfer” ele-
mentary embeddings from one forcing extension to another, and lastly a result that
gives a sufficient condition for preserving sequence closure when moving to generic
extensions.
1.5.1 Lifting criterion
When we are working with an elementary embedding π : M→ N between sets
in the universe, we would sometimes like to lift such an embedding to a generic
extension, meaning that given a forcing notion P ∈ M and anM-generic g ⊆ P,
we are interested in when we can lift π to an embedding
π+ : M[g]→ N [h],
where h ⊆ π(P) is N -generic. The lifting criterion shows exactly when this is
possible.
Proposition 1.51 (The Lifting Criterion; [Cummings, 2010] 9.1). Let π : M→ N
be an elementary embedding between weak κ-models. Fix a forcing notion P ∈
M, anM-generic g ⊆ P and an N -generic h ⊆ π(P). Then the following are
equivalent:
(i) π[g] ⊆ h;
(ii) There exists an elementary π+ : M[g]→ N [h] such that π+(g) = h and
π+ M = π.
Proof. (ii) ⇒ (i) is clear, so assume (i). Define π+ : M[g] → N [h] as
π+(τ̇ g) := π(τ)h. To see that π+ is well-defined fix σ̇, τ̇ ∈MP such that σ̇g = τ̇ g ,
and fix p ∈ g such that p σ̇ = τ̇ . By elementarity π(p)π(σ̇) = π(τ̇), so since
π(p) ∈ h by (i) we get that π(σ̇)h = π(τ̇)h.
To show elementarity, note that for x ∈M it holds that π(x̌) = ˇπ(x), implying
π+(x) = π+(x̌g) = π(x̌)h = π(x). Further, letting ġ ∈ MP be the standard P-
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name for g, then π(ġ) is the standard π(P)-name for h and therefore π+(g) = h. 
1.5.2 Countable embedding absoluteness
A key folklore lemma which we will frequently need when dealing with elementary
embeddings existing in generic extensions is the following:
Lemma 1.52 (Countable Embedding Absoluteness). LetM,N be sets, P a transitive
class withM,N ∈ P , and let π : M→N be an elementary embedding. Assume
that P |= ZF− + DC + pM is countableq and fix any finite X ⊆M.
Then P contains an elementary embedding π∗ : M→N which agrees with
π on X . If π has a critical point and ifM is transitive then we can also assume
that critπ = critπ∗.16
Proof. Let {ai | i < ω} ∈ P be an enumeration ofM and set
M n := {ai | i < n}.
Then, in P , build the tree T of all partial isomorphisms betweenM n and N for
n < ω, agreeing with π on X , ordered by extension. Then T is illfounded in V by
assumption, so it is also illfounded in P since P is transitive and P |= ZF− + DC.
The branch then gives us the embedding π∗, and if critπ exists then we can ensure
that it agrees with π on the critical point and finitely many values by adding these
conditions to T . 
The following proposition is an almost immediate corollary of Countable Embed-
ding Absoluteness:
Proposition 1.53. LetM andN be transitive models and assume that there is a
generic elementary embedding π :M→N . Then V Col(ω,M) has an elementary
embedding π∗ :M→ N which agrees with π on any desired finite set and has
the same critical point if it exists. 
16We are using transitivity ofM to ensure that the ordinal critπ exists.
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1.5.3 Preservation of sequence closure
The following lemma is from [Lücke and Schlicht, 2014] and gives a useful condition
on when sequence closure is preserved when moving to generic extensions:
Lemma 1.54. Let λ be an infinite cardinal,M |= ZF− a transitive model, P ∈M
a λ+-cc forcing notion and g ⊆ P an M-generic filter. Then V |= λM ⊆ M
implies that V [g] |= λM⊆M.
Proof. Work in V [g]. Let c := 〈cα | α < λ〉 be a λ-sequence such that
cα ∈ M[g] for every α < λ. Fix for every α < λ a P-name ċα such that ċgα = cα.
Also let ȧ be a P-name with ȧg = 〈ċα | α < λ〉 and choose p ∈ g such that
V |= pp ∀α < λ̌ : ȧ(α) ∈MPq.
Now, working in V , there is for each α < λ a maximal antichain Aα below p
such that every q ∈ Aα decides ȧ(α); i.e., qpȧ(α) = x̌q for some x ∈M. Define
now
σ := {((α, x), q) | α ∈ λ ∧ q ∈ Aα ∧ qpȧ(α) = x̌q}.
Then ppσ = ȧq. Note that |σ| ≤ λ, since |Aα| ≤ λ for each α < λ. Thus
σ ∈M. Now it holds that
V [g] |= p〈ċα | α < λ〉 = ȧg = σg ∈M[g]q,
and we can compute c = 〈cα | α < λ〉 = 〈ċgα | α < λ〉 from 〈ċα | α < λ〉 and g,
so c ∈M[g] by Replacement. 
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2 | Virtual large cardinals
In this chapter we investigate the properties of virtual versions of well-known large
cardinals, including measurables, strongs, supercompacts, Woodins and Vopěnkas.
This entails firstly analysing the relationships between them, and secondly looking
at more general properties in terms of their behaviour in core models as well as
their indestructibility. This virtual perspective also allows us to analyse virtualised
versions of large cardinals that are otherwise inconsistent with ZFC, such as the
Berkeley cardinals.
2.1 Strongs & supercompacts
We start out with measurables, strongs and supercompacts. Their (non-virtual)
definitions can be found in Section 1.3.
Definition 2.1. For θ a regular uncountable cardinal, a cardinal κ < θ is...
• faintly θ-measurable if, in a forcing extension of V , there is a transitive set
N and an elementary embedding π : HVθ → N with critπ = κ;
• faintly θ-strong if, in a forcing extension of V , there is a transitive setN with
HVθ ⊆ N and an elementary embedding π : HVθ → N with critπ = κ;
• faintly θ-supercompact if, in a forcing extension of V , there is a transitive
set N with <θN ∩ V ⊆ N and an elementary embedding π : HVθ → N
with critπ = κ.
We further replace “faintly” by virtually when N ⊆ V , we attach a “pre” if we
do not assume that π(κ) > θ, and we will leave out θ when it holds for all regular
θ > κ. ◦
As a quick example of this terminology, a faintly prestrong cardinal is a cardinal κ
such that for all regular θ > κ, κ is faintly θ-measurable with HVθ ⊆ N .
Observe that whenever we have a virtual large cardinal that has its defining
property for all regular θ, we can assume that the target of the embedding is an
element of the ground model V and not just a subset of V . Suppose, for instance,
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that κ is virtually measurable and fix a regular θ > κ and set λ := (2<θ)+. Take
a generic elementary embedding π : Hλ → Mλ witnessing that κ is virtually
λ-measurable.
Since |Hθ| = 2<θ it holds that Hθ ∈ Hλ, so that the restriction π Hθ : Hθ →
π(Hθ) witnesses that κ is virtually θ-measurable, and the target model Mθ :=
π(Hθ) is in V becauseMλ ⊆ V by assumption. Thus, the weaker assumption that
the target model is a subset of the ground model only affects level-by-level virtual
large cardinals. Indeed, as we will see in later sections, for virtually strong cardinals
we may even further weaken the assumption thatMθ ⊆ V to Hθ = HMθθ (we do
not know whether this holds level-by-level).
We note that even small cardinals can be faintly measurable: we may for in-
stance have a precipitous ideal on ω1; see [Jech, 2006, Theorem 22.33]. The “virtu-
ally” adverb further implies that the cardinals are large cardinals in the usual sense,
as Proposition 2.2 below shows.
Proposition 2.2 (Virtualised folklore). For any regular uncountable cardinal θ,
every virtually θ-measurable cardinal is 1-iterable1 (in particular, inaccessible).
Proof. Let κ be virtually θ-measurable, witnessed by a forcing P, a transitive
N ⊆ V and an elementary π : HVθ → N with π ∈ V P. If κ is not a strong limit
then we have a surjection π(f) : P(α) → π(κ) with ranπ(f) = ran f ⊆ κ for
some α < κ,  . Note that we used N ⊆ V to ensure that P(α)V = P(α)N .
The same argument shows that κ is regular. By restricting the generic embedding
and using that P(κ)V = P(κ)N as N ⊆ V and P(κ)V ⊆ N , we get that κ is
1-iterable. 
Along with the above definition of faint supercompactness we can also virtualise
Magidor’s characterisation of supercompact cardinals2, which was one of the orig-
inal characterisations of the remarkable cardinals in [Schindler, 2000a].
1See Section 1.3 for a definition of the 1-iterable cardinals.
2See Section 1.3 for a definition of the non-virtual version of this characterisation.
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Definition 2.3. Let θ be a regular uncountable cardinal. Then κ < θ is virtually
θ-Magidor-supercompact if there are cardinals θ̄ < κ and κ̄ < θ̄, and a generic
elementary π : HV
θ̄
→ HVθ such that critπ = κ̄ and π(κ̄) = κ. ◦
[Gitman and Schindler, 2018] observed that remarkable cardinals are precisely the
virtually supercompacts. Surprisingly, they are also precisely the virtually strongs,
which in turn makes virtually strongs and virtually supercompacts equivalent. The
proofs of these equivalences were omitted in [Gitman and Schindler, 2018], so we
give proofs of these here. These are not the original proofs, however, but a slight
improvement that allows us to get a more fine-grained level-wise corollary  see
Remark 2.5.
Theorem 2.4 ([Gitman and Schindler, 2018]). For an uncountable cardinal κ, the
following are equivalent:
(i) κ is virtually strong;
(ii) κ is virtually supercompact;
(iii) κ is virtually Magidor-supercompact.
Proof. (ii)⇒ (i) is simply by definition.
(i) ⇒ (iii): Fix θ > κ. By (i) there exists a generic elementary embedding
π : HV
(2<θ)+
→ M with3 critπ = κ, π(κ) > θ, HV
(2<θ)+
⊆ M and M ⊆ V .
Since HVθ , HMπ(θ) ∈ M, Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 implies that M
has a generic elementary embedding π∗ : HVθ → HMπ(θ) with critπ
∗ = κ and
π∗(κ) = π(κ) > θ. Since HVθ = HMθ as M ⊆ V and HVθ ⊆ M, elementarity
of π now implies that HV
(2<θ)+
has cardinals θ̄ < κ and κ̄ < θ̄, and a generic
elementary σ : HV
θ̄
→ HVθ with critσ = κ̄ and σ(κ̄) = κ. This shows (iii).
(iii) ⇒ (ii): Fix θ > κ and set δ := (2<θ)+. By (iii) there exist cardinals
δ̄ < κ and κ̄ < δ̄, and a generic elementary embedding π : HV
δ̄
→ HVδ with
critπ = κ̄ and π(κ̄) = κ. We will argue that κ̄ is virtually θ̄-supercompact in HV
δ̄
,
so that by elementarity κ is virtually θ-supercompact in HVδ and hence also in V
by the choice of δ. Consider the restriction
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Note that HVθ is closed under <θ̄-sequences (and more) in V . Now define
X := θ̄+1 ∪ {x ∈ HVθ | ∃y ∈ HVθ̄ ∃p ∈ Col(ω,H
V
θ̄ ) : p σ̇(y̌) = x̌} ∈ V.
Note that |X| =
∣∣HV
θ̄
∣∣ = 2<θ̄ and that ranσ ⊆ X . Now let M ≺ HVθ be such
that X ⊆M andM is closed under <θ̄-sequences. Note that we can find such an
M of size (2<θ̄)<θ̄ = 2<θ̄ . LetM be the transitive collapse ofM, so thatM is still




Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 then implies that HV
δ̄
has a generic
elementary embedding σ∗ : HV
θ̄
→Mwith critσ∗ = κ̄, showing that κ̄ is virtually
θ̄-supercompact in HV
δ̄
, which is what we wanted to show. 
Remark 2.5. As mentioned above, the proof in fact shows something stronger: if
κ is virtually (2<θ)+-strong then it is virtually θ-supercompact, and if it is virtu-
ally (2<θ)+-Magidor-supercompact then it is virtually θ-supercompact. It is open
whether these notions are equivalent level-by-level (see Question 5.1).
As a corollary of the proof, we obtain the following weaker characterization of vir-
tually strong cardinals:
Proposition 2.6. A cardinal κ is virtually strong if and only if for every θ > κ
there is a forcing extension, in which there is a transitive setN and an elementary
embedding π : Hθ → N with critπ = κ and Hθ = HNθ . 
A key difference between the normal large cardinals and the virtual kinds is that we
do not have a virtual version of the Kunen inconsistency4: it is perfectly possible
to have a generic elementary embedding HVθ → HVθ with θ much larger than the
critical point, and thus in particular also the image of the critical point. Here is an
example of such a virtualised Kunen inconsistency.
4See Section 1.3 for a definition of the Kunen inconsistency.
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Proposition 2.7 (Folklore). If 0] exists then there are inaccessible cardinals κ < θ
such that, in a generic extension of L, there is an elementary embedding
π : Lθ → Lθ.
In other words, π witnesses a strong failure of the virtualised Kunen inconsistency.
Proof. From 0] we get an elementary embedding j : L → L. Let C ⊆ On
be the proper class club of limit points of j above crit j, which then contains
an L-inaccessible cardinal θ as there are stationarily many such. Restrict j to
π := j Lθ : Lθ → N and note that N = Lθ by condensation of L and be-
cause θ is a limit point of j. Let κ := critπ. Now an application of Countable
Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 shows that a generic extension of L contains an ele-
mentary embedding π̃ : Lθ → Lθ with crit π̃ = κ. 
This becomes important when dealing with the “pre”-versions of the large cardinals.
We next move to a virtualisation of the α-superstrong cardinals.
Definition 2.8. Let θ be a regular uncountable cardinal and α an ordinal. Then a
cardinal κ < θ is faintly (θ, α)-superstrong if it is faintly θ-measurable, HVθ ⊆ N
and πα(κ) ≤ θ.5 We replace “faintly” by virtually when N ⊆ V , we say that κ is
faintly α-superstrong if it is faintly (θ, α)-superstrong for some θ, and κ is simply
faintly superstrong if it is faintly 1-superstrong.6 ◦
As in the non-virtual case, the virtually superstrongs surpass the virtually strongs in
consistency strength. This then also implies that the superstrongs are stronger than
the virtually supercompacts, which is not the case outside the virtual world.
Proposition 2.9 (N.). If κ is faintly superstrong then Hκ has a proper class of
virtually strong cardinals, and thus also a proper class of virtually supercompact
cardinals.
5Here π1 = π, πα+1 = π ◦ πα and πα(κ) = supξ<α πξ(κ) when α is a limit ordinal.
6Note that the conventions stated here are different from the ones in Definition 2.1.
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Proof. Fix a regular θ > κ and a generic embedding π : HVθ → N with
critπ = κ, HVθ ⊆ N and π(κ) ≤ θ. Then π(κ) is a V -cardinal, so that HVπ(κ)
thinks that κ is virtually strong. This implies that HVκ thinks there is a proper class
of virtually strong cardinals, using that HVκ ≺ HVπ(κ). 
The following theorem and its subsequent corollaries then show that the only thing
stopping prestrongness from being equivalent to strongness is the existence of vir-
tualised Kunen inconsistencies:
Theorem 2.10 (N.). Let θ be an uncountable cardinal. Then a cardinal κ < θ is
virtually θ-prestrong iff either
(i) κ is virtually θ-strong; or
(ii) κ is virtually (θ, ω)-superstrong.
Proof. (⇐) is trivial, so we show (⇒). Let κ be virtually θ-prestrong. Assume (i)
fails, meaning that there is a generic elementary embedding π : Hθ → N for some
transitive N ⊆ V with Hθ ⊆ N , critπ = κ and π(κ) ≤ θ.
First, assume that there is some n < ω such that πn(κ) = θ. The proof of
Proposition 2.9 shows that κ is virtually strong in Hπ(κ). It follows that π(κ) is
virtually strong in Hπ2(κ) by elementarity, and by applying elementarity repeatedly
we get that πn(κ) = θ is virtually strong in N . Note that the condition πn(κ) = θ
implies that θ is inaccessible in N , and hence a limit cardinal there.
In particular, θ is virtually δ := (θ+)N -strong in N , so that N has a generic el-
ementary embedding σ : HNδ → M with critσ = θ and HVθ ⊆ HNδ ⊆ M.
Thus, HVθ ≺ HMσ(θ), from which it follows that κ is virtually strong in H
M
σ(θ)
and, in particular, virtually θ-strong. But HMσ(θ) must be correct about this since
HMθ = H
N
θ = Hθ , from which we can conclude that κ is actually virtually θ-
strong, contradicting our assumption that (i) fails.
Next, assume that there is a least n < ω such that πn+1(κ) > θ. Since π(κ) ≤
θ, we have as before that κ is virtually strong in Hπ(κ). Since Hπi(κ) ≺ Hπi+1(κ)
holds by elementarity, we have that κ is virtually strong in Hπn(κ). Applying ele-
mentarity to the statement that κ is virtually strong in Hπ(κ) we also get that πn(κ)
is virtually strong in HNπn+1(κ).
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This means that there is some generic elementary embedding σ : Hθ → M
with Hθ ⊆ M,M ⊆ HNπn+1(κ), critσ = π
n(κ) and σ(πn(κ)) > θ. Thus, again
by elementarity, we get that Hπn(κ) ≺ HMσ(πn(κ)). Since, as we already argued, κ is
virtually strong inHπn(κ), this means that κ is also virtually strong inHMσ(πn(κ)) and
as HMθ = HNθ = Hθ , this means that κ is actually virtually θ-strong, contradicting
our assumption that (i) fails.
Finally, assume πn(κ) < θ for all n < ω and let λ = supn<ω πn(κ). Since
λ ≤ θ, we have that κ is virtually (θ, ω)-superstrong by definition. 
To get a better intuition for the virtual ω-superstrongs, recall that a cardinal κ is
virtually rank-into-rank if there exists a cardinal θ > κ and a generic elementary
embedding π : HVθ → HVθ with critπ = κ. We then note that the virtually ω-
superstrongs coincide with the virtually rank-into-ranks.
Proposition 2.11 (N.). A regular uncountable cardinal κ is virtually ω-superstrong
iff it is virtually rank-into-rank.
Proof. If κ is virtually ω-superstrong, witnessed by a generic elementary embed-
ding π : HVθ → N , then λ := supn<ω πn(κ) is well-defined. By restricting π to
π HVλ : H
V
λ → HVλ we get a witness to κ being virtually λ-rank-into-rank. Con-
versely, if κ is θ-rank-into-rank, witnessed by a generic embedding π : HVθ → HVθ ,
then one readily checks that π also witnesses that κ is virtually ω-superstrong. 
Theorem 2.10 also gives us the following surprising consistency result:
Corollary 2.12 (N.). For any uncountable regular θ, the existence of a virtually
θ-strong cardinal is equiconsistent with the existence of a faintly θ-measurable
cardinal.
Proof. The above Proposition 2.9 and Theorem 2.10 show that virtually θ-
prestrongs are equiconsistent with virtually θ-strongs. Now note that Countable
Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 and condensation in L imply that every faintly θ-
measurable cardinal is virtually θ-prestrong in L. 
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2.2 Woodins & Vopěnkas
In this section we will analyse the virtualisations of the Woodin and Vopěnka car-
dinals, which are defined using “boldface” variants of strongs and supercompacts.
Definition 2.13. Let θ be a regular uncountable cardinal. Then a cardinal κ < θ
is faintly (θ,A)-strong for a set A ⊆ HVθ if there exists a generic elementary
embedding
π : (HVθ ,∈, A)→ (M,∈, B)
withM transitive, such that critπ = κ, π(κ) > θ, HVθ ⊆ M and B ∩HVθ = A.
κ is faintly (θ,A)-supercompact if we further have that <θM∩V ⊆M and say
that κ is faintly (θ,A)-extendible if M = HVµ for some V -cardinal µ. We will
leave out θ if it holds for all regular θ > κ. ◦
Definition 2.14. A cardinal δ is faintly Woodin if given any A ⊆ HVδ there exists
a faintly (<δ,A)-strong cardinal κ < δ. ◦
As with the previous definitions, for both of the above two definitions we substitute
“faintly” for virtually whenM ⊆ V , and substitute “strong”, “supercompact” and
“Woodin” for prestrong, presupercompact and pre-Woodin when we do not
require that π(κ) > θ.
We note in the following proposition that, in analogy with the real Woodin
cardinals, virtually Woodin cardinals are Mahlo. This contrasts the virtually pre-
Woodins since [Wilson, 2019a], together with Theorem 2.22 below, show that these
can be singular.
Proposition 2.15 (Virtualised folklore). Virtually Woodin cardinals are Mahlo.
Proof. Let δ be virtually Woodin. Note that δ is a limit of weakly compact
cardinals by Proposition 2.2, making δ a strong limit. As for regularity, assume that
we have a cofinal increasing function f : α → δ with f(0) > α and α < δ, and
note that f cannot have any closure points since f(0) > α and f is increasing. Fix
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a virtually (<δ, f)-strong cardinal κ < δ; we claim that κ is a closure point for f ,
which will yield our desired contradiction.
Let γ < κ and choose a regular θ ∈ (max(f(γ), κ), δ). We then have a
generic embedding π : (HVθ ,∈, f ∩HVθ ) → (N ,∈, f+) with HVθ ⊆ N , N ⊆ V ,
critπ = κ, π(κ) > θ and f+ is a function such that f+∩HVθ = f ∩HVθ . But then
f+(γ) = f(γ) < π(κ) by our choice of θ, so elementarity implies that f(γ) < κ,
making κ a closure point for f ,  . This shows that δ is inaccessible.
As for Mahloness, let C ⊆ δ be a club and κ < δ a virtually (<δ,C)-strong
cardinal. Let θ ∈ (minC, δ) and let π : HVθ → N be the associated generic el-
ementary embedding. Then for every γ < κ there exists an element of C below
π(κ), namely minC , so by elementarity κ is a limit of elements of C , making it an
element of C . As κ is regular, this shows that δ is Mahlo. 
The well-known equivalence of the “function definition” and “A-strong” defini-
tion of Woodin cardinals7 holds if we restrict ourselves to virtually Woodins, and
the analogue of the equivalence between virtually strongs and virtually supercom-
pacts allows us to strengthen this:
Proposition 2.16 (Dimopoulos-Gitman-N.). For an uncountable cardinal δ, the
following are equivalent:
(i) δ is virtually Woodin;
(ii) for every A ⊆ HVδ there exists a virtually (<δ,A)-supercompact κ < δ;
(iii) for every A ⊆ HVδ there exists a virtually (<δ,A)-extendible κ < δ;
(iv) for every function f : δ → δ there are regular cardinals κ < θ < δ, where
κ is a closure point for f , and a generic elementary π : HVθ → M such
that critπ = κ, HVθ ⊆M,M⊆ V and θ = π(f κ)(κ);
(v) for every function f : δ → δ there are regular cardinals κ < θ < δ, where
κ is a closure point for f , and a generic elementary π : HVθ → M such
that critπ = κ, <π(f)(κ)M⊆M,M⊆ V and θ = π(f κ)(κ);
(vi) for every function f : δ → δ there are regular cardinals θ̄ < κ < θ <
δ, where κ is a closure point for f , and a generic elementary embedding
π : HV
θ̄
→ HVθ with π(critπ) = κ, f(critπ) = θ̄ and f κ ∈ ranπ.
7See Section 1.3 for this characterisation of (non-virtual) Woodin cardinals.
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Figure 2.1: Proof strategy of Proposition 2.16, dotted lines are trivial implications.
Proof. Firstly note that (iii) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (i) and (v) ⇒ (iv) are simply by
definition.
(i)⇒ (iv) Assume δ is virtually Woodin, and fix a function f : δ → δ. Let
κ < δ be virtually (<δ, f)-strong and let θ < δ be a regular cardinal such that
supα≤κ f(α) < θ. Then there is a generic elementary embedding
π : (Hθ,∈, f ∩Hθ)→ (M,∈, f+)
such that Hθ ⊆ M, f ∩ Hθ = f+ ∩ Hθ , M ⊆ V , and π(κ) > θ. Note that, by
our choice of θ, f κ ∈ HVθ and π(f κ)(κ) = f+(κ) = f(κ) < θ.
So it suffices to show that κ is a closure point for f . Let α < κ. Then
f(α) = f+(α) = π(f κ)(α) = π(f κ)(π(α)) = π(f(α)),
so π fixes f(α) for every α < κ. Now, if κ was not a closure point of f then, letting
α < κ be the least such that f(α) ≥ κ, we have
θ > f(α) = π(f(α)) ≥ π(κ) > θ,
a contradiction. Note that we used that π(κ) > θ here, so this argument would not
work if we had only assumed δ to be virtually pre-Woodin.
(iv)⇒ (vi) Assume (iv) holds, let f : δ → δ be given and define g : δ → δ
as g(α) := (2<γα)+, where γα is the least regular cardinal above |f(α)|. By (iv)
there is a κ < δ which is a closure point of g (and so also a closure point of f ), and
there is a regular λ ∈ (κ, δ) for which there is a generic elementary embedding
π : Hλ →M with critπ = κ, Hλ ⊆M,M⊆ V , and π(g κ)(κ) < λ.
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Let θ be the least regular cardinal above |π(f κ)(κ)|, and note that Hθ ∈ Hλ
by our definition of g. Thus, both Hθ and HMπ(θ) are elements ofM. An applica-
tion of Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 then yields that M has a generic
elementary embedding π∗ : HMθ → HMπ(θ) such that critπ
∗ = κ, π∗(κ) = π(κ),
π(f κ) ∈ ranπ∗, and π(f κ)(κ) < θ. By elementarity of π, Hθ has an ordinal
θ̄ < κ and a generic elementary embedding σ : Hθ̄ → Hθ with σ(critσ) = κ,
f κ ∈ ranσ and f(critσ) < θ̄, which is what we wanted to show.
(vi)⇒ (v) Assume (vi) holds and let f : δ → δ be given. Define g : δ → δ
as g(α) := 〈(2<γα)+, f(α)〉, where γα is the least regular cardinal above |f(α)|.
In particular, g codes f . By (vi) there exist regular κ̄ < λ̄ < κ < λ such that κ is a
closure point of g (so also a closure point of f ) and there exists a generic elementary
embedding π : Hλ̄ → Hλ with critπ = κ̄, π(κ̄) = κ, g(κ̄) < λ̄, and g κ ∈ ranπ.
Since f is definable from g and g κ ∈ ranπ, it follows that f κ ∈ ranπ. So let
π(f̄) = f κ with f̄ : κ̄ → κ̄. Now observe that f̄ = f  κ̄ since for α < κ̄, we
have f(α) = π(f̄)(α) = π(f̄(α)) = f̄(α).
Let θ̄ be the least regular cardinal above |f(κ̄)|. By the definition of g, we have
Hθ̄ ∈ Hλ̄. Now, following the (iii) ⇒ (ii) direction in the proof of Theorem
2.4 we get that Hλ̄ has a generic elementary embedding σ : Hθ̄ →M with M
closed under <θ̄-sequences from V , critσ = κ̄, σ(κ̄) > θ̄, and σ(f̄)(κ̄) < θ̄.
Let π(θ̄) = θ and π(M) = N . Now by elementarity of π, we get that there is
a generic elementary embedding σ∗ : Hθ → N with critσ∗ = κ, σ∗(κ) > θ, and
σ∗(π(f̄))(κ) = σ∗(f κ)(κ) < θ.
(vi)⇒ (iii) Let C be the club of all α such that
(Hα,∈, A ∩Hα) ≺ (Hδ,∈, A).
Let f : δ → δ be given as f(α) := 〈γα0 , γα1 〉, where γα0 is the first limit point of C
above α and the γα1 are chosen such that {γα1 | α < β} encodes A∩β for cardinals
β. This definition makes sense since δ is inaccessible by Proposition 2.2.
Let κ < δ be a closure point of f such that there are regular cardinals θ̄ <
κ < θ and a generic elementary embedding π : Hθ̄ → Hθ such that π(critπ) = κ,
f(critπ) < θ̄, and f κ ∈ ranπ. Let κ̄ = critπ. We claim that κ̄ is virtually
(<δ,A)-extendible. Since κ ∈ C because it is a closure point of f , it suffices by the
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definition of C to show that
(Hκ,∈, A ∩Hκ) |= pκ̄ is virtually (A ∩Hκ)-extendibleq. (1)
Let β be the least element of C above κ̄ but below θ̄, and note that β exists as
f(κ̄) < θ̄, and the definition of f says that the first coordinate of f(κ̄) is a limit
point of C above κ̄. It then holds that
(Hκ̄,∈, A ∩Hκ̄) ≺ (Hβ,∈, A ∩Hβ)
as both κ̄ and β are elements of C . Since f encodes A in the manner previously
described and π(f  κ̄) = f κ, we get that π(A ∩Hκ̄) = A ∩Hκ, and thus
(Hκ,∈, A ∩Hκ) ≺ (Hπ(β),∈, A∗) (2)
for A∗ := π(A ∩ Hβ). Now, as (Hγ ,∈, A ∩ Hγ) and (Hπ(γ),∈, A∗ ∩ Hπ(γ))
are elements of Hπ(β) for every γ < κ, Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52
implies that Hπ(β) sees that κ̄ is virtually (<κ,A∗)-extendible, which by (2) then
implies (1), which is what we wanted to show. 
As a corollary of the proof, we now have an analogue of Proposition 2.6 for virtually
Woodin cardinals.
Proposition 2.17 (Dimopoulos-Gitman-N.). A cardinal δ is virtually Woodin if
and only if, for every A ⊆ Hδ , there is a cardinal κ satisfying the weakening of
virtual (<δ,A)-strongness where Hθ = HNθ holds in place of N ⊆ V , with N
being the target of the generic embedding. 
As a corollary we arrive at the surprising result that there is no distinction between
the faint and virtual Woodin cardinals, in contrast with what we will see in Theorem
2.50.
Corollary 2.18 (Gitman-N.). Faintly Woodin cardinals are virtually Woodin.
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Proof. Using Proposition 2.17, it suffices to observe that if θ is inaccessible and
π : (Hθ,∈, A)→ (M,∈, B)
is a faintly (θ,A)-strong embedding such that A codes the sequence of Hλ for
λ < θ, then Hθ = HMθ . 
We will now step away from the Woodins for a little bit, and introduce the Vopěnkas.
In anticipation of the next section we will work with the class-sized version here,
but all the following results work equally well for inaccessible virtually Vopěnka
cardinals8.
Definition 2.19 (GBC). The Generic Vopěnka Principle (gVP) states that for any
class C consisting of structures in a common first-order language, there are distinct
M,N ∈ C and a generic elementary embedding π : M→N . ◦
We will be using a standard variation of gVP involving the following natural
sequences:
Definition 2.20 (GBC). Say that a class function f : On → On is an indexing
function if it satisfies that f(α) > α and f(α) ≤ f(β) for all α < β. ◦
Definition 2.21 (GBC). Say that an On-sequence 〈Mα | α < On〉 is natural if
there exists an indexing function f : On → On and unary relations Rα ⊆ Vf(α)
such that Mα = (Vf(α),∈, {α}, Rα) for every α. Denote this indexing function
by f ~M and the unary relations as R ~Mα . ◦
The following Theorem 2.22 is then the main theorem of this section, showing that
inaccessible cardinals are virtually Vopěnka iff they are virtually pre-Woodin.
Theorem 2.22 (Dimopoulos-Gitman-N.; GBC). The following are equivalent:
(i) gVP holds;
8Note however that we have to require inaccessibility here: see [Wilson, 2019a] for an analysis of
the singular virtually Vopěnka cardinals.
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(ii) For any natural On-sequence ~M there exists a generic elementary embed-
ding π : Mα →Mβ for some α < β;
(iii) On is virtually pre-Woodin;
(iv) On is faintly pre-Woodin.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii) and (iii)⇒ (iv) are trivial.
(iv)⇒ (i): Assume On is faintly pre-Woodin and fix some On-sequence
~M := 〈Mα | α < On〉 of structures in a common language. Let κ be (<On, ~M)-
prestrong and fix some regular θ > κ satisfying thatMα ∈ HVθ for every α < θ,
and fix a generic elementary embedding
π : (HVθ ,∈, ~M)→ (N ,∈,M∗)
with HVθ ⊆ N and ~M∩HVθ =M
∗ ∩HVθ . Set κ := critπ.
We have that π Mκ : Mκ →M∗π(κ), but we need to reflect this embedding
down below θ as we do not know whetherM∗π(κ) is on the ~M sequence. Working
in the generic extension, we have
N |= ∃κ̄ < π(κ)∃σ̇ ∈ V Col(ω,M
∗
κ̄) : pσ̇ : M∗κ̄ →M∗π(κ) is elementaryq.
Here κ realises κ̄ and π Mκ realises σ. Note thatM∗κ =Mκ since we ensured
thatMκ ∈ HVθ and we are assuming that ~M∩HVθ =M
∗ ∩HVθ , so the domain
of σ (= π Mκ) isM∗κ  also note that σ exists in a Col(ω,Mκ) extension of N
by an application of Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52. Now elementarity of
π implies that
HVθ |= ∃κ̄ < κ∃σ̇ ∈ V Col(ω,Mκ̄) : pσ̇ : Mκ̄ →Mκ is elementaryq,
which is upwards absolute to V , from which we can conclude that σ : Mκ̄ →Mκ
witnesses that gVP holds.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Assume (ii) holds and assume that On is not virtually pre-
Woodin, which means that there exists some class A such that there are no virtually
A-prestrong cardinals. This allows us to define a function f : On → On as f(α)
being the least regular η > α such that α is not virtually (η,A)-prestrong.
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We also define g : On→ On as taking α to the least strong limit cardinal above
α which is a closure point for f . Note that g is an indexing function, so we can let
~M be the natural sequence induced by g and Rα := A ∩HVg(α). (ii) supplies us
with α < β and a generic elementary embedding9







Since g(α) is a closure point for f it holds that f(critπ) < g(α), so fixing a regular
θ ∈ (f(critπ), g(α)) we get that critπ is virtually (θ,A)-prestrong, contradicting
the definition of f . Hence On is virtually pre-Woodin. 
2.2.1 Weak Vopěnka
We now move to a weak variant of gVP, introduced in a category-theoretic con-
text in [Adámek and Rosický, 1994]. It starts with the following equivalent charac-
terisation of gVP, which is the virtual analogue of the characterisation shown in
[Adámek and Rosický, 1994]:
Lemma 2.23 (Virtualised Adámek-Rosický; GBC). The following are equivalent10:
(i) gVP
(ii) There is not a natural On-sequence 〈Mα | α < On〉 satisfying that
• there is a generic homomorphismMα →Mβ for every α ≤ β, which
is unique in all generic extensions;
• there is no generic homomorphismMβ →Mα for any α < β.
(iii) There is not a natural On-sequence 〈Mα | α < On〉 satisfying that
• there is a homomorphismMα →Mβ in V for every α ≤ β, which
is unique in all generic extensions;
• there is no generic homomorphismMβ →Mα for any α < β.
Proof. Note that the only difference between (ii) and (iii) is that the homomor-
phism exists in V , making (ii)⇒ (iii) trivial.
9Note that Vg(α) = HVg(α) since g(α) is a strong limit cardinal.
10This is equivalent to saying that On, viewed as a category, cannot be fully embedded into the
category Gra of graphs, which is how it is stated in [Adámek and Rosický, 1994].
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(iii)⇒ (i): Assume that gVP fails, meaning by Theorem 2.22 that we have a
natural On-sequence ~Mα such that, in every generic extension, there is no homo-




Mξ := {(x, ξ) | ξ ≤ κ ∧ ξ ∈ Card∧x ∈Mξ},
with a unary relation R∗ given as R∗(x, ξ) iffMξ |= R(x) and a binary relation
∼∗ given as (x, ξ) ∼∗ (x′, ξ′) iff ξ = ξ′. Whenever we have a homomorphism
f : N κ → N λ we then get an induced homomorphism f̃ : M0 →Mξ , given as
f̃(x) := f(x, 0), where ξ ≤ κ is given by preservation of ∼∗.
For any two cardinals κ < λ we have a homomorphism jκλ : N κ → N λ in
V , given as jκλ(x, ξ) := (x, ξ). This embedding must also be the unique such,
in all generic extensions, as otherwise we get a generic homomorphism between
two distinctMα’s. Furthermore, there cannot be any homomorphism N λ → N κ
as that would also imply the existence of a generic homomorphism between two
distinctMα’s.
(i) ⇒ (ii): Assume that we have an On-sequence ~Mα as in the theorem,
with generic homomorphisms jαβ : Mα → Mβ that are unique in all generic
extensions for every α ≤ β, with no generic homomorphisms going the other way.
We first note that we can for every α ≤ β choose the jαβ in a Col(ω,Mα)-
extension, by a proof similar to the proof of Lemma 1.52 and using the uniqueness
of jαβ . Next, fix a proper class C ⊆ On such that α ∈ C implies that
sup
ξ∈C∩α
|Mξ|V < |Mα|V .
and note that this implies that V [g] |= |Mξ| < |Mα| for every V -generic
g ⊆ Col(ω,Mξ). This means that for every α ∈ C we may choose some ηα ∈Mα
which is not in the range of any jξα for ξ < α. But now define first-order structures
〈Nα | α ∈ C〉 as Nα := (Mα, ηα). Then, by our assumption on theMα’s and
construction of theNα’s, there can be no generic homomorphism between any two
distinct Nα, showing that gVP fails. 
11∐ is the “model-theoretic union”, also known as the coproduct.
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The weak version of gVP is then simply “flipping the arrows around” in the above
characterisation of gVP.
Definition 2.24 (GBC). Generic Weak Vopěnka’s Principle (gWVP) states that
there does not exist an On-sequence of first-order structures 〈Mα | α < On〉 such
that
• there is a homomorphism Mβ → Mα in V for every α ≤ β, which is
unique in all generic extensions;
• there is no generic homomorphismMα →Mβ for any α < β. ◦
We start by showing that gWVP is indeed a weaker version of gVP.
Proposition 2.25. gVP implies gWVP.
Proof. Assume gVP holds and gWVP fails, and let 〈Mα | α < On〉 be an
On-sequence of first-order structures such that for every α ≤ β there exists a
homomorphism
jβα : Mβ →Mα
in V which is unique in all generic extensions, with no generic homomorphisms
going the other way. We can then find a proper class C ⊆ On such that |Mα|V <
|Mβ|V for every α < β in C . By gVP there are then α < β in C and a generic
homomorphism
π : Mα →Mβ
in some V [g]. Here we may assume, as in the proof of Lemma 2.23, that g ⊆
Col(ω,Mβ). But then π ◦ jβα = id by uniqueness of jββ = id, which means that
jβα is injective in V [g] and hence also in V . But then |Mβ|V ≤ |Mα|V , contra-
dicting the definition of C . 
Denoting the corresponding non-generic principle by WVP Wilson showed the
following surprising result:
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Theorem 2.26 ([Wilson, 2019b]). WVP is equivalent to On being a Woodin cardi-
nal.
Given our Theorem 2.22 we may then suspect that in the virtual world these two
continue to be equivalent, which turns out to almost be the case. In the pro-
ceeding argument we will be roughly following the structure of the argument in
[Wilson, 2019b], but we have to diverge from it at several points in which the au-
thor is using the fact that they are working with class-sized elementary embeddings.
Indeed, in that paper they establish a correspondence between elementary em-
beddings and certain homomorphisms, a correspondence we will not achieve here.
Proving that the elementary embeddings we do get are non-trivial seems to further-
more require extra assumptions on our structures. In any case, let us begin.
Define for every strong limit cardinal λ and Σ1-formula ϕ the relations
Rϕ := {x ∈ V | (V,∈) |= ϕ[x]}
Rϕλ := {x ⊆ H
V
λ | ∃y ∈ Rϕ : y ∩HVλ = x}





λ , {λ}, A ∩H
V
λ )ϕ∈Σ1 .
Say that a homomorphism h : Pλ,A →Pη,A is trivial if
h(x) ∩HVη = x ∩HVη
for every x ∈ HVλ+ . Note that h can only be trivial if η ≤ λ since h(λ) = η.
Lemma 2.27 (Gitman-N.; GBC). Let λ be a singular strong limit cardinal, η a
strong limit cardinal and A ⊆ V a class. If there exists a non-trivial generic
homomorphism h : Pλ,A →Pη,A then there is a non-trivial generic elementary
embedding π : (HVλ+ ,∈, A ∩ H
V
λ ) → (M,∈, B) for some M such that, letting
ν := min{λ, η}, it holds that HVν = HMν , A ∩HVν = B ∩HVν and critπ < ν .
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Proof. Assume that we have a non-trivial homomorphism h : Pλ,A → Pη,A in
a forcing extension V [g], define in V [g] the set
M∗ := {〈b, f〉 | b ∈ [Hν ]<ω ∧ f ∈ HVλ+ ∧ f : H
V
λ → HVλ },
and define the standard relations ∈∗ and =∗ onM∗ as
〈b0, f0〉 ∈∗ 〈b1, f1〉 iff b0b1 ∈ h({xy ∈ [HVλ ]<ω | f0(x) ∈ f1(y)})
〈b0, f0〉 =∗ 〈b1, f1〉 iff b0b1 ∈ h({xy ∈ [HVλ ]<ω | f0(x) = f1(y)})
LetM :=M∗ / =∗, and also call ∈∗ the induced relation onM, which is clearly
well-defined. We then get a version of Loś’ Theorem, using that h preserves all
Σ1-relations and that HVλ |= ZFC
−.
Claim 2.28. For every formula ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) and every [b1, f1], . . . , [bn, fn] ∈
M the following are equivalent:
(i) (M,∈∗) |= ϕ[[b1, f1], . . . , [bn, fn]];
(ii) b1 · · · bn ∈ h({a1 · · · an |Pλ,A |= ϕ[f1(a1), . . . , fn(an)]}).
Proof of claim. The proof is straightforward, using that h preserves Σ1-
relations. We prove this by induction on ϕ. If ϕ is vi ∈ vj then we have that
(M,∈∗) |= ϕ[[b1, f1], . . . , [bn, fn]]
⇔〈bi, fi〉 ∈∗ 〈bj , fj〉
⇔bibj ∈ h({aiaj ∈ [HVλ ]<ω | fi(ai) ∈ fj(aj)})
⇔b1 · · · bn ∈ h({a1 · · · an | fi(ai) ∈ fj(aj)})
⇔b1 · · · bn ∈ h({a1 · · · an |Pλ,A |= ϕ[f1(a1), . . . , fn(an)]}).
The cases where ϕ is ψ ∧ χ or ¬ψ is straightforward. If ϕ is ∃xψ then
(M,∈∗) |= ϕ[[b1, f1], . . . , [bn, fn]]
⇔∃〈b, f〉 ∈ M∗ : (M,∈) |= ψ[〈b, f〉, 〈b1, f1〉, . . . , 〈bn, fn〉]
⇔∃〈b, f〉 ∈ M∗ : bb1 · · · bn ∈ h({a~a |Pλ,A |= ψ[f(a), f1(a1), . . . , fn(an)]})
⇔b1 · · · bn ∈ h({~a |Pλ,A |= ϕ[f1(a1), . . . , fn(an)]}),
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finishing the proof. a
Note that we have not shown that (M,∈∗) is well-founded, and indeed it might
not be. However, the following claim will show that (HVν ,∈) is isomorphic to
a rank-initial segment of (M∗,∈∗), giving well-foundedness up to that point at
least. Define the function χ : (HVν ,∈) → (M∗,∈∗) as χ(a) := [〈a〉, pr], where
pr(〈x〉) := x.
Claim 2.29. For every [a, f ] ∈M and b ∈ HVν ,
[a, f ] ∈∗ χ(b) ⇔ ∃c ∈ HVν : [a, f ] = χ(c).
Proof of claim. We have that
[a, f ] ∈∗ χ(b) = [〈b〉, pr]⇔ a〈b〉 ∈ h({x〈y〉 | f(x) ∈ y})
⇔ a〈b〉 ∈ h({x〈y〉 | ∃z ∈ y : f(x) = z})
⇔ ∃c ∈ b : a〈c〉 ∈ h({x〈z〉 | f(x) = z})
⇔ ∃c ∈ b : [a, f ] = [〈c〉, pr] = χ(c),
yielding the wanted. a
This claim implies that by taking the transitive collapse of ranχ ⊆ M we may
assume that HVν = HMν . Now define
B := {[b, f ] ∈M | b ∈ h({x ∈ HVλ | f(x) ∈ A})}.
and, in V [g], let π : (HVλ ,∈, A ∩HVλ )→ (M,∈, B) be given as π(x) := [〈〉, cx].
Claim 2.30. π is elementary.
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Proof of claim. For x1, . . . , xn ∈ HVλ it holds that
(M,∈∗, B) |= ϕ[π(x1), . . . , π(xn)]⇔ (M,∈∗) |= ϕ[π(x1), . . . , π(xn)]
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ h({〈〉 |Pλ,A |= ϕ[x1, . . . , xn]})
⇔ (HVλ+ ,∈, A ∩H
V
λ ) |= ϕ[x1, . . . , xn]
and we also get that, for every x ∈ HVλ ,
x ∈ A⇔ 〈〉 ∈ h({a ∈ HVλ | x ∈ A})⇔ π(x) ∈ B,
which shows elementarity. a
We next need to show that B ∩ HVν = A ∩ HVν , so let x ∈ HVν . Note that
x = [〈x〉, pr] by Claim 2.29 and the observation proceeding it, which means that
x ∈ B ⇔ 〈x〉 ∈ h({〈y〉 ∈ HVλ | y ∈ A})⇔ x ∈ A.
The last thing we need to show is that critπ < ν . We start with an analogous
result about h.
Claim 2.31. There exists some b ∈ HVν such that h(b) 6= b.
Proof of claim. Assume the claim fails. We now have two cases.
Case 1: λ ≥ η
By non-triviality of h there is an x ∈PV (HVλ ) such that h(x) 6= x ∩HVη ,
which means that there exists an a ∈ HVη such that a ∈ h(x)⇔ a /∈ x.
If a ∈ x then {a} = h({a}) ⊆ h(x),12 making a ∈ h(x),  , so assume
instead that a ∈ h(x). Since η is a strong limit cardinal we may fix a cardinal
θ < η such that a ∈ HVθ and HVθ ∈ HVη . We then have that13
{a} ⊆ h(x) ∩HVθ = h(x) ∩ h(HVθ ) = h(x ∩HVθ ) = x ∩HVθ ,
12Note that as h preserves Σ1 formulas it also preserves singletons and boolean operations.
13Note that we are using λ ≥ η here to ensure that HVθ ∈ domh.
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so that a ∈ x,  .
Case 2: λ < η
In this case we are assuming that h HVλ = id, but h(λ) = η > λ. Since λ
is singular we can fix some γ < λ and a cofinal function f : γ → λ. Define the
relation
R := {(α, β, ᾱ, β̄, g) | pg is a cofinal function g : α→ βq ∧ g(ᾱ) = β̄}.
Then R(γ, λ, α, f(α), f) holds by assumption for every α < γ, so that R holds
for some (γ∗, λ∗, α∗, f(α)∗, f∗) such that
(γ∗, λ∗, α∗, f(α)∗, f∗) ∩HVη = (h(γ), h(λ), h(α), h(f(α)), h(f))
= (γ, η, α, f(α), h(f)),
using our assumption that h fixes every b ∈ HVλ . Since γ, α and f(α) are
transitive and bounded in HVλ , it holds that h(γ) = γ∗, h(α) = α∗ and that
h(f(α)) = f(α)∗. Also, since dom(f∗) = γ = dom(f) we must in fact have
that f∗ = h(f). But this means that h(f) : γ → η is cofinal and ran(h(f)) ⊆ λ,
a contradiction! a
To use the above Claim 2.31 to conclude anything about π we will make use of the
following standard lemma:
Claim 2.32. For any x ∈ HVλ it holds that h(x) = π(x) ∩HVη .
Proof of claim. For any n < ω and 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ [HVη ]n we have that
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ π(x)
⇔ (M,∈) |= 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ π(x)
⇔ (M,∈) |= 〈[〈a1〉, pr], . . . , [〈an〉, pr]〉 ∈ [〈〉, cx]
⇔ 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ h({〈x1, . . . , xn〉 |Pλ,A |= 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ x})
⇔ 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ h(x),
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showing that h(x) = π(x) ∩HVη . a
Now use Claim 2.31 to fix a b ∈ HVν which is moved by h. Claim 2.32 then implies
that
π(b) ∩HVη = h(b) ∩HVη = h(b) 6= b = b ∩HVη ,
showing that π(b) 6= b and hence critπ < ν . This finishes the proof. 
Definition 2.33. A cardinal κ is W-virtually pre-Woodin if it is virtually pre-
Woodin but without requiring that the target model is well-founded. ◦
Theorem 2.34 (Gitman-N.; GBC). gWVP holds iff On is W-virtually pre-Woodin.
Proof. (⇐) is just observing that the virtualisation of the argument in [Wilson, 2019b]
that WVP holds if On is Woodin works in the W-virtually pre-Woodin case, so we
only give a brief sketch.
Assume On is W-virtually pre-Woodin and let ~M be a counterexample to
gWVP, so that we in V have homomorphismsMβ →Mα for all α ≤ β. Work
in some generic extension V [g], fix a W-virtually ~M-prestrong cardinal κ and let
θ  κ be such thatMκ+1 ∈ HVθ . Letting π : (HVθ ,∈) → (M,∈∗) be the corre-
sponding embedding we get thatMκ+1 = π( ~M)κ+1, so that
π Mκ : (Mκ,∈)→ (π(Mκ),∈∗) = (π( ~M)π(κ),∈∗).
But then, by the choice of θ and elementarity of π, we get thatM has a homomor-
phism
h : (π( ~M)π(κ),∈∗)→ (π( ~M)κ+1,∈∗) = (Mκ+1,∈),
making h ◦ (π Mκ) : (Mκ,∈)→ (Mκ+1,∈) a counterexample to gWVP.
(⇒): Assume that On is not W-virtually pre-Woodin. This means that there
exists a class A such that there are no W-virtually A-prestrong cardinals. We can
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therefore assign to any cardinal κ the least cardinal f(κ) > κ such that κ is not
W-virtually (f(κ), A)-prestrong.
Also define a function g : On→ Card as taking an ordinal α to the least singular
strong limit cardinal above α closed under f . Then we are assuming that there is
no non-trivial generic elementary embedding







g(α). Assume towards a contradiction that
for some α, β there is a non-trivial generic homomorphism h : Pg(α),A →Pg(β),A.
Lemma 2.27 then gives us a non-trivial generic elementary embedding
π : (HVg(α),∈, A ∩H
V
g(α))→ (M,∈, B)
for some transitive M such that HVν ⊆ M with ν := min{g(α), g(β)} and
A ∩ HVν = B ∩ HVν , a contradiction! Therefore every generic homomorphism
h : Pg(α),A → Pg(β),A is trivial. Since there is a unique trivial homomorphism
when α ≥ β and no trivial homomorphism when α < β since g(α) is sent to g(β),
the sequence of structures
〈Pg(α),A | α ∈ On〉
is a counterexample to gWVP, which is what we wanted to show. 
2.3 Berkeleys
We next move to the higher realms of the virtual large cardinal hierarchy, and study
cardinals whose non-virtual versions are inconsistent with ZFC.
In the virtual setting the virtually Berkeley cardinals, like all the other virtual
large cardinals, are simply downwards absolute to L. It turns out that virtually
Berkeley cardinals are natural objects, as the main theorem of this section, Theo-
rem 2.43, shows that these large cardinals are precisely what separates virtually pre-
Woodins from the virtually Woodins, as well as separating virtually Vopěnka car-
dinals from Mahlo cardinals, improving on a result in [Gitman and Hamkins, 2019].
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Definition 2.35. Say that a cardinal δ is virtually proto-Berkeley if for every
transitive set M such that δ ⊆ M there exists a generic elementary embedding
π : M→M with critπ < δ.
If critπ can be chosen arbitrarily large below δ then δ is virtually Berkeley,
and if critπ can be chosen as an element of any club C ⊆ δ we say δ is virtually
club Berkeley. ◦
Note that a quick application of Countable Embedding Absoluteness 1.52 shows
that virtually (proto-)Berkeley cardinals are downwards absolute to L.
We are not interested in the virtually proto-Berkeley cardinals for the same
reason we are not interested in the proto-Berkeley cardinals, namely that if δ is
virtually proto-Berkeley then every κ > δ is proto-Berkeley as well. The following
theorem, which is a straight-forward virtualisation of the corresponding theorem in
the non-virtual context, then shows that the least virtually proto-Berkeley cardinal
is indeed virtually Berkeley.
Theorem 2.36 (Virtualised [Cutolo, 2017] 2.1.14). The least virtually proto-Berkeley
cardinal is virtually Berkeley.
Proof. Let δ0 be the least virtually proto-Berkeley cardinal and assume that η0 < δ0
is least such that there exists a transitive setM0 with δ0 ∈M0 such that there are
no generic elementary embeddings π : M→M with critπ ∈ (η0, δ0).
We will show that η0 is virtually proto-Berkeley, which would contradict min-
imality of δ0, so letM be any transitive set with η0 ∈ M. We can now fix some
λ > δ0 such thatM,M0 ∈ Vλ and define
M′ := Vλ ∪ {{〈x, η0,M,M0〉 | x ∈ Vλ}}.
Note that η0,M0 andM are all definable inM′. Use the fact that δ0 is virtually
proto-Berkeley to get a generic embedding π : M′ → M′, so that definability
ensures that π fixes η0,M0 andM.
By choice of η0 and becauseM0 is fixed by π we get that critπ ≤ η0, and since
π fixes η0 we further have that critπ < η0. This implies that π M : M →M
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witnesses that η0 is virtually proto-Berkeley,  . 
Virtually (proto-)Berkeley cardinals turn out to be equivalent to their “boldface”
versions, the proof of which is a straightforward virtualisation of Lemma 2.1.12 and
Corollary 2.1.13 in [Cutolo, 2017].
Proposition 2.37 (Virtualised [Cutolo, 2017] 2.1.12 and 2.1.13). If δ is virtually
proto-Berkeley then for every transitive setM such that δ ⊆M and every subset
A ⊆M there exists a generic elementary embedding π : (M,∈, A)→ (M,∈, A)
with critπ < δ. If δ is virtually Berkeley then we can furthermore ensure that
critπ is arbitrarily large below δ.
Proof. LetM be transitive with δ ⊆M and A ⊆M. Let
N :=M∪{A, {{A, x} | x ∈M}} ∪ {{A, x} | x ∈M}
and note that N is transitive. Further, both A and M are definable in N with-
out parameters: A is definable in N as the unique set such that there is a set B
(= {{A, x} | x ∈ M}), all of whose elements are unordered pairs {A, x} and for
every x ∈ N such thatA /∈ x and x /∈ {A,B} it holds that {A, x} ∈ B. M is then
what remains if we remove all x such that A is in the transitive closure of x. But
this means that a generic elementary embedding π : N → N fixes bothM and A,
giving us a generic elementary σ : (M,∈, A) → (M,∈, A) with critσ = critπ,
yielding the wanted conclusion. 
The following is a straightforward virtualisation of the usual definition of the Vopěnka
filter (see e.g. [Kanamori, 2008]):
Definition 2.38 (GBC). Define the virtually Vopěnka filter F on On as X ∈ F
iff there is a natural On-sequence ~M such that critπ ∈ X for any α < β and any
generic elementary π : Mα →Mβ . ◦
Theorem 2.22 shows that ∅ is in the virtually Vopěnka filter iff gVP fails, in anal-
ogy with the non-virtual case. Normality also holds in the virtual context, as the
following proof shows:
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Lemma 2.39 (Virtualised folklore; GBC). The virtually Vopěnka filter is a normal
filter.
Proof. Let F be the virtually Vopěnka filter. We first show that F is actually a
filter. If X ∈ F and Y ⊇ X then Y ∈ F simply by definition of F . If X,Y ∈ F ,
witnessed by natural sequences ~M and ~N , then X ∩ Y ∈ F as well, witnessed
by the natural sequence ~P induced by the indexing function f ~P := max(f ~M, f ~N )




α 〉). Indeed, if π : Pα → Pβ is a generic
elementary embedding with critical point µ then µ is also the critical point of both
π Mα : Mα →Mβ and π Nα : Nα → N β .
For normality, let X ∈ F+ be F -positive, where we recall that this means that
X ∩C 6= ∅ for every C ∈ F , and let f : X → On be regressive. We want to show
that f is constant on an F -positive set.
Assume this fails, meaning that there are natural sequences ~Mγ for γ such that
for any generic elementary π : Mγα → M
γ
β satisfies that f(critπ) 6= γ. Define a
new natural sequence ~N as induced by the indexing function g : On → On given





α := Code(〈〈Mγα | γ < α〉, f α〉).
Now since X is F -positive there exists a generic elementary embedding
π : Nα → N β
with critπ ∈ X . As f(critπ) < critπ we get that π(f(critπ)) = f(critπ), so
that we have a generic elementary embedding
π Mf(critπ)α : Mf(critπ)α →M
f(critπ)
β ,
but this contradicts the definition of ~Mf(critπ)! Thus F is normal. 
The reason why we are being careful in showing all these analogous properties for
the virtual Vopěnka filter is that not all of the properties carry over. Indeed, note
48 of 130
Chapter 2. Virtual large cardinals 2.3. Berkeleys
that uniformity of filters is non-trivial as we are working with proper classes14, and
we will see in Theorem 2.43 that uniformity of this filter is equivalent to there being
no virtually Berkeley cardinals  the following lemma is the first implication:
Lemma 2.40 (N.; GBC). Assume gVP and that there are no virtually Berkeley car-
dinals. Then the virtually Vopěnka filter F on On contains every class club C .
Proof. The crucial extra property we get by assuming that there are not any
virtually Berkeleys is that F becomes uniform, i.e. contains every tail (δ,On) ⊆ On.
Indeed, assume that δ is the least cardinal such that (δ,On) /∈ F . Let M be a
transitive set with δ ⊆ M and γ < δ a cardinal. As (γ,On) ∈ F by minimality of
δ, we may fix a natural sequence ~N witnessing this. Let ~M be the natural sequence
induced by the indexing function f : On→ On given by
f(α) := max(α+ 1, δ + 1)
and unary relations Rα := {〈M,N β〉 | β ≤ α}. If π : Mα → Mβ is a generic
elementary embedding with critπ ≤ δ, which exists as (δ,On) /∈ F , then π(Rα) =
Rβ implies that π M : M→M with critπ ≤ δ. We also get that critπ > γ, as
π N critπ : N critπ → N π(critπ)
is an embedding between two structures in ~N and hence critπ > γ as ~N witnesses
that (γ,On) ∈ F . This means that δ is virtually Berkeley, a contradiction. Thus
critπ > δ, implying that (δ,On) ∈ F .
Note that the class C0 ⊆ On of limit ordinals is in F , since it is the diagonal
intersection of the tails (α+ 1,On). Now let C ⊆ On be a class club, and let
C := {aα | α < On}
be its increasing enumeration. Then C ⊇ C0 ∩ 4α<On(aα,On), implying that
C ∈ F . 
14This boils down to the fact that the class club filter is not provably normal in GBC, see
[Gitman et al., 2019]
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Theorem 2.41 (N.; GBC). If there are no virtually Berkeley cardinals then On is
virtually pre-Woodin iff On is virtually Woodin.
Proof. Assume On is virtually pre-Woodin, so gVP holds by Theorem 2.22 and
we can let F be the virtually Vopěnka filter. The assumption that there are not any
virtually Berkeley cardinals implies that for any class A we not only get a virtually
A-prestrong cardinal, but we get stationarily many such. Indeed, assume this fails
 we will follow the proof of Theorem 2.22.
Failure means that there is some class A and some class club C such that there
are no virtually A-prestrong cardinals in C . Since there are no virtually Berkeley
cardinals, Lemma 2.40 imples that C ∈ F , so there exists some natural sequence
~N such that whenever π : Nα → N β is an elementary embedding between two
distinct structures of ~N it holds that critπ ∈ C . Define f : On → On as sending
α to the least cardinal η > α such that α is not virtually (η,A)-prestrong if α ∈ C ,
and set f(α) := α if α /∈ C . Also define g : On → On as g(α) being the least
strong limit cardinal in C above α which is a closure point for f .
Now let ~M be the natural sequence induced by g and
Rα := Code(〈A ∩HVg(α),Nα〉)
and apply gVP to get α < β and a generic elementary embedding π : Mα →Mβ ,
which restricts to











making critπ virtually (g(α), A)-prestrong and thus critπ /∈ C . But as we also
get the embedding π Nα : Nα → N β , we have that critπ ∈ C by definition of
~N ,  .
Now fix any class A and some large n < ω and define the class
C := {κ ∈ Card | (HVκ ,∈, A ∩HVκ ) ≺Σn (V,∈, A)}.
This is a club and we can therefore find a virtually A-prestrong cardinal κ ∈ C .
Assume that κ is not virtually A-strong and let θ be least such that it is not virtually
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(θ,A)-strong. Fix a generic elementary embedding
π : (HVθ ,∈, A ∩HVθ )→ (M,∈, B)
with critπ = κ, HVθ ⊆M , M ⊆ V , A ∩HVθ = B ∩HVθ and π(κ) < θ.







believes that κ is virtually (A ∩ HVπ(κ))-strong as in the proof of Theorem 2.10,
meaning that (HVκ ,∈, A ∩ HVκ ) believes that there is a proper class of virtually
(A ∩HVκ )-strong cardinals. But κ ∈ C , which means that
(V,∈, A) |= pThere exists a proper class of virtually A-strong cardinalsq,
implying that On is virtually Woodin. 
Next, the following result is an improvement of a theorem in [Gitman and Hamkins, 2019],
reducing the assumption of the existence of 0] to the existence of a virtually Berkeley
cardinal, which we will later see is optimal:
Theorem 2.42 (N.; GBC). If there exists a virtually Berkeley cardinal δ then gVP
holds and On is not Mahlo.
Proof. If On was Mahlo then there would in particular exist an inaccessible
cardinal κ > δ, but then HVκ |= pthere exists a virtually Berkeley cardinalq, con-
tradicting the incompleteness theorem, as we would have shown that
GBC + Φ`Con(GBC + Φ),
witnessed by the model (HVκ ,PV (HVκ )), with Φ being “There exists a virtually
Berkeley cardinal”.
To show gVP we show that On is virtually pre-Woodin, which is equivalent by
Theorem 2.22. Fix therefore a classA  we have to show that there exists a virtually




θ ,∈, A ∩HVθ )→ (HVθ ,∈, A ∩HVθ )
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with critπ < δ. By the pigeonhole principle we thus get some κ < δ which is
the critical point of proper class many πθ , showing that κ is virtually A-prestrong,
making On virtually pre-Woodin. 
Theorem 2.43 (N.; GBC). The following are equivalent:
(i) if gVP holds then On is Mahlo;
(ii) On is virtually pre-Woodin iff On is virtually Woodin;
(iii) There are no virtually Berkeley cardinals.
Proof. (iii) ⇒ (ii) is Theorem 2.41, and the contraposed version of (i) ⇒ (iii)
is Theorem 2.42. For (ii) ⇒ (i) note that gVP implies that On is virtually pre-
Woodin by Theorem 2.22, which by (ii) means that it is virtually Woodin and the
usual proof shows that virtually Woodins are Mahlo15, showing (i). 
This also immediately implies the following equiconsistency, as virtually Berkeley
cardinals have strictly larger consistency strength than virtually Woodin cardinals:
Corollary 2.44 (N.). The existence of an inaccessible virtually pre-Woodin car-
dinal is equiconsistent with the existence of an inaccessible virtually Woodin
cardinal. 
2.4 Behaviour in core models
Most of the cardinals turn out to be downwards absolute to most inner models,
including L.
Proposition 2.45. For any regular uncountable cardinal θ, faintly θ-measurable
cardinals are downwards absolute to any transitive class U ⊆ V satisfying
ZF− + DC.
Proof. Let κ be faintly θ-measurable, witnessed by a forcing poset P and a
V -generic g ⊆ P such that, in V [g], there is a transitive M and an elementary
embedding π : HVθ → M with critπ = κ. Fix a transitive class U ⊆ V which
15See e.g. Exercise 26.10 in [Kanamori, 2008].
52 of 130
Chapter 2. Virtual large cardinals 2.4. Behaviour in core models
satisfies ZF− + DC. Restricting the embedding to π HUθ : HUθ → N we can now
apply the Countable Absoluteness Lemma 1.52 to π HUθ to get that there exists
an embedding π∗ : HUθ → N
∗ in a generic extension of U , making κ faintly θ-
measurable in U . 
Theorem 2.46 (N.). Let θ be a regular uncountable cardinal.
(i) L |= pfaintly θ-measurables are equivalent to virtually θ-prestrongsq.
(ii) Assume that L[µ] exists. It then holds that
L[µ] |= pfaintly θ-measurables are equivalent to virtually θ-measurablesq.
(iii) Assume there is no inner model with a Woodin. It then holds that
K |= pfaintly θ-measurables are equivalent to virtually θ-measurablesq.
Proof. For (i) simply note that if π : Lθ → N is a generic elementary embedding
with N transitive, then by condensation we have that N = Lγ for some γ ≥ θ, so
that π also witnesses the virtual θ-prestrongness of critπ.
(ii): Assume that V = L[µ] for notational simplicity and let κ be faintly θ-
measurable, witnessed by a generic elementary embedding π : Lθ[µ]→ N existing
in some generic extension V [g]. By condensation we get that N = Lγ [µ] for some
γ ≥ θ and µ ∈ V [g], but we are not guaranteed that µ ∈ V here. Let λ be the
unique measurable cardinal of V = L[µ].
Note that µ̄ is a measure on π(λ) ≥ λ. If π(λ) = λ then L[µ] = L[µ̄]
by [Kanamori, 2008, Kunen’s Theorem 20.10] and we trivially get that N ⊆ V .
Assume thus that π(λ) > λ, which implies that L[µ̄] is an internal iterate of
L[µ] by [Kanamori, 2008, Kunen’s Theorem 20.12]. In particular it then holds that
L[µ̄] ⊆ L[µ], so again we get that N ⊆ V .
(iii): Assume that V = K = L[E ] and fix a faintly θ-measurable cardinal
κ, witnessed by a generic embedding π : Lθ[E ] → N = Lγ [E ] in some generic
extension V [g]. Now coiterate16 L[E ] with L[E ], and denote the last models by
P and Q. Since K = KV [g] and as K is universal we get that QEP . Then the
L[E ]-to-Q branch did not drop, giving us an iteration embedding i : L[E ]→ Q.
Note that crit i ≥ κ as E is simply the pointwise image of E under π, so noth-
ing below κ is touched and is therefore not used in the comparison either. This
16See Section 1.4 for more information about the core model K and coiterations.
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means that crit(i ◦π) = κ, so that (i ◦π) : Lθ[E ]→ Q witnesses that κ is virtually
θ-measurable, since QEP implies that Q ⊆ K . 
Note that the proofs of (ii) and (iii) above do not show that κ is virtually θ-
prestrong, as it might still be the case that µ̄ 6= µ or Ē 6= E , so we cannot conclude
that Lθ[µ] ⊆ Lθ[µ̄] or Lθ[E ] ⊆ Lθ[E ]. It might still hold however; see Question
5.2.
2.5 Separation results
Having proven many positive results about the relations between the virtual large
cardinals in the previous sections, this section is dedicated to the negatives. More
precisely, we will aim to separate many of the defined notions (potentially under
suitable large cardinal assumptions). See Figure 2.2 for an overview of the relations
between the various level-wise faint- and virtual large cardinals.
Our first separation result is that the virtuals form a level-by-level hierarchy.
Theorem 2.47 (N.). Let α < κ and assume that κ is faintly κ+α+2-measurable.
Then
Lκ |= pThere is a proper class of λ which are virtually λ+α+1-strongq.
Proof. Write θ := κ+α+1. Then by Theorem 2.10 we get that either κ is faintly
θ+-strong in L or otherwise, in particular, Lκ thinks that there is a proper class of
remarkables. In the second case we also get that Lκ thinks that there is a proper
class of λ such that λ is virtually λ+α+1-strong and we would be done, so assume
the first case. Then Lκ ≺2 Lθ+ , so define for each ξ < κ the sentence ψξ as
ψξ :≡ ∃λ > ξ : pλ is virtually λ+α+1-strongq.
Then ψξ is Σ2({α, ξ}) since being virtually β-strong is a ∆2({β})-statement. As
Lθ+ |= ψξ for all ξ < κ we also get that Lκ |= ψξ for all ξ < κ, which is what we
wanted to show. 
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As we are only assuming κ to be faintly measurable in the above, this also shows
that the faintly κ+α+1-measurable cardinals κ form a strict hierarchy whenever
α < κ.
A separation result in a similar vein is the following, showing that it is consistent
to have an inaccessible faintly measurable cardinal which is not weakly compact:
Proposition 2.48 (N.). Assuming κ is measurable, there is a generic extension of
V in which κ is inaccessible and faintly measurable, but not weakly compact.
Proof. Let P be the forcing notion that adds a κ-Suslin tree T . By [Kunen, 1978]
it then holds that P ∗ T ∼= Add(κ+, 1), a <κ+-closed forcing, which preserves
the measurability of κ. Further, the P forcing is shown to preserve the inaccesi-
bility of κ, making κ inaccesible and faintly measurable in V [g]. Lastly, it cannot
be weakly compact in V [g] because T is a κ-tree without a branch, by definition. 
Next, we show that the virtuals are in fact different from the faints. This is trivial
in general as successor cardinals can be faintly measurable and are never virtually
measurable, but the separation still holds true if we rule out this successor case.
For a slightly more fine-grained distinction let us define an intermediate large car-
dinal between the faintly and virtual.
Definition 2.49. Let κ < θ be infinite regular cardinals. Say that κ is faintly θ-
power-Φ for Φ ∈ {measurable, prestrong, strong} if it is faintly θ-Φ, witnessed by
an embedding π : HVθ → N , and PV (κ) = PN (κ). ◦
Note that the proof of Lemma 2.2 shows that faintly power-measurables are also
1-iterable and so in particular weakly compact. Our separation result is then the
following:
Theorem 2.50 (Gitman-N.). For Φ ∈ {measurable, prestrong, strong}, if κ is virtu-
ally Φ, then there exist forcing extensions V [G] and V [G∗] such that
(i) in V [G], κ is inaccessible and faintly Φ, but not faintly power-Φ, and
(ii) in V [G∗], κ is faintly power-Φ, but not virtually κ++-prestrong.
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Proof. We start with (i). Let us assume that κ is virtually measurable. This
implies, in particular, that for every regular θ > κ, we have generic embeddings
π : Hθ → M with critπ = κ such thatM ∈ V . Thus, by Proposition 1.53, we
can assume that the generic embedding π exists in a Col(ω,Hθ)-extension.
Let Pκ be the Easton support iteration that adds a Cohen subset to every regular
α < κ, and let G ⊆ Pκ be V -generic. Standard computations show that Pκ
preserves all inaccessible cardinals.
Fix a regular θ  κ and let h ⊆ Col(ω,Hθ) be V [G]-generic. In V [h], we
must have an elementary embedding π : Hθ →M with critπ = κ andM ∈ V ,
and we can assume without loss that M is countable. Obviously, π ∈ V [G][h].
Working in V [G][h], we will now lift π to an elementary embedding on Hθ[G]. To
ensure that such a lift exists, it suffices to find in V [G][h] an M-generic filter for
π(Pκ) containing π′′G17. Observe first that π′′G = G since the critical point of
π is κ and we can assume that Pκ ⊆ Vκ. Next, observe that π(Pκ) ∼= Pκ ∗ Ptail,
where Ptail is the forcing beyond κ. Since M[G] is countable, we can build an
M[G]-generic filter Gtail for Ptail in V [G][h]. Thus, G ∗ Gtail is M-generic for
π(Pκ), and so we can lift π to π : Hθ[G] → M[G][Gtail]. Since θ was chosen
arbitrarily, we have just shown that κ is faintly measurable in V [G].
Now suppose that κ is faintly power-measurable in V [G]. Fix regular θ < θ̄
and a generic elementary embedding σ : Hθ̄[G] → N with critσ = κ and
P(κ)V [G] = P(κ)N . By elementarity, HNσ(θ) = σ(Hθ)[σ(G)] is a forcing ex-
tension of K = σ(Hθ) by σ(G) = G ∗ Ḡtail ⊆ σ(Pκ) ∼= Pκ ∗ P̄tail. Thus, we
have the restrictions σ : Hθ → K and σ : Hθ[G]→ K[G][Ḡtail]. Let us argue that
PV [G](κ) ⊆ PK[G](κ), and hence we have equality. Suppose A ⊆ κ in V [G]
and let Ȧ be a nice Pκ-name for A, which can be coded by a subset of κ. Since
critσ = κ, we have that Ȧ ∈ K , and hence A = ȦG ∈ K[G]. But now it follows
that the K[G]-generic for Add(κ, 1), the forcing at stage κ in σ(Pκ), cannot be in
V [G]. Thus, we have reached a contradiction, showing that κ cannot be faintly
power-measurable in V [G].
If Φ = measurable, then we are done at this point. For Φ = prestrong we
simply note that G ∈M[G∗Gtail] so that H
V [G]
θ ⊆ N [G∗Gtail] as well, and since
we lifted π, we still have π(κ) > θ in the Φ = strong case.
17This standard lemma is referred to in the literature as the lifting criterion.
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For (ii), we change Pκ to only add Cohen subsets to successor cardinals λ < κ
and call the resulting forcing P∗κ. Let G∗ ⊆ P∗κ be V -generic. We verify that κ is
faintly-Φ as above by lifting an embedding π : Hθ →M, withM⊆ V , to
π : Hθ[G
∗]→M[G∗][Gtail]
in a collapse extension V [G∗][h]. The lifted embedding is κ-powerset preserv-
ing because a subset of κ fromM[G∗][Gtail] has to already be inM[G∗] as Ptail is
≤κ-closed, andM[G∗] ⊆ V [G∗]. So it remains to show that κ is not virtually κ++-
prestrong. Suppose it is and fix a generic embedding σ : Hκ++ [G∗]→ K[G∗][Gtail]
with critσ = κ and Hκ++ [G∗] ⊆ K[G∗][Gtail]. It follows that the generic subset
of κ+ added at stage κ+ by the tail forcing must be V [G∗]-generic, which is con-
tradictory. 
Starting from a much stronger hypothesis, it can be shown that a power-measurable
cardinal need not even be virtually κ+-measurable.
To see this, we first observe that virtually θ-measurable cardinals κ are Π21-
indescribable for all θ > κ. The proof is identical to the standard Hanf-Scott proof
that measurable cardinals are Π21-indescribable; see e.g. Hanf-Scott’s Proposition 6.5
in [Kanamori, 2008]. It should be noted that we crucially need the “virtual” property
for the proof to go through.
Using this indescribability fact, the proof of the following theorem is precisely
the same as Hamkins’ Proposition 8.2 in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018]:
Theorem 2.51 (Virtualised Hamkins). Assuming κ is a κ++-tall cardinal,18 there
is a forcing extension in which κ is not virtually κ+-measurable, but becomes
measurable in a further Add(κ+, 1)-generic extension.
This then immediately gives the separation result.
Corollary 2.52. Assuming κ is a κ++-tall cardinal, it is consistent that κ is faintly
power-measurable, but not virtually κ+-measurable.
18Recall that κ is κ++-tall if there is an elementary embedding j : V → M with crit j = κ,
κM ⊆M and j(κ) > κ++.
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Proof. By the above Theorem 2.51 we may assume that κ is not virtually κ+-
measurable but that it is measurable in V P for P := Add(κ+, 1), so that κ is faintly
power-measurable. 
In contrast to the above separation result, note that we showed in Corollary 2.18
and Theorem 2.22 that the faint-virtual distinction vanishes when we are dealing
with virtual pre-Woodin or Woodin cardinals.
Our next separation result is concerning the virtually prestrong and virtually
strong cardinals.
Corollary 2.53 (N.). There exists a virtually rank-into-rank cardinal iff there
is an uncountable cardinal θ and a virtually θ-prestrong cardinal which is not
virtually θ-strong.
Proof. (⇐) is directly from the above Proposition 2.11 and Theorem 2.10.
(⇒): Here we have to show that if there exists a virtually rank-into-rank car-
dinal then there exists a θ > κ and a virtually θ-prestrong cardinal which is not
virtually θ-strong. Let (κ, θ) be the lexicographically least pair such that κ is virtu-
ally θ-rank-into-rank, which trivially makes κ virtually θ-prestrong. If κ was also
virtually θ-strong then it would be Σ2-reflecting19, so that the statement that there
exists a virtually rank-into-rank cardinal would reflect down to HVκ , contradicting
the minimality of κ. 
Figure 2.2 summarises the separation results along with the results from Section
2.4. Note that it might be the case that virtually θ-measurables are always virtually
θ-prestrong (and hence also equivalent in L[µ] and K below a Woodin cardinal);
see Question 5.2.
2.6 Indestructibility
It is well-known that supercompact cardinals κ can be made indestructible by
all <κ-directed closed forcings by a suitable Laver preparatory forcing, which is
the main theorem in the seminal paper [Laver, 1978]. A natural question, then,
is whether similar results hold for the faintly and virtual versions. We noted in
19See Exercise 20.18 in [Jech, 2006], and Section 1.3 for a definition of Σn-reflecting cardinals.
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Figure 2.2: Direct implications between virtuals, where the red lines with crosses
indicate that ZFC does not prove the reverse implication.
Proposition 2.2 that the virtuals are weakly compact, so the following theorem from
[Jensen et al., 2009] shows that the consistency strength of indestructible virtual su-
percompacts is very large, potentially even in the realm of supercompacts:
Theorem 2.54 (Schindler). The consistency strength of a weakly compact cardinal
κ which is indestructible by <κ-directed closed forcing is larger than the consis-
tency strength of a proper class of strong cardinals and a proper class of Woodin
cardinals.
This gets close to resolving the question about the indestructible virtuals, so what
about the faintly supercompact cardinals? To make things a bit easier for ourselves,
let us make the notion a bit stronger.
Definition 2.55. Fix uncountable cardinals κ < θ. Then κ is generically setwise
θ-supercompact if there exists a generic extension V [g], a transitive N ∈ V [g]
and a generic elementary embedding π : HVθ → N , π ∈ V [g], with critπ = κ,
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π(κ) > θ and V [g] |= <θN ⊆ N . If it holds for all θ > κ then we say that κ is
generically setwise supercompact. ◦
Note that the only difference between a generically setwise θ-supercompact cardinal
and a virtually θ-supercompact cardinal is that the former is closed under sequences
in the generic extension, where the latter is only closed under sequences in V ; i.e.,
that V ∩ <θN ⊆ N .
Ostensibly this seems to be an incredibly strong notion, as the target model
now inherits a lot of structure from the generic extension. A first stab at an upper
consistency bound could be to note that if there exists a proper class of Woodin
cardinals then ω1 is generically setwise supercompact. This can be shown using
the countable stationary tower, see 2.7.7 and 2.7.8 in [Larson, 2004].
But, surprisingly, the following result from Usuba shows that they can exist in
L:
Theorem 2.56 ([Usuba, TBA]). If κ is virtually extendible then Col(ω,<κ) forces
that ω1 is generically setwise supercompact. 
It turns out that this slightly stronger notion does have indestructiblity properties.
We warm up by firstly showing that they are indestructible by small forcing.
Proposition 2.57 (N.-Schlicht). Generic setwise supercompactness of κ is inde-
structible for forcing notions of size < κ.
Proof. Fix a forcing P of size <κ and assume without loss of generality that
P ∈ HVκ , and fix also a cardinal θ > κ. Using the setwise supercompactness of
κ we may fix a forcing Q and a V -generic h ⊆ Q such that in V [h] we have an
elementary π : M := HVθ → N in V [h] with N <θ-closed.
Let g ⊆ P be V [h]-generic and work in V [g× h]. By the Lifting Criterion 1.51
we get a lift π̃ : M [g] → N [g] of π. If κ is a limit cardinal, then we may choose
a cardinal λ < κ such that P ∈ HVλ . Since P has the λ+-cc in V we get that
π(P) = P has the λ+-cc in N and hence in V [h] as well, making N [g] <θ-closed
by Lemma 1.54 and we are done.
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If κ = ν+, then there are no cardinals between ν and π(κ) in N and hence
|θ| ≤ ν . Thus it suffices to show thatN [g] is ν-closed. Since π(P) = P has size≤ν
in V , it has the ν+V [h]-cc in V [h]. Therefore N [g] is again <θ-closed by Lemma
1.54. 
Next, we show that these generic setwise supercompact cardinals κ are in fact
indestructible for<κ-directed closed forcings, without having to do any preparation
forcing at all.
Theorem 2.58 (N.-Schlicht). Generic setwise supercompactness of κ is indestruc-
tible for <κ-directed closed forcings.
Proof. Suppose that κ is generically setwise supercompact, P is a <κ-directed
closed forcing and g is P-generic over V . We will show that κ is generically setwise
supercompact in V [g].
In V fix a regular θ > κ such that P ∈ HVθ , and let Q be the forcing given
by the definition of setwise supercompactness. Let h be Q-generic over V [g]. Let
π : HVθ → N be as in the definition of generically setwise supercompactness, so
that π ∈ V [h] ⊆ V [g × h]. Work in V [g × h].
We may assume that θ = θ<θ holds, as otherwise we just replace Q with
Q∗Col(θ, θ<θ)  we retain the<θ-closure ofN because Col(θ, θ<θ) is<θ-closed.
We can further assume that |N | = θ<θ = θ, as otherwise we can take a hull of
N containing ran(π) and recursively close under <θ-sequences, ending up with a
<θ-closed elementary substructure H ≺ N containing ran(π) – now replace N
by the transitive collapse of H.
Claim 2.59. There is a π(P)-generic filter g̃ over N that extends π[g].
Proof of claim. Since N is (in particular) |P|-closed in V [h] and P is trivially
|P|+-cc, Lemma 1.54 implies thatN is still |P|-closed in V [g×h]. As below, we
thus still get that π[g] ∈ N . Now work in V [h], where we have full <θ-closure
of N .
Since π(P) is directed, there is a condition q ≤ π[g] in π(P). Using the
fact that |N | = θ and π(P) is <θ-closed, we can construct a π(P)-generic filter
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g̃ over N with q ∈ g. Namely, enumerate the dense subsets of π(P) that are
elements of N in order type θ and use the fact that the initial segments of the
sequence, and of the corresponding sequence of conditions that we construct,
are in N . Then g̃ is as required. a
Since we now have that π[g] ⊆ g̃ by the claim, the lifting criterion implies that we
can lift π to π̃ : HVθ [g]→ N [g̃].
It thus remains to see that N [g̃] is <θ-closed. To see this, take a sequence
~x = 〈xi | i < γ〉 with γ < θ and xi ∈ N [g̃] and find names σi ∈ N with σg̃i = xi
for all i < γ. Since <θN ⊆ N we have that ~σ = 〈σi | i < γ〉 ∈ N , and from ~σ
we obtain a canonical name ~σ• ∈ N with ~σ•g̃ = ~x ∈ N [g̃]. 
Investigating further, we also show indestructibility for some forcings that do not
fall into the above-mentioned categories.
Proposition 2.60 (N.-Schlicht). Generic setwise supercompactness of a regular
cardinal κ is indestructible for Add(ω, κ). If κ is a successor cardinal then it
is also indestructible for Col(ω,<κ).
Proof. Let g be Add(ω, κ)-generic over V . In V fix a regular θ > κ and let Q be
the forcing given by the definition of generic setwise supercompactness. Let h be
Q-generic over V [g] and work in V [g × h].
Let π : HVθ → N be as in the definition of generically setwise supercompact-
ness. Moreover, let g̃ be Add(ω, π(κ))-generic over V [g × h]. Since π[g] = g, the
lifting criterion allows us to extend π to some π̃ : HVθ [g] → N [g × g̃]. To show
that N [g × g̃] is <θ-closed in V [g × h× g̃], it suffices that Add(ω, π(κ)) has the
ccc by Lemma 1.54.
For Col(ω,<κ), we proceed similarly. Assume that κ = ν+. Take Col(ω,<κ)-
, Q- and Col(ω,<π(κ))-generic filters g, h and g̃. π and N are as above. Since
ν < κ < θ < π(κ) and there are no cardinals between ν and π(κ) (in N and
thus also in V [h]), <θ-closure means ν-closure (in any model containing V [h]).
By Lemma 1.54, it is thus sufficient to know that Col(ω,<π(κ)) has the ν+-cc in
V [g × h]. This is because π(κ) = ν+N ≤ ν+V [g×h]. 
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Usuba’s Theorem 2.56 shows that the consistency strength of these generically set-
wise supercompact cardinals is small, but do they appear naturally anywhere? The
following result shows that we cannot find any in either L, L[µ] nor K below a
measurable cardinal:
Proposition 2.61 (N.-Schlicht). No cardinal κ is generically setwise supercompact
in either L, K below a measurable cardinal, or L[µ] with µ being a normal
ultrafilter.
Proof. Assume first that V = L and that κ is generically setwise supercompact.
Let g be a generic filter and π : Lθ → N an embedding in V [g] with π Lκ+L ∈ N .
ThenN = Lα for some α by condensation and thus π Hκ+L ∈ L. But this would
induce a <κ-complete ultrafilter on κ, contradicting V = L.
Assume now that there exists no inner model with a measurable cardinal and
let K be the core model. Let κ be generically setwise supercompact in K and
π : K|θ → N be the generic elementary embedding. As above we get that
π Hκ+K ∈ N ,
so that again N has a measure on κ. But that means that K|κ has a measurable
cardinal, which is a contradiction since κ is inaccessible (in both V and K) and
therefore K|κ |= ZFC, contradicting our assumption that no inner model with a
measurable cardinal exists.
Assume now that V = L[µ] and that κ is generically setwise supercompact,
witnessed by a generic embedding π : Lθ[µ] → Lα[µ̄]. In particular this means
that π Lκ+L[µ] [µ] ∈ Lα[µ̄]. If critµ < κ then µ = µ̄ and
PL[µ](κ) = PL[µ̄](κ),
so that both π(κ) and κ are now measurable cardinals in L[µ̄], contradicting Solo-
vay’s Lemma [Kanamori, 2008, 20.2]. So critµ ≥ κ.
If π(critµ) > critµ then by Kunen’s Theorem [Kanamori, 2008, 20.12] we get
that L[µ̄] is an iterate of L[µ]. But iteration embeddings preserve the subsets of
their critical point, so again we have that PL[µ](κ) = PL[µ̄] and we get the same
contradiction as before.
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Lastly, if critµ > κ and π(critµ) = critµ then µ = µ̄ by Kunen’s Theorem
[Kanamori, 2008, 20.10], so we get a contradiction as in the critµ < κ case. 
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3 | Filters & Games
Moving away from the pure theory of the virtual large cardinals from Chapter 2, we
now move to connections between these large cardinals and common set-theoretic
objects of study. In this chapter those objects are filters and games, with the next
chapter dealing with connections to ideals. This chapter covers the content of the
paper [Nielsen and Welch, 2019], which started out as a further analysis of the re-
sults in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] and somewhat surprisingly we ended up in the
realm of virtual large cardinals. In the process, we answer almost every open ques-
tion raised in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018].
We will in this section be dealing with many properties of M-measures1, so
we start with a couple of definitions.
Definition 3.1. Let κ be a cardinal, M a weak κ-model and µ an M-measure.
Then µ is...
• M-normal if (M,∈, µ) |= ∀ ~X ∈ κµ : 4 ~X ∈ µ;
• genuine if |4 ~X| = κ for every κ-sequence ~X ∈ κµ;
• normal if 4 ~X is stationary in κ for every κ-sequence ~X ∈ κµ;
• 0-good, or simply good, if it has a well-founded ultrapower when applied to
M;
• α-good for α > 0 if it is weakly amenable and has α-many well-founded
iterated ultrapowers when applied toM. ◦
We emphasise that the main difference betweenM-normality and normality (and
genuineness) is that the former is local and the latter are global.
We note a few basic relations between these properties.
Proposition 3.2. Let κ be an uncountable cardinal,M a weak κ-model. Then
(i) Every genuineM-measure on κ is countably complete;
1See Section 1.1 for the definitions of weak κ-modelsM and their associatedM-measures.
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(ii) Every countably complete weakly amenableM-measure on κ is α-good for
all ordinals α.
Proof. (i): Let µ be a genuineM-measure on κ. To show countable completeness,
let ~X ∈ ωµ be an ω-sequence of measure one sets and define a κ-sequence ~Y ∈ κµ
as Yn := Xn for n < ω and Yα := κ for α ∈ [ω, κ). Then
∣∣∣4~Y ∣∣∣ = κ as µ
is genuine, so letting α ∈ 4~Y − ω we get that α ∈
⋂ ~X , making µ countably
complete.
(ii): Now let µ be a countably complete weakly amenableM-measure on κ.
Firstly note that countable completeness implies that the ultrapower Ult(M, µ) is
well-founded. Next, weak amenability implies that X := {α < κ | Xα ∈ µ} ∈ M
for every ~X ∈ κµ ∩M since we can rewrite the set as
X = {α < κ | Xα ∈ {Xβ | β < κ} ∩ µ}
and weak amenability ensures that {Xα | α < κ} ∩ µ ∈ M. From this we can
form iterated ultrapowers as in Chapter 19 of [Kanamori, 2008], which will all be
well-founded by countable completeness of the measure. 
Holy and Schlicht provided the following characterisation of the normal measures:
Lemma 3.3 ([Holy and Schlicht, 2018]). Let M be a weak κ-model and µ an M-
measure. Then µ is normal iff 4 ~X is stationary for some enumeration ~X of
µ.
Proof. (⇒) is trivial since
∣∣∣ ~X∣∣∣ = |µ| ≤ |M| = κ, so assume that ~X is an
enumeration of µ such that 4 ~X is stationary. Let ~Y ∈ κµ be a κ-sequence and
define g : κ → κ such that Yα = Xg(α) for α < κ. Letting Cg ⊆ κ be the club of
closure points of g we get that 4 ~X ∩ Cg ⊆ 4~Y ∩ Cg , making 4~Y stationary. 
We next move on to the games. All of our games will be two-player games with
perfect information; see e.g. [Kanamori, 2008, Chapter 27] for an introduction to
set-theoretic game theory. We will also, mostly for convenience, use the following
game equivalence notion:
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Definition 3.4. Two games G0 and G1 are said to be game equivalent, or simply
equivalent, if player I has a winning strategy in G0 iff they have one in G1, and
player II has a winning strategy in G0 iff they have one in G1. We will also denote
such an equivalence as G0 ∼ G1. ◦
The following is a game which was introduced by Holy and Schlicht and led to
their notion of α-Ramsey cardinals:
Definition 3.5 ([Holy and Schlicht, 2018]). For an uncountable cardinal κ = κ<κ,
a regular cardinal γ ≤ κ and a regular cardinal θ > κ define the game wfGθγ(κ)
of length γ as follows.
I M0 M1 M2 · · ·
II µ0 µ1 µ2 · · ·
HereMα ≺ Hθ is a κ-model and µα is anMα-measure, theMα’s and µα’s are
⊆-increasing and 〈Mξ | ξ < α〉, 〈µξ | ξ < α〉 ∈ Mα for every α < γ. Letting
µ :=
⋃
α<γ µα and M :=
⋃
α<γMα, player II wins iff µ is an M-normal good
M-measure. ◦
We will also be using the following fact due to Holy and Schlicht, that the games
wfGθγ(κ) do not depend upon the values of θ:
Lemma 3.6 ([Holy and Schlicht, 2018] 3.3). For a fixed κ and γ, wfGθ0γ (κ) and
wfGθ1γ (κ) are equivalent for any regular θ0, θ1 > κ. 
See the proof of Proposition 3.8 below for an idea of the proof strategy of this lemma.
We will be working with the following variant of the wfGγ(κ) games in which
we require less of player I and more of player II. It will turn out that this change of
game is innocuous, as Proposition 3.12 will show that they are (game) equivalent:
Definition 3.7 (Holy-N.-Schlicht). Let κ = κ<κ be an uncountable cardinal, γ ≤ κ
and ζ ordinals and θ > κ a regular cardinal. Then define the following filter game
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Gθγ(κ, ζ) with (γ+1)-many rounds:
I M0 M1 · · · Mγ
II µ0 µ1 · · · µγ
HereMα ≺ Hθ is a weak κ-model for every α ≤ γ, µα is a normalMα-measure
for α < γ, µγ is anMγ-normal goodMγ-measure and theMα’s and µα’s are ⊆-





ξ<α µξ and that µα is ζ-good. Player II wins iff they could continue to play
throughout all (γ+1)-many rounds. ◦
Note that we assume that κ = κ<κ is uncountable in the definition of the games
that we are considering, so this is a standing assumption throughout this chapter,
whenever any one of the above two games are considered.
As in Lemma 3.6, we do not have to worry about the θ parameter. The proof is
almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3.6, but we supply it here for completeness.
Proposition 3.8 ([Holy and Schlicht, 2018]). Gθ0γ (κ) ∼ Gθ1γ (κ) for all regular car-
dinals θ0, θ1 > κ.
Proof. Fix regular cardinals θ0, θ1 > κ. First assume that player I has a winning
strategy σ0 in Gθ0γ (κ); we will informally describe a winning strategy σ1 for player
I in Gθ1γ (κ). Whenever σ0 plays a weak κ-modelMα ≺ Hθ0 we simply let σ1 play




which is by definition an elementary substructure of Hθ1 . Then any response from
player II in Gθ1γ (κ) is also a valid response in Gθ0γ (κ), as PMα(κ) ⊆PM̃α(κ), so
σ1 is well-defined. Further, as σ0 is winning for player I, we get that µγ , the last
measure played by player II in Gθ0γ (κ), does not have a well-founded ultrapower
when applied toMγ . This is witnessed by an ω-sequence 〈fn | n < ω〉 of functions
fn : κ→ κ inMγ such that
{α < κ | fn+1(α) ∈ fn(α} ∈ µγ .
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These fn’s can be encoded as subsets of κ, so that fn ∈ M̃γ as well, meaning that
µγ does not have a well-founded ultrapower when applied to M̃γ either.
Next, assume that player II has a winning strategy τ0 in Gθ0γ (κ); again we de-
scribe a winning strategy τ1 for player II in Gθ1γ (κ). Here, every time player I plays
some M in Gθ1γ (κ) we form M̃ ≺ Hθ0 as above and let τ1’s response to M be
τ0’s response to M̃. Since τ0’s measures have well-founded ultrapowers when ap-
plied to the M̃γ ’s, they will also have well-founded ultrapowers when applied to
theMα’s, for the same reason as above. 
We will for convenience write Gθγ(κ) for the game Gθγ(κ, 0), and with the above
Proposition 3.8 in mind we will also write Gγ(κ) for Gθγ(κ).
We will at times work with the following weakening of the filter game:
Definition 3.9 (N.). Define the weak filter game G−γ (κ, ζ) like Gκ
+
γ (κ, ζ), but
where we do not require that µγ is ζ-good. ◦
We will also be working with the following variant of these games:
Definition 3.10 (N.). Define the Cohen game Cθγ(κ) as Gθγ(κ) but where we re-
quire that |Mα−Hκ| < γ for every α < γ, i.e. that we only allow player I to
add <γ new elements to the models in each round, and where we only require
Mα |= ZFC− andMα ≺ Hθ for α ≤ γ limit.2
Also define the weak Cohen game C−γ (κ) in analogy with G−γ (κ). ◦
Proposition 3.11 (N.). Assume γℵ0 = γ and let κ be regular. Then C−γ (κ) is
equivalent to Cθγ(κ) for all regular θ > κ. In particular, if CH holds then C−ω1(κ)
is equivalent to Cθω1(κ) for all regular θ > κ.
Proof. The assumption that γℵ0 = γ allows us to ensure without loss of generality
that ωMα ⊆Mγ holds for all α < γ: If player I has a winning strategy in Cθγ(κ)
for some regular θ > κ then they still win if we require that ωMα ⊆ Mγ (since
they are only enlargening their models, making it even harder for player II to win),
2Cθω(κ) is similar to the H(F, λ)-games in [Donder and Levinski, 1989].
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in which case the final measure µγ is countably complete and hence automatically
has a well-founded ultrapower.
If player II has a winning strategy in C−γ (κ) then they still win if player I plays
Mα such that ωMα ⊆Mγ , ensuring that µγ has a well-founded ultrapower. 
Proposition 3.12 (Holy-N.-Schlicht). Gθγ(κ), Gθγ(κ, 1) and wfGθγ(κ) are all game
equivalent for all limit ordinals γ ≤ κ, and Gθγ(κ, ζ) is equivalent to Gθγ(κ)
whenever cof γ > ω and ζ ∈ On.
Proof. We start by showing the latter statement, so assume that cof γ > ω.
Consider now the auxilliary game, call it G, which is exactly like Gθγ(κ, 0), but where
we also require that ωMα ⊆ Mα+1 and 〈Mξ | ξ ≤ α〉, 〈µξ | ξ ≤ α〉 ∈ Mα+1
for every α < γ.
Claim 3.13. G is equivalent to Gθγ(κ).
Proof of claim. If player I has a winning strategy in G then they also have
one in Gθγ(κ), by doing exactly the same. Analogously, if player II has a winning
strategy in Gθγ(κ) then they also have one in G. If player I has a winning strategy
σ in Gθγ(κ) then we can construct a winning strategy σ′ in G, which is defined as
follows. Fix α ≤ γ and, writing ~Mξ := 〈Mξ | ξ ≤ α〉 and ~µξ := 〈µξ | ξ ≤ α〉,
we set
σ′(〈Mξ, µξ | ξ ≤ α〉) := HullHθ(σ(〈Mξ, µξ | ξ ≤ α〉) ∪ ωMα ∪ { ~Mξ, ~µξ}),
i.e. that we are simply throwing the sequences into our models and making sure
that we are still an elementary substructure ofHθ . This new strategy σ′ is clearly
winning. Assuming now that τ is a winning strategy for player II in G, we define
a winning strategy τ ′ for player II in Gθγ(κ) by letting τ ′(〈Mξ, µξ | ξ ≤ α〉)
be the result of throwing in the appropriate sequences into the modelsMξ , ap-
plying τ to get a measure, and intersecting that measure with Mα to get an
Mα-measure. a
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Now, letting Mγ be the final model of a play of G, cof γ > ω implies that any
ω-sequence ~X ∈ Mγ really is a sequence of elements from someMξ for ξ < γ,
so that ~X ∈ Mξ+1 by definition of G, makingMγ closed under ω-sequences and
thus also µγ countably complete. Since γ is a limit ordinal and the models contain
the previous measures and models as elements, the proof of e.g. Theorem 5.6 in
[Holy and Schlicht, 2018] shows that µγ is also weakly amenable, making it ζ-good
for all ordinals ζ .
Now we deal with the first statement, stating that Gθγ(κ), Gθγ(κ, 1) andwfGθγ(κ)
are all game equivalent for all limit ordinals γ ≤ κ. Fix a limit ordinal γ. Firstly
Gθγ(κ) is equivalent to Gθγ(κ, 1) as above, since the proof of Theorem 5.6 in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018]
shows that µγ is weakly amenable when γ is a limit ordinal. So it remains to
show that Gθγ(κ) is equivalent to wfGθγ(κ). If player I has a winning strategy σ in
wfGθγ(κ) then define a winning strategy σ′ for player I in Gθγ(κ) as
σ′(〈Mξ, µξ | ξ ≤ α〉) := σ(〈M0, µ0〉a〈Mξ+1, µξ+1 | ξ + 1 ≤ α〉)
and for limit ordinals α ≤ γ set σ′(〈Mξ, µξ | ξ < α〉) :=
⋃
ξ<αMξ ; i.e. they
simply follow the same strategy as in wfGθγ(κ) but plug in unions at limit stages.
Likewise, if player II had a winning strategy in Gθγ(κ) then they also have a winning
strategy in wfGθγ(κ), this time just by skipping the limit steps in Gθγ(κ).
Now assume that player I has a winning strategy σ in Gθγ(κ) and that player I
does not have a winning strategy in wfGθγ(κ). Then define a strategy σ′ for player
I in wfGθγ(κ) as follows. Let s = 〈Mα, µα | α ≤ η〉 be a partial play of wfGθγ(κ)
and let s′ be the modified version of s in which we have “inserted” unions at limit
steps, just as in the above paragraph. We can assume that every µα in s′ is good and
Mα-normal as otherwise player II has already lost and player I can play anything.
Now, we want to show that s′ is a valid partial play of Gθγ(κ). All the models in s
are κ-models, so in particular weak κ-models.
Claim 3.14. Every µα in s′ is normal.
Proof of claim. Assume without loss of generality that α = η. Let player I
play any legal responseM to s in wfGθγ(κ) (such a response always exists). If
player II cannot respond then player I has a winning strategy by simply following
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s∩〈M〉,  , so player II does have a response µ to s∩M. But now the rules of
wfGθγ(κ) ensure that µη ∈M, so since
(M,∈, µ) |= ∀ ~X ∈ κµ : p4 ~X is stationary in κq,
we then also get thatM |= p4µη is stationary in κq since µη ⊆ µ, so elemen-
tarity ofM inHθ implies that4µη really is stationary in κ, making µη normal. a
This makes s′ a valid partial play of Gθγ(κ), so we may form the weak κ-model
M̃η := σ(s′). Now let Mη ≺ Hθ be a κ-model with M̃η ⊆ Mη and s ∈ Mη
and set σ′(s) :=Mη . This defines the strategy σ′ for player I in wfGθγ(κ), which
is winning since the winning condition for the two games is the same for γ a limit.
More precisely, that σ is winning in Gθγ(κ) means that there is a sequence
〈fn : κ→ κ | n < ω〉
with the fn’s all being elements of the last model M̃γ , witnessing the ill-foundedness
of the ultrapower. But then all these functions will also be elements of the union





α<γ µα ill-founded as well.
Next, assume that player II has a winning strategy τ in wfGθγ(κ). We recur-
sively define a strategy τ̃ for player II in Gθγ(κ) as follows. If M̃0 is the first move by
player I in Gθγ(κ), letM0 ≺ Hθ be a κ-model with M̃0 ⊆M0, makingM0 a valid
move for player I in wfGθγ(κ). Write µ0 := τ(〈M0〉) and then set τ̃(〈M̃0〉) to be
µ̃0 := µ0∩M̃0, which again is normal by the same trick as above, making µ̃0 a legal
move for player II in Gθγ(κ). Successor stages α + 1 in the construction are analo-
gous, but we also make sure that 〈Mξ | ξ < α+ 1〉, 〈µξ | ξ < α+ 1〉 ∈ Mα+1. At
limit stages τ outputs unions, as is required by the rules of Gθγ(κ). Since the union
of all the µα’s is good as τ is winning, µ̃γ :=
⋃
α<γ µ̃α is good as well, making τ̃
winning and we are done. 
We now arrive at the definitions of the cardinals we will be considering. They were
in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] only defined for γ being a cardinal, but given the above
result we generalise it to all ordinals γ.
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Definition 3.15. Let κ be a cardinal and γ ≤ κ an ordinal. Then κ is γ-Ramsey
if player I does not have a winning strategy in Gθγ(κ) for all regular θ > κ. We
furthermore say that κ is strategic γ-Ramsey if player II does have a winning
strategy in Gθγ(κ) for all regular θ > κ.
Define (strategic) genuine γ-Ramseys and (strategic) normal γ-Ramseys anal-
ogously, but where we require the last measure µγ to be genuine and normal, re-
spectively. ◦
Definition 3.16 (N.). A cardinal κ is<γ-Ramsey if it is α-Ramsey for every α < γ,
almost fully Ramsey if it is <κ-Ramsey and fully Ramsey if it is κ-Ramsey.
Further, say that κ is coherent<γ-Ramsey if it is strategic α-Ramsey for every
α < γ and that there exists a choice of winning strategies τα in Gα(κ) for player II
satisfying that τα ⊆ τβ whenever α < β. In other words, there is a single strategy
τ for player II in Gγ(κ) such that τ is a winning strategy for player II in Gα(κ) for
every α < γ, but we do not require τ to be winning in Gγ(κ)3. ◦
This is not the original definition of (strategic) γ-Ramsey cardinals however, as this
involved elementary embeddings between weak κ-models – but as the following
theorem due to Holy and Schlicht shows, the two definitions coincide whenever γ
is a regular cardinal:
Theorem 3.17 ([Holy and Schlicht, 2018]). For regular cardinals λ, a cardinal κ is
λ-Ramsey iff for arbitrarily large θ > κ and every subset A ⊆ κ there is a weak
κ-model M ≺ Hθ with M<λ ⊆ M and A ∈ M with an M-normal 1-good
M-measure µ on κ. 
3.1 The finite case
In this section we are going to consider properties of the n-Ramsey cardinals for
finite n. Note in particular that the Gθn(κ) games are determined, making the “strate-
gic” adjective superfluous in this case. We further note that the θ’s are also dispen-
sible in this finite case:
3Note that, with this terminology, “coherent” is a stronger notion than “strategic”. We could have
called the cardinals coherent strategic <γ-Ramseys, but we opted for brevity instead.
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Proposition 3.18 (N.). Let κ < θ be regular cardinals and n < ω. Then player
II has a winning strategy in Gθn(κ) iff they have a winning strategy in the game
Gn(κ), which is defined as Gθn(κ) except that we do not require thatMn ≺ Hθ .
Proof. ⇐ is clear, so assume that II has a winning strategy τ in Gθn(κ). Whenever
player I plays Mk in Gn(κ) for k ≤ n then define M∗k := HullHθ(P), where
P ∼= Mk is the transitive collapse ofMk , and playM∗k in Gθn(κ). Let µk be the
τ -responses to theM∗k ’s and let player II play the µk ’s in Gn(κ) as well.
Assume that this new strategy is not winning for player II in Gn(κ), so that
Ult(Mn, µn) is ill-founded. This is witnessed by some ~f := 〈fk | k < ω〉 of
fk ∈ κo(Mn)∩Mn with Xk := {α < κ | fk+1(α) < fk(α)} ∈ µn for all k < ω.
Let ν  κ, H := cHullHν (Mn ∪{~f,Mn, µn}) be the transitive collapse of the
Skolem hull HullHν (Mn ∪{~f,Mn, µn}), and π : H → Hν be the uncollapse;
write x̄ := π−1(x) for all x ∈ ranπ.
Now Ā = A for every A ∈ P(κ) ∩Mn and thus also µ̄n = µn. But now
the f̄k ’s witness that Ult(M̄n, µn) is ill-founded and thus also that Ult(M∗n, µn)
is ill-founded sinceM∗n = HullHθ(M̄n), contradicting that τ is winning. 
For this reason we will work with the Gn(κ) games throughout this section. Since
we do not have to deal with the θ’s anymore we note that n-Ramseyness can now
be described using a Π12n+2-formula and normal n-Ramseyness using a Π12n+3-
formula.
We have the following characterisations:
Theorem 3.19 ([Abramson et al., 1977]). Let κ = κ<κ be a cardinal. Then
(i) κ is weakly compact if and only if it is 0-Ramsey;
(ii) κ is weakly ineffable if and only if it is genuine 0-Ramsey;
(iii) κ is ineffable if and only if it is normal 0-Ramsey.
Proof. This is mostly just changing the terminology in [Abramson et al., 1977] to
the current game-theoretic one, so we only show (i).
Theorem 1.1.3 in [Abramson et al., 1977] shows that κ is weakly compact if
and only if every κ-sized collection of subsets of κ is measured by a <κ-complete
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measure, in the sense that every <κ-sequence (in V ) of measure one sets has a
non-empty intersection.
For the⇒ direction we can let player II respond to anyM0 by first getting the
<κ-completeM0-measure ν0 on κ from the above-mentioned result, forming the
(well-founded) ultrapower π : M0 → Ult(M0, ν) and then playing the derived
measure of π, which isM0-normal and good. For⇐, ifX ⊆P(κ) has size κ then,
using that κ = κ<κ, we can find a κ-model M0 ≺ Hθ with X ⊆ M0. Letting
player I playM0 in G0(κ) we get someM0-normal goodM0-measure µ0 on κ.
SinceM0 is closed under <κ-sequences we get that µ0 is <κ-complete. 
3.1.1 Indescribability
In this section we aim to prove that n-Ramseys are Π12n+1-indescribable and that
normal n-Ramseys are Π12n+2-indescribable, which will also establish that the hi-
erarchy of alternating n-Ramseys and normal n-Ramseys forms a strict hierarchy.
Recall the following definition:
Definition 3.20. A cardinal κ is Π1n-indescribable if whenever ϕ(v) is a Πn for-
mula, X ⊆ Vκ and Vκ+1 |= ϕ[X], then there is an ordinal α < κ such that
Vα+1 |= ϕ[X ∩ Vα]. ◦
Our first indescribability result is then the following, where the n = 0 case is
inspired by the proof of weakly compact cardinals being Π11-indescribable  see
[Abramson et al., 1977].
Theorem 3.21 (N.). Every n-Ramsey κ is Π12n+1-indescribable for n < ω.
Proof. Let κ be n-Ramsey and assume that it is not Π12n+1-indescribable, wit-
nessed by a Π2n+1-formula ϕ(v) and a subsetX ⊆ Vκ, meaning that Vκ+1 |= ϕ[X]
and, for every α < κ, Vα+1 |= ¬ϕ[X ∩ Vα]. We will deal with the (2n+ 1)-many
quantifiers occuring in ϕ in (n+1)-many steps. We will here describe the first two
steps with the remaining steps following the same pattern.
First step. Write ϕ(v) ≡ ∀v1ψ(v, v1) for a Σ2n-formula ψ(v, v1). As we are
assuming that Vα+1 |= ¬ϕ[X ∩ Vα] holds for every α < κ, we can pick witnesses
A
(0)
α ⊆ Vα to the outermost existential quantifier in ¬ϕ[X ∩ Vα].
75 of 130
Chapter 3. Filters & Games 3.1. The finite case
Let M0 be a weak κ-model such that Vκ ⊆ M0 and ~A(0), X ∈ M0. Fix
a good M0-normal M0-measure µ0 on κ, using the 0-Ramseyness of κ. Form
A(0) := [ ~A(0)]µ0 ∈ Ult(M0, µ0), where we without loss of generality may assume
that the ultrapower is transitive. M0-normality of µ0 implies that A(0) ⊆ Vκ, so
that we have that Vκ+1 |= ψ[X,A(0)]. Now Loś’ Lemma,M0-normality of µ0 and
Vκ ⊆M0 also ensures that
Ult(M0, µ0) |= pVκ+1 |= ¬ψ[X,A(0)]q. (1)
This finishes the first step. Note that if n = 0 then ¬ψ would be a ∆0-formula,
so that (1) would be absolute to the true Vκ+1, yielding a contradiction. If n > 0
we cannot yet conclude this however, but that is what we are aiming for in the
remaining steps.
Second step. Write ψ(v, v1) ≡ ∃v2∀v3χ(v, v1, v2, v3) for a Σ2(n−1)-formula
χ(v, v1, v2, v3). Since we have established that Vκ+1 |= ψ[X,A(0)] we can pick
some B(0) ⊆ Vκ such that
Vκ+1 |= ∀v3χ[X,A(0), B(0), v3] (2)
which then also means that, for every α < κ,
Vα+1 |= ∃v3¬χ[X ∩ Vα, A(0)α , B(0) ∩ Vα, v3]. (3)
Fix witnesses A(1)α ⊆ Vα to the existential quantifier in (3) and define the sets
S(0)α := {ξ < κ | A
(0)
ξ ∩ Vα = A
(0) ∩ Vα}
for every α < κ and note that S(0)α ∈ µ0 for every α < κ, since Vκ ⊆M0 ensures
that A(0) ∩ Vα ∈ M0 and M0-normality of µ0 then implies that S(0)α ∈ µ0 is
equivalent to
Ult(M0, µ0) |= A(0) ∩ Vα = A(0) ∩ Vα,
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which is clearly the case. Now let M1 ⊇ M0 be a weak κ-model such that
A(0), ~A(1), ~S(0), B(0) ∈ M1. Let µ1 ⊇ µ0 be anM1-normalM1-measure on κ,
using the 1-Ramseyness of κ, so thatM1-normality of µ1 yields that 4~S(0) ∈ µ1.
Observe that ξ ∈ 4~S(0) if and only if A(0)ξ ∩ Vα = A
(0) ∩ Vα for every α < ξ,
so if ξ is a limit ordinal then it holds that A(0)ξ = A
(0) ∩ Vξ . Now, as before, form
A(1) := [ ~A(1)]µ1 ∈ Ult(M1, µ1), so that (2) implies that
Vκ+1 |= χ[X,A(0), B(0),A(1)]
and the definition of the A(1)α ’s along with (3) gives that, for every α < κ,
Vα+1 |= ¬χ[X ∩ Vα, A(0)α , B(0) ∩ Vα, A(1)α ].
Now this, paired with the above observation regarding4~S(0), means that for every
α ∈ 4~S(0) ∩ Lim we have that
Vα+1 |= ¬χ[X ∩ Vα,A(0) ∩ Vα, B(0) ∩ Vα, A(1)α ],
so thatM1-normality of µ1 and Loś’ lemma implies that
Ult(M1, µ1) |= pVκ+1 |= ¬χ[X,A(0), B(0),A(1)]q.
This finishes the second step. Continue in this way for a total of (n + 1)-many
steps, ending with a ∆0-formula φ(v, v1, . . . , v2n+1) such that
Vκ+1 |= φ[X,A(0), B(0), . . . ,A(n−1), B(n−1),A(n)] (4)
and that Ult(Mn, µn) |= pVκ+1 |= ¬φ[X,A(0), B(0), . . . ,A(n)]q. But now abso-
luteness of ¬φ means that Vκ+1 |= ¬φ[X,A(0), B(0), . . . ,A(n)], which contradicts
(4) above. 
Note that this is optimal, as we saw that n-Ramseyness can be described by a
Π12n+2-formula. As a corollary we then immediately get the following:
Corollary 3.22 (N.). Every <ω-Ramsey cardinal is ∆20-indescribable. 
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The second indescribability result concerns the normal n-Ramseys, where the n = 0
case here is inspired by the proof of ineffable cardinals being Π12-indescribable 
see [Abramson et al., 1977].
Theorem 3.23 (N.). Every normal n-Ramsey κ is Π12n+2-indescribable for n < ω.
Before we commence with the proof, note that we cannot simply do the same thing
as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.21, as we would end up with a Π11 statement in
an ultrapower, and as Π11 statements are not upwards absolute in general we would
not be able to get our contradiction.
Proof. Let κ be normal n-Ramsey and assume that it is not Π12n+2-indescribable,
witnessed by a Π2n+2-formula ϕ(v) and a subset X ⊆ Vκ. Use that κ is n-
Ramsey to perform the same n + 1 steps as in the proof of Theorem 3.21. This
gives us a Σ1-formula φ(v, v1, . . . , v2n+1) along with sequences 〈A(0), · · · ,A(n)〉,
〈B(0), . . . , B(n−1)〉 and a play 〈Mk, µk | k ≤ n〉 of Gn(κ) in which player II wins
and µn is normal, such that
Vκ+1 |= φ[X,A(0), B(0), . . . ,A(n−1), B(n−1),A(n)] (1)
and, for µn-many α < κ,
Vα+1 |= ¬φ[X ∩ Vα,A(0) ∩ Vα, B(0) ∩ Vα, . . . ,A(n−1) ∩ Vα, B(n−1) ∩ Vα, A(n)α ].
Now form S(n)α ∈ µn as in the proof of Theorem 3.21. The main difference now is
that we do not know if ~S(n) ∈Mn (in the proof of Theorem 3.21 we only ensured
that ~S(k) ∈ Mk+1 for every k < n and we only defined ~S(k) for k < n), but we
can now use normality4 of µn to ensure that we do have that 4~S(n) is stationary
in κ. This means that we get a stationary set S ⊆ κ such that for every α ∈ S it
holds that
Vα+1 |= ¬φ[X ∩ Vα,A(0) ∩ Vα, B(0) ∩ Vα, . . . , B(n−1) ∩ Vα,A(n) ∩ Vα]. (2)
4Recall that this is stronger than just requiring it to beMn-normal  we do not require ~S(n) ∈Mn.
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Now note that since κ is inaccessible it is Σ11-indescribable, meaning that we can
reflect (1). Furthermore, Lemma 3.4.3 of [Abramson et al., 1977] shows that the set
of reflection points of Σ11-formulas is in fact club, so intersecting this club with S
we get a ζ ∈ S satisfying that
Vζ+1 |= φ[X ∩ Vζ ,A(0) ∩ Vζ , B(0) ∩ Vζ , . . . , B(n−1) ∩ Vζ ,A(n) ∩ Vζ ],
contradicting (2). 
Note that this is optimal as well, since we saw that normal n-Ramseyness can be
described by a Π12n+3-formula. In particular this then means that every (n+1)-
Ramsey is a normal n-Ramsey stationary limit of normal n-Ramseys, and every
normal n-Ramsey is an n-Ramsey stationary limit of n-Ramseys, making the hier-
archy of alternating n-Ramseys and normal n-Ramseys a strict hierarchy.
3.1.2 Downwards absoluteness to L
Our absoluteness result below, Theorem 3.25, is inspired by several arguments in
[Abramson et al., 1977], and uses the following lemma from that paper:
Lemma 3.24 ([Abramson et al., 1977]). There is a Π11 formula ϕ(A) such that, for
any ordinal α, (Vα, Vα+1) |= ϕ[A] iff α is a regular cardinal and A is a non-
constructible subset of α.5 
Theorem 3.25 (N.). Genuine and normal n-Ramseys are downwards absolute to
L, for every n < ω.
Proof. Assume first that n = 0 and that κ is a genuine 0-Ramsey cardinal. Let
M∈ L be a weak κ-model  we want to find a genuineM-measure inside L. By
assumption we can find such a measure µ in V ; we will show that in fact µ ∈ L.
Fix any enumeration 〈Aξ | ξ < κ〉 ∈ L of P(κ) ∩M. It then clearly suffices to
show that T ∈ L, where T := {α < κ | Aξ ∈ µ}.
Claim 3.26. T ∩ α ∈ L for any α < κ.
5This appears as Lemma 4.1.2 in [Abramson et al., 1977].
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Proof of claim. Let ~B be the µ-positive part of ~A, meaning that Bξ := Aξ if
Aξ ∈ µ and Bξ := ¬Aξ if Aξ /∈ µ. As µ is genuine we get that 4 ~B has size κ,
so we can pick δ ∈ 4 ~B with δ > α. Then T ∩ α = {ξ < α | δ ∈ Aξ}, which
can be constructed within L. a
Now let ϕ be the Π11 formula given by Lemma 3.24. If we therefore assume that
T /∈ L then (Vκ, Vκ+1) |= ϕ[T ], which by Π11-indescribability of κ means that
there exists some α < κ such that (Vα, Vα+1) |= ϕ[T ∩ Vα], i.e. that T ∩ α /∈ L,
contradicting the claim. Therefore µ ∈ L. It is still genuine in L as (4µ)L = 4µ,
and if µ was normal then that is still true in L as clubs in L are still clubs in V .
The cases where κ is a genuine or normal n-Ramsey cardinal is analogous. 
Since (n+1)-Ramseys are normal n-Ramseys we then immediately get the follow-
ing:
Corollary 3.27 (N.). Every (n+1)-Ramsey cardinal is a normal n-Ramsey car-
dinal in L, for every n < ω. In particular, <ω-Ramseys are downwards absolute
to L. 
3.1.3 Complete ineffability
In this subsection we provide a characterisation of the completely ineffable cardi-
nals6 in terms of the α-Ramseys. To arrive at such a characterisation, we need a
slight strengthening of the<ω-Ramsey cardinals, namely the coherent<ω-Ramseys
as defined in 3.16. Note that a coherent<ω-Ramsey is precisely a cardinal satisfying
the ω-filter property, as defined in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018].
The following theorem shows that assuming coherency does yield a strictly
stronger large cardinal notion. The idea of its proof is closely related to the proof of
Theorem 3.23 (the indescribability of normal n-Ramseys), but the main difference
is that we want everything to occur locally inside our weak κ-models. We will need
another lemma from [Abramson et al., 1977]:
6See Section 1.3 for a definition of the completely ineffable cardinals.
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Lemma 3.28 ([Abramson et al., 1977]). Let κ be inaccessible, X ⊆ κ and ϕ a Σ11-
formula such that (Vκ,∈, X) |= ϕ[X]. Then
{α < κ | (Vα,∈, X ∩ Vα) |= ϕ[X ∩ Vα]}
is a club. 
Theorem 3.29 (N.). Every coherent<ω-Ramsey is a stationary limit of<ω-Ramseys.
Proof. Let κ be coherent <ω-Ramsey. Let θ  κ be regular and letM0 ≺ Hθ
be a weak κ-model with Vκ ⊆M0. Let then player I play arbitrarily while player
II plays according to their coherent winning strategies in Gn(κ), yielding a weak
κ-modelM≺ Hθ with anM-normalM-measure µ :=
⋃
n<ω µn on κ.
Assume towards a contradiction that
X := {ξ < κ | ξ is <ω-Ramsey} /∈ µ.
Since X =
⋂ ~X and ~X ∈ M, where Xn := {ξ < κ | ξ is n-Ramsey}, we must
have by M-normality of µ that there is a smallest k < ω such that ¬Xk ∈ µ.
Note that ¬Xk ∈ M0 by elementarity, so that ¬Xk ∈ µ0 as well. Perform the
k + 1 steps as in the proof of Theorem 3.23 with ϕ(ξ) being pξ is k-Ramseyq, so
that we get a weak κ-modelMk+1 ≺ Hθ , anMk+1-normalMk+1-measure µ̃k+1
on κ, a Σ1-formula ϕ(v, v1, v2, . . . , v2k+1) and sequences 〈A(0), . . . ,A(k)〉 and
〈B(0), . . . , B(k−1)〉 such that
Vκ+1 |= ϕ[κ,A(0), B(0),A(1), B(1), . . . ,A(k−1), B(k−1),A(k)] (2)
and there is a Y ∈ µ̃k+1 with Y ⊆ ¬Xk such that given any ξ ∈ Y ,
Vξ+1 |= ¬ϕ[ξ, A
(0)
ξ , B
(0) ∩ Vξ, A
(1)
ξ , B
(1) ∩ Vξ, . . . , A
(k−1)
ξ , B




where A(i) = [ ~A(i)]µi ∈ Ult(Mi, µi) as in the proof of Theorem 3.21.
Since κ in particular is Σ11-indescribable, Lemma 3.28 implies that we get a
club C ⊆ κ of reflection points of (2). Let Mk+2 ⊇ Mk+1 be a weak κ-model
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with A(k) ∈Mk+2, where the above (n+ 1)-steps ensured that the B(i)’s and the
remaining A(i)’s are all elements ofMk+1. In particular, as C is a definable subset
in the A(i)’s and B(i)’s we also get that C ∈Mk+2. Letting µ̃k+2 be the associated
measure on κ,Mk+2-normality of µ̃k+2 ensures that C ∈ µ̃k+2. Now define, for
every α < κ,
Sα := {ξ ∈ Y | ∀i ≤ k : A(i) ∩ Vα = A(i)ξ ∩ Vα}
and note that Sα ∈ µ̃k+2 for every α < κ. Write ~S := 〈Sα | α < κ〉 and note
that since ~S is definable it is an element ofMk+2 as well. ThenMk+2-normality
of µ̃k+2 ensures that 4~S ∈ µ̃k+2, so that C ∩ 4~S ∈ µ̃k+2 as well. But letting




(0) ∩ Vζ , A
(1)
ζ , B
(1) ∩ Vζ , . . . , A
(k)
ζ ]
since4~S ⊆ Y , contradicting (3). Hence X ∈ µ, and sinceM≺ Hθ we have that
M is correct about stationary subsets of κ, meaning that κ is a stationary limit of
<ω-Ramseys. 
Now, having established the strength of this large cardinal notion, we move towards
complete ineffability. We then arrive at the following characterisation, influenced
by the proof of Theorem 1.3.4 in [Abramson et al., 1977]:
Theorem 3.30 (N.). A cardinal κ is completely ineffable if and only if it is coherent
<ω-Ramsey.
Proof. (⇐): Assume κ is a coherent <ω-Ramsey cardinal, witnessed by strategies
〈τn | n < ω〉. Let f : [κ]2 → 2 be arbitrary and form the sequence 〈Afα | α < κ〉
as
Afα := {β > α | f({α, β}) = 0}.
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LetMf be a transitive weak κ-model with ~Af ∈Mf , and let µf be the associated
Mf -measure on κ given by τ0.7 1-Ramseyness of κ ensures that µf is normal,
meaning4µf is stationary in κ. Define a new sequence ~Bf as the µf -positive part
of ~Af .8 Then Bfα ∈ µf for all α < κ, so that normality of µf implies that 4 ~Bf is
stationary.
Let nowM′f be a transitive weak κ-model withMf ⊆ M′f and µf ∈ M′f ,
and use τ1 to get anM′f -measure µ′f ⊇ µf on κ. Then4 ~Bf ∩{ξ < κ | A
f
ξ ∈ µf}
and4 ~Bf ∩ {ξ < κ | Afξ /∈ µf} are both elements ofM
′
f , so one of them is in µ′f ;
set Hf to be that one. Note that Hf is now both stationary in κ and homogeneous
for f .
Now let g : [Hf ]2 → 2 be arbitrary and again form
Agα := {β ∈ Hf | β > α ∧ g({α, β}) = 0}
for α ∈ Hf . LetMf,g ⊇M′f be a transitive weak κ-model with ~Ag ∈ Mf,g and
use τ2 to get anMf,g-measure µf,g ⊇ µ′f on κ. As before we then get a stationary
Hf,g ∈ µ′f,g which is homogeneous for g. We can continue in this fashion since
τn ⊆ τn+1 for all n < ω. Define then
R := {A ⊆ κ | ∃~f : H~f ⊆ A},
where the ~f ’s range over finite sequences of functions as above; i.e. f0 : [κ]2 → 2
and fk+1 : [Hfk ] → 2 for k < ω. This is clearly a stationary class which satisfies
that wheneverA ∈ R and g : [A]2 → 2, we can findH ∈ Rwhich is homogeneous
for f . Indeed, if we let ~f be such that H~f ⊆ A, which exists as A ∈ R, then we
can simply let H := H~f,g . This shows that κ is completely ineffable.
(⇒): Now assume that κ is completely ineffable and letR be the corresponding
stationary class. We show that κ is n-Ramsey for all n < ω by induction, where we
inductively make sure that the resulting strategies are coherent as well. Let player
I in G0(κ) playM0 and enumerate P(κ) ∩M0 as ~A0 = 〈A0α | α < κ〉 such that
A0ξ ⊆ A0ζ implies ξ ≤ ζ . For α < κ define sequences rα : α→ 2 as rα(ξ) = 1 iff
7Technically we would have to require thatMf ≺ Hθ for some regular θ > κ to be able to use
τ0, but note that we could simply get a measure on HullHθ (Mf ) and restrict it toMf . We will use
this throughout the proof.
8The µ-positive part was defined in Claim 3.26.
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α ∈ A0ξ . Let <αlex be the lexicographical ordering on α2. Define now a colouring
f : [κ]2 → 2 as
f({α, β}) :=
{
0 if rmin(α,β) <
min(α,β)
lex rmax(α,β) min(α, β)
1 otherwise
Let H0 ∈ R be homogeneous for f , using that κ is completely ineffable. For α < κ
consider now the sequence 〈rξ α | ξ ∈ H0 ∧ ξ > α〉, which is of length κ so
there is an η ∈ [α, κ) satisfying that rβ α = rγ α for every β, γ ∈ H0 with
η ≤ β < γ. Define g : κ → κ as g(α) being the least such η, which is then a
continuous non-decreasing cofinal function, making the set of fixed points of g club
in κ – call this club C .
Since H0 is stationary we can pick some ζ ∈ C ∩ H0. As ζ ∈ C we get
g(ζ) = ζ , meaning that rβ  ζ = rγ  ζ holds for every β, γ ∈ H0 with ζ ≤ β < γ.
As ζ is also a member of H0 we can let β := ζ , so that rζ = rγ  ζ holds for every
γ ∈ H0, γ > ζ . Now, by definition of rα we get that for every α, γ ∈ H0 ∩C with
α ≤ γ and ξ < α, α ∈ A0ξ iff γ ∈ A0ξ . Define thus theM0-measure µ0 on κ as
µ0(A
0
ξ) = 1 iff (∀β ∈ H0 ∩ C)(β > ξ → β ∈ A0ξ)
iff (∃β ∈ H0 ∩ C)(β > ξ ∧ β ∈ A0ξ),
where the last equivalence is due to the above-mentioned property of H0∩C . Note
that the choice of enumeration implies that µ0 is indeed a filter. Letting
~B := 〈Bα | α < κ〉
be the µ0-positive part of ~A0, it is also simple to check that H0∩C ⊆ 4 ~B, making
µ0 normal and hence also bothM0-normal and good, showing that κ is 0-Ramsey.
Assume now that κ is n-Ramsey and let 〈M0, µ0, . . . ,Mn, µn,Mn+1〉 be a
partial play of Gn+1(κ). Enumerate P(κ) ∩Mn+1 as ~An+1 = 〈An+1ξ | ξ < κ〉,
again satisfying that ξ ≤ ζ whenever An+1ξ ⊆ A
n+1
ζ , but also such that given
any ξ < κ there are ζ, ζ ′ ∈ (ξ, κ) satisfying that An+1ζ ∈ P(κ) ∩ Mn and
An+1ζ′ ∈ (P(κ)∩Mn+1)−Mn. The plan now is to do the same thing as before,
but we also have to check that the resulting measure extends the previous ones.
84 of 130
Chapter 3. Filters & Games 3.2. The countable case
Let Hn ∈ R and C be club in κ such that Hn ∩C ⊆ 4µn, which exist by our
inductive assumption. For α < κ define rα : α → 2 as rα(ξ) = 1 iff α ∈ An+1ξ ,
and define a colouring f : [Hn]2 → 2 as
f({α, β}) :=
{
0 if rmin(α,β) <
min(α,β)
lex rmax(α,β) min(α, β)
1 otherwise
As Hn ∈ R there is an Hn+1 ∈ R homogeneous for f . Just as before, define
g : κ → κ as g(α) being the least η ∈ [α, κ) such that rβ α = rγ α for every
β, γ ∈ Hn+1 with η ≤ β < γ, and let D be the club of fixed points of g. As above
we get that given any α, γ ∈ Hn+1 ∩ D with α ≤ γ and ξ < α, α ∈ An+1ξ iff
γ ∈ An+1ξ . Define then theMn+1-measure µn+1 on κ as
µn+1(A
n+1
ξ ) = 1 iff (∀β ∈ Hn+1 ∩D ∩ C)(β > ξ → β ∈ A
n+1
ξ )
iff (∃β ∈ Hn+1 ∩D ∩ C)(β > ξ ∧ β ∈ An+1ξ ).
Then Hn+1 ∩D ∩ C ⊆ 4µn+1, making µn+1 normal,Mn+1-normal and good,
just as before. It remains to show that µn ⊆ µn+1. Let thus A ∈ µn be given, and
say A = An+1ξ = A
n
η , where ~An was the enumeration of P(κ) ∩Mn used at the
n’th stage. Then by definition of µn we get that for every β ∈ Hn ∩C with β > η,
β ∈ Anη . We need to show that
(∃β ∈ Hn+1 ∩D ∩ C)(β > ξ ∧ β ∈ An+1ξ )
holds. But here we can simply pick a β > max(ξ, η) with
β ∈ Hn+1 ∩D ∩ C ⊆ Hn ∩ C.
This shows that µn ⊆ µn+1, making κ (n+1)-Ramsey and thus inductively also
coherent <ω-Ramsey. 
3.2 The countable case
This section covers the (strategic) γ-Ramsey cardinals whenever γ has countable
cofinality. This case is special because it is in contrast with the uncountable cofinal-
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ity case, as we cannot ensure that the final measure in Gθγ(κ) is countably complete
and so the existence of winning strategies might depend on θ.
3.2.1 [Strategic] ω-Ramsey cardinals
We now move to the strategic ω-Ramsey cardinals and their relationship to the
virtual cardinals that we introduced in Chapter 2.
Theorem 3.31 (Schindler-N.). Let κ < θ be regular cardinals. Then κ is faintly
θ-measurable iff player II has a winning strategy in Cθω(κ).
Proof. (⇐) : Fix a winning strategy σ for player II in Cθω(κ). Let g ⊆ Col(ω,HVθ )
be V -generic and in V [g] fix an elementary chain 〈Mn | n < ω〉 of weak κ-models
Mn ≺ HVθ in V such that HVθ ⊆
⋃
n<ωMn, using that θ is regular in V and has
countable cofinality in V [g]. Player II follows σ, resulting in a HVθ -normal HVθ -
measure µ on κ.
We claim that Ult(HVθ , µ) is well-founded, so assume not, witnessed by a
sequence 〈gn | n < ω〉 of functions gn : κ→ θ such that gn ∈ HVθ and
{α < κ | gn+1(α) < gn(α)} ∈ µ.
Now, in V , define a tree T of triples (f,Mf , µf ) such that f : κ → θ, Mf is a
weak κ-model, µf is an Mf -measure on κ and letting f0 <T · · · <T fn = f be
the T -predecessors of f ,
• 〈Mf0 , µf0 , . . . ,Mfn , µfn〉 is a partial play of Cθω(κ) in which player II follows
σ; and
• {α < κ | fk+1(α) < fk(α)} ∈ µfk+1 for every k < n.
Now the gn’s induce a cofinal branch through T in V [g], so by absoluteness of well-
foundedness there is a cofinal branch b through T in V as well. But b now gives us
a play of Cθω(κ) where player II is following σ but player I wins, a contradiction.
Thus Ult(HVθ , µ) is well-founded, so that the ultrapower embedding
π : HVθ → Ult(HVθ , µ)
witnesses that κ is faintly θ-measurable.
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(⇒) : Assume that κ is faintly θ-measurable. Let P be a forcing µ̇ a P-name for
an HVθ -normal HVθ -measure on κ and π̇ a P-name for the associated ultrapower
embedding. Define a strategy for player II in Cθω(κ) as follows: Whenever player I
playsMn then fix some P-condition pn such that, letting 〈fni | i < k〉 enumerate
all functions inMn with domain κ,
pnpµ̌ ∩Mn = µ̌n ∩ ∀i < ǩ : π̇(f̌ni )(κ̌) = α̌ni q,
with µn, αni ∈ V . Note here that we can ensure µn ∈ V because it is finite.
Also, ensure that the pn’s are ≤-decreasing. Assume now that Ult(Mω, µω) is ill-
founded, witnessed by functions gn ∈ κMω ∩Mω for n < ω. Then gn = fknin for
some kn, in < ω, and hence pkn+1 pα̌
kn+1
in+1
< α̌knin q for every n < ω, so in V we
get an ω-sequence of strictly decreasing ordinals,  . 
We note that the above Theorem along with our results from Chapter 2 show that
winning the Cohen games does not guarantee weak compactness.
Corollary 3.32 (N.). Let κ be inaccessible.
(i) The existence of a winning strategy for player II in Cθω(κ) for all regular
θ > κ does not imply that κ is weakly compact;
(ii) If player II wins Cκ(κ) then κ is weakly compact.
Proof. The first claim is directly by Proposition 2.48 and Theorem 3.31, and the
second claim is because the hypothesis implies that player II wins G0(κ) so that
inaccesibility of κ makes κ weakly compact  see e.g. [Gitman, 2011] for this char-
acterisation of weak compactness. 
Here is a near-analogous result of Theorem 3.31 for the Gθω(κ) game.
Theorem 3.33 (Schindler-N.). Let κ < θ be regular cardinals. If κ is virtually
θ-prestrong then player II has a winning strategy in Gθω(κ), and if player II has
a winning strategy in Gθω(κ) then κ is faintly θ-power-measurable. In particular,
Gθω(κ)L ∼ Cθω(κ)L.
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Proof. The second statement is exactly like the (⇐) direction in the previous
theorem, so we show the first statement. Assume κ is virtually θ-prestrong and
fix a regular θ > κ, a transitive M ∈ V , a poset P and, in V P, an elementary
embedding π : HVθ →M with critπ = κ. Fix a name µ̇ and a P-condition p such
that
ppµ̇ is a weakly amenable Ȟθ-normal good Ȟθ-measureq.
We now define a strategy σ for player II in Gθω(κ) as follows. Whenever player I
plays a weak κ-modelMn ≺ HVθ , player II fixes pn ∈ P, anMn-measure µn and
a function πn : Mn → π(Mn) such that p0 ≤ p, pn ≤ pk for every k ≤ n and
that
pnpµ̇ ∩ M̌n = µ̌n ∩ µ̌n = µ̇ M̌nq. (1)
Note that by the Ancient Kunen Lemma 1.4 we get that π Mn ∈ M ⊆ V , so
such πn always exist in V . The µn’s also always exist in V , by weak amenability
of µ. Player II responds toMn with µn. It is clear that the µn’s are legal moves for
player II, so it remains to show that µω :=
⋃
n<ω µn has a well-founded ultrapower.
Assume it has not, so that we have a sequence 〈gn | n < ω〉 consisting of functions
gn : κ→Mω :=
⋃
n<ωMn such that gn ∈Mω and
Xn+1 := {α < κ | gn+1(α) < gn(α)} ∈ µω (2)
for every n < ω. Without loss of generality we can assume that gn, Xn ∈ Mn.
Then (2) implies that pn+1pπ̇(ǧn+1)(κ̌) < π̇(ǧn)(κ̌)q, but by (1) this also means
that
pn+1pπ̌n+1(ǧn+1)(κ̌) < π̌n(ǧn)(κ̌)q,
so defining, in V , the ordinals αn := πn(gn)(κ), (3) implies that αn+1 < αn for
all n < ω,  . So µω has a well-founded ultrapower, making σ a winning strategy. 
We get the following immediate corollary:
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Corollary 3.34 (N.-Schindler). Strategic ω-Ramseys are downwards absolute to
L, and the existence of a strategic ω-Ramsey cardinal is equiconsistent with the
existence of a virtually measurable cardinal. Further, in L the two notions are
equivalent. 
Note also that the proof of Theorem 3.33 shows that whenever κ is strategic ω-
Ramsey then for every regular ν > κ there is a generic extension in which there
exists a weakly amenable HVν -normal Hν-measure on κ.
We end this section with a result showing precisely where in the large cardinal
hierarchy the strategic ω-Ramsey cardinals and ω-Ramsey cardinals lie, namely
that strategic ω-Ramseys are equiconsistent with remarkables and ω-Ramseys are
strictly below. Theorem 4.8 of [Gitman and Welch, 2011] showed that 2-iterables
are limits of remarkables, and our Propositions 3.12 and 3.40 show that ω-Ramseys
are limits of 1-iterables, so that the strategic ω-Ramseys and the ω-Ramseys both lie
strictly between the 2-iterables and 1-iterables. [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] showed
that ω-Ramseys are consistent with V = L.
Remarkable cardinals were introduced in [Schindler, 2000b], and they were
shown to be equivalent to virtually supercompacts in [Gitman and Schindler, 2018],
and thus by Theorem 2.4 also equivalent to virtually strong cardinals. To maintain
consistent terminology we will therefore denote remarkables by simply virtually
strongs/supercompacts.
Combining Corollaries 3.34 and 2.12 we get the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 3.35 (N.-Schindler). Strategic ω-Ramsey cardinals are equiconsistent
with virtually strong cardinals. 
Now, using these results we show that the strategic ω-Ramseys have strictly stronger
consistency strength than the ω-Ramseys.
Theorem 3.36 (N.). Virtually supercompact cardinals are strategic ω-Ramsey lim-
its of ω-Ramsey cardinals.
Proof. Let κ be virtually supercompact. We can then find a transitive M closed
under 2κ-sequences and a generic elementary embedding π : HVν → M for some
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ν > 2κ. We will show that κ is ω-Ramsey in M . Note that remarkables are clearly
virtually measurable, and thus by Theorem 3.33 also strategic ω-Ramsey; let τθ be
the winning strategy for player II in Gθω(κ) for all regular θ > κ.
In M we fix some regular θ > κ and let σ be some strategy for player I in
Gθω(κ)M . Since M is closed under 2κ-sequences it means that P(P(κ)) ⊆ M
and thus that M contains all possible filters on κ. We let player II follow τ , which
produces a play σ ∗ τ in which player II wins. But all player II’s moves are in
P(P(κ)) and hence in M , and as M is furthermore closed under ω-sequences,
σ ∗ τ ∈M . This means that M sees that σ is not winning, so κ is ω-Ramsey in M .
This also implies that κ is a limit of ω-Ramseys in Hν . But as κ is virtually su-
percompact it holds that Hκ ≺2 V , in analogy with the same property for strongs
and supercompacts, and as being ω-Ramsey is a Π2-notion this means that κ is a
limit of ω-Ramseys. 
This immediately yields the following corollary:
Corollary 3.37 (N.-Schindler). If κ is a strategic ω-Ramsey cardinal then
Lκ |= pthere is a proper class of ω-Ramseysq. a
3.2.2 (ω, α)-Ramsey cardinals
A natural generalisation of the γ-Ramsey definition is to require more iterability of
the last measure. Of course, by Proposition 3.12 we have that Gγ(κ, ζ) is equiva-
lent to Gγ(κ) when cof γ > ω so the next definition is only interesting whenever
cof γ = ω.
Definition 3.38 (N.). Let α, β be ordinals. Then a cardinal κ is (α, β)-Ramsey if
player I does not have a winning strategy in Gθα(κ, β) for all regular θ > κ.9 ◦
Definition 3.39 ([Gitman, 2011]). A cardinal κ is α-iterable if for every subset A ⊆
κ there exists a transitive weak κ-model M with A ∈ M and an α-good M-
measure µ onM. ◦
9Note that an α-Ramsey cardinal is the same as an (α, 0)-Ramsey cardinal.
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Proposition 3.40 (N.). If β > 0 then every (α, β)-Ramsey is a β-iterable station-
ary limit of β-iterables.
Proof. Fix β > 0, an ordinal α and an (α, β)-Ramsey cardinal κ. Fix a subset
A ⊆ κ and let M0 := cHullHκ+ ({A, κ} ∪ κ). Now let player I play M0 and
play arbitrary transitive legal moves for the rest of the Gθα(κ, β) game. Since κ is
(α, β)-Ramsey this strategy is not winning for player I, meaning that there exists a
play ~µ by player II such that player II wins against the strategy.
LetM be the final model of this game, and µ the final measure. By definition µ
is now a β-goodM-measure on κ. SinceM is transitive by choice of our strategy
for player I, this shows that κ is β-iterable.
That κ is β-iterable is reflected to some Hθ , so let now (N ,∈, ν) be a result
of a play of Gθα(κ, β) in which player II won. Then N ≺ Hθ , so that κ is also
β-iterable in N . Since being β-iterable is witnessed by a subset of κ and β > 0
implies10 that we get a κ-powerset preserving j : N → P , P also thinks that κ is
β-iterable, making κ a stationary limit of β-iterables by elementarity. 
We now move towards Theorem 3.44 which gives an upper consistency bound for
the (ω, α)-Ramseys. We first recall a few definitions and a folklore lemma.
Definition 3.41. For an infinite ordinal α, a cardinal κ is α-Erdős for α ≤ κ if
given any club C ⊆ κ and regressive c : [C]<ω → κ there is a set H ∈ [C]α
homogeneous for c; i.e. that |c“[H]n| ≤ 1 holds for every n < ω. ◦
Definition 3.42. A set of indiscernibles I for a structure M = (M,∈, A) is re-
markable if I − ι is a set of indiscernibles for (M,∈, A, 〈ξ | ξ < ι〉) for every
ι ∈ I .11 ◦
Lemma 3.43 (Folklore). Let κ be α-Erdős where α ∈ [ω, κ] and let C ⊆ κ be
club. Then any structureM in a countable language L with κ+ 1 ⊆M has a
remarkable set of indiscernibles I ∈ [C]α.
10Recall that β-good for β > 0 in particular implies weak amenability.
11Note that this terminology is not at all related to remarkable cardinals.
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Proof. Let 〈ϕn | n < ω〉 enumerate all L-formulas and define c : [C]<ω → κ as
follows. For an increasing sequence α1 < · · · < α2n ∈ C let
c({α1, . . . , α2n}) := the least λ < α1 such that
∃δ1 < · · · δk∃m < ω : λ = 〈m, δ1, . . . , δk〉∧
M 6|= ϕm[~δ, α1, . . . , αn]↔ ϕm[~δ, αn+1, . . . , α2n]
if such a λ exists, and c(s) = 0 otherwise. Clearly c is regressive, so since κ is
α-Erdős we get a homogeneous I ∈ [C]α for c; i.e. that |c“[I]n| ≤ 1 for every
n < ω. Then c({α1, . . . , α2n}) = 0 for every α1, . . . , α2n ∈ I , as otherwise there
exists an m < ω and δ1 < · · · δk such that for any α1 < . . . < α2n ∈ I ,
M 6|= ϕm[~δ, α1, . . . , αn]↔ ϕm[~δ, αn+1, . . . , α2n]. (†)
But then simply pick α1 < . . . α2n < α′1 < · · · < α′2n so that both {α1, . . . , α2n}
and {α′1, . . . , α′2n} witnesses (†); then either {α1, . . . , αn, α′1, α′n} or
{α1, . . . , αn, α′n+1, . . . , α′2n} also witnesses that (†) fails,  . 
Theorem 3.44 (N.). Let α ∈ [ω, ω1] be additively closed. Then any α-Erdős car-
dinal is a limit of (ω, α)-Ramsey cardinals.
Proof. Let κ be α-Erdős, θ > κ a regular cardinal and β < κ any ordinal. Use
the above Lemma 3.43 to get a set of remarkable indiscernibles I ∈ [κ]α for the
structure (Hθ,∈, 〈ξ | ξ < β〉), and let ι ∈ I be the least indiscernible in I . We will
show that player I has no winning strategy in Gθω(ι, α), so by the proof of Theorem
5.5(d) in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] it suffices to find a weak ι-modelM ≺ Hθ and
an α-goodM-measure on ι. Define
M := HullHθ(ι ∪ I) ≺ Hθ
and let π : I → I be the right-shift map. Since I is remarkable, I (= I − ι) is
a set of indiscernibles for the structure (Hθ,∈, 〈ξ | ξ < ι〉), so that π induces an
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elementary embedding j :M→M with crit j = ι, given as
j(τM[~ξ, ιi0 , . . . , ιik ]) := τ
M[~ξ, ιi0+1, . . . , ιik+1],
with ~ξ ⊆ ι. Since j is trivially ι-powerset preserving we get that M ≺ Hθ is a
weak ι-model satisfying ZFC− with a 1-good M-measure µj on ι. Furthermore,
as we can linearly iterate M simply by applying j we get an α-iteration of M
since there are α-many indiscernibles. Note that at limit stages γ < α our iteration
sends τM[~ξ, ιi0 , . . . , ιik ] to τM[~ξ, ιi0+γ , . . . , ιik+γ ] so here we are using that α is
additively closed.
This shows that player I has no winning strategy in Gθω(ι, α). Since ι > β and
β < κ was arbitrary, κ is a limit of η such that player I has no winning strategy in
Gθω(η, α). If we repeat this procedure for all regular θ > κwe get by the pigeonhole
principle that κ is a limit of (ω, α)-Ramsey cardinals. 
As Theorem 4.5 in [Gitman and Schindler, 2018] shows that (α+1)-iterable cardi-
nals have α-Erdős cardinals below them for α ≥ ω additively closed, this shows
that the (ω, α)-Ramseys form a strict hierarchy. Further, as α-Erdős cardinals are
consistent with V = L when α < ωL1 and ω1-iterable cardinals are not consistent
with V = L, we also get that (ω, α)-Ramsey cardinals are consistent with V = L
if α < ωL1 and that they are not if α = ω1.
3.2.3 [Strategic] (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinals
The next step is then to consider (ω+1)-Ramseys, which turn out to cause a con-
siderable jump in consistency strength. We first need the following result which is
implicit in [Mitchell, 1979] and in the proof of Lemma 1.3 in [Donder et al., 1981] 
see also [Dodd, 1982] and [Gitman, 2011].
Theorem 3.45 (Jensen-Mitchell). A cardinal κ is Ramsey if and only if every A ⊆
κ is an element of a weak κ-modelM such that there exists a weakly amenable
countably completeM-measure on κ. 
The following theorem then supplies us with a lower bound for the strength of
the (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinals. It should be noted that a better lower bound will
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be shown in Theorem 3.58, but we include this Ramsey lower bound as well for
completeness.
Theorem 3.46 (N.). Every (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinal is a Ramsey limit of Ramseys.
Proof. Let κ be (ω+1)-Ramsey and A ⊆ κ. Let σ be a strategy for player I
in Gκ+ω+1(κ) satisfying that whenever ~Mα ∗ ~µα is consistent with σ it holds that
A ∈ M0 and µα ∈ Mα+1 for all α ≤ ω. Then σ is not winning as κ is (ω+1)-
Ramsey, so we may fix a play σ ∗ ~µα of Gκ
+
ω+1(κ) in which player II wins. Then
by the choice of σ we get that µω is a weakly amenableMω-measure on κ, and by
the rules of Gκ+ω+1(κ) it is also countably complete (it is even normal), which makes
κ Ramsey by the above Theorem 3.45.
Since κ is Ramsey, Mω |= pκ is Ramseyq as well. Letting j : Mω → N
be the κ-powerset preserving embedding induced by µω , κ-powerset preservation
implies that N |= pκ is Ramseyq. This then implies that κ is a stationary limit of
Ramsey cardinals insideMω , and thus also in V by elementarity. 
As for the consistency strength of the strategic (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinals, we get the
following result that they reach a measurable cardinal. The proof of the following is
closely related to the proof due to Silver and Solovay that player II having a winning
strategy in the cut and choose game is equiconsistent with a measurable cardinal
 see e.g. p. 249 in [Kanamori and Magidor, 1978].
Theorem 3.47 (N.). If κ is a strategic (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinal then, in V Col(ω,2κ),
there is a transitive class N and an elementary embedding j : V → N with
crit j = κ. In particular, the existence of a strategic (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinal is
equiconsistent with the existence of a measurable cardinal.
Proof. Set P := Col(ω, 2κ) and let σ be player II’s winning strategy in Gκ+ω+1(κ).
Let Ṁ be a P-name of an ω-sequence 〈Mn | n < ω〉 of weak κ-modelsMn ∈ V
such that Mn ≺ HVκ+ and P(κ)
V ⊆
⋃
n<ωMn, and let µ̇ be a P-name for the




Assume that there is a P-condition p which forces ill-foundedness of the generic
ultrapower Ult(V,
⋃
n µ̇n), meaning that we can fix a P-name ḟ for an ω-sequence
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〈fn | n < ω〉 such that




Now, in V , we fix some large regular θ  κ and a countable N ≺ Hθ such that
Ṁ, µ̇, ḟ , HVκ+ , σ, p ∈ N . We can find anN -generic g ⊆ P
N in V with p ∈ g since
N is countable, so thatN [g] ∈ V . But the play Ṁgn∗µ̇
g








n is normal and in particular countably








n then 〈ḟgn(α) | n < ω〉




This conclusion is well-known to imply that κ is a measurable in an inner
model; see e.g. Lemma 4.2 in [Kellner and Shelah, 2011]. 
The above Theorem 3.47 then answers Question 9.2 in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] in
the negative, asking if λ-Ramseys are strategic λ-Ramseys for uncountable cardinals
λ, as well as answering Question 9.7 from the same paper in the positive, asking
whether strategic fully Ramseys are equiconsistent with a measurable.
3.3 The general case
3.3.1 Gitman’s cardinals
In this subsection we define the strongly and super Ramsey cardinals which were
introduced in [Gitman, 2011] and investigate further connections between these and
the α-Ramsey cardinals. First, a definition.
Definition 3.48 ([Gitman, 2011]). A cardinal κ is strongly Ramsey if every A ⊆ κ
is an element of a transitive κ-modelM with a weakly amenableM-normalM-
measure µ on κ. Furthermore, ifM≺ Hκ+ then we say that κ is super Ramsey.
◦
Note that since the model M in question is a κ-model it is closed under count-
able sequences, so that the measure µ is automatically countably complete. The
definition of the strongly Ramseys is thus exactly the same as the characterisation
of Ramsey cardinals, with the added condition that the model is closed under <κ-
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sequences. [Gitman, 2011] shows that every super Ramsey cardinal is a strongly
Ramsey limit of strongly Ramsey cardinals, and that κ is strongly Ramsey iff every
A ⊆ κ is an element of a transitive κ-modelM |= ZFC with a weakly amenable
M-normalM-measure µ on κ.
Now, a first connection between the α-Ramseys and the strongly and super
Ramseys is the result in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] that fully Ramsey cardinals are
super Ramsey limits of super Ramseys. The following result then shows that the
strongly and super Ramseys are sandwiched between the almost fully Ramseys and
the fully Ramseys:
Theorem 3.49 (N.-Welch). Every strongly Ramsey cardinal is a stationary limit of
almost fully Ramseys.
Proof. Let κ be strongly Ramsey and let M |= ZFC be a transitive κ-model
with Vκ ∈ M and µ a weakly amenable M-normal M-measure. Let γ < κ
have uncountable cofinality and σ ∈ M a strategy for player I in Gγ(κ)M. Now,
whenever player I playsMα ∈M let player II play µ∩Mα, which is an element
ofM by weak amenability of µ. AsM<κ ⊆M the resulting play is insideM, so
M sees that σ is not winning.
Now, letting jµ : M → N be the induced embedding, κ-powerset preserva-
tion of jµ implies that µ is also a weakly amenable N -normal N -measure on κ.
This means that we can copy the above argument to ensure that κ is also almost
fully Ramsey in N , entailing that it is a stationary limit of almost fully Ramseys
in M. But note now that λ is almost fully Ramsey iff it is almost fully Ramsey
in a transitive ZFC-model containing H(2λ)+ as an element by Theorem 5.5(e) in
[Holy and Schlicht, 2018], so that κ being inaccessible, Vκ ∈M andM being tran-
sitive implies that κ really is a stationary limit of almost fully Ramseys. 
3.3.2 Downwards absoluteness to K
Lastly, we consider the question of whether the α-Ramseys are downwards absolute
to K , which turns out to at least be true in many cases. The below Theorem 3.51
then also answers Question 9.4 from [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] in the positive, asking
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whether α-Ramseys are downwards absolute to the Dodd-Jensen core model for
α ∈ [ω, κ] a cardinal. We first recall the definition of 0¶.
Definition 3.50. 0¶ is “the sharp for a strong cardinal”, meaning the minimal
sound active mouse M with M| crit(ḞM) |= pThere exists a strong cardinalq,
with ḞM being the top extender ofM. ◦
Theorem 3.51 (N.-Welch). Assume 0¶ does not exist. Let λ be a limit ordinal with
uncountable cofinality and let κ be λ-Ramsey. Then
K |= pκ is a λ-Ramsey cardinalq.
Proof. Note first that κ+K = κ+ by [Schindler, 1997], since κ in particular is
weakly compact. Let σ ∈ K be a strategy for player I in Gκ+λ (κ)K , so that a
play following σ will produce weak κ-modelsM ≺ K|κ+. We can then define a
strategy σ̃ for player I in Gκ+λ (κ) as follows. Firstly let
σ̃(∅) := HullHκ+ (K|κ ∪ σ(∅)).
Assuming now that 〈M̃α, µ̃α | α < γ〉 is a partial play of Gκ
+
λ (κ) which is consis-
tent with σ̃, we have two cases. If µ̃α ∈ K for every α < γ then let 〈Mα | α < γ〉
be the corresponding models played in Gκ+λ (κ)K from which the M̃α’s are derived
and let
σ̃(〈M̃α, µ̃α | α < γ〉) := HullHκ+ (K|κ ∪ σ(〈Mα, µ̃α | α < γ〉)),
and otherwise let σ̃ play arbitrarily. As κ is λ-Ramsey (in V ) there exists a play
〈M̃α, µ̃α | α ≤ λ〉 of Gκ
+
λ (κ) which is consistent with σ̃ in which player II won.
Note that M̃λ∩K|κ+ ≺ K|κ+ so let N be the transitive collapse of M̃λ∩K|κ+.
But if j : N → K|κ+ is the uncollapse then crit j is both an N -cardinal and also
> κ because we ensured that K|κ ⊆ N . This means that j = id because κ is
the largest N -cardinal by elementarity in K|κ+, so that M̃λ ∩ K|κ+ = N is a
transitive elementary substructure of K|κ+, making it an initial segment of K .
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Now, since µ := µ̃λ is a countably complete weakly amenable K|o(N )-
measure12, Theorem 1.49 shows that µ ∈ K13, so that we can then define a strategy
τ for player II in Gκ+λ (κ)K as simply playing µ ∩N ∈ K whenever player I plays
N . Since µ = µ̃λ we also have that µ∩Mα = µ̃α ∩Mα, so that σ will eventually
play N , making τ win against σ.14 
Note that the only thing we used cof λ > ω for in the above proof was to ensure
that µ was countably complete. If now κ instead was either genuine or normal
α-Ramsey for any limit ordinal α then µα would also be countably complete and
weakly amenable, so the same proof shows the following:
Corollary 3.52 (N.-Welch). Assume 0¶ does not exist and let α be any limit
ordinal. Then every genuine and every normal α-Ramsey cardinal is downwards
absolute toK . In particular, if α is a limit of limit ordinals then every<α-Ramsey
cardinal is downwards absolute to K as well. 
3.3.3 Indiscernible games
We now move to the strategic versions of the α-Ramsey hierarchy. The first thing
we want to do is define α-very Ramsey cardinals from [Sharpe and Welch, 2011],
and show the tight connection between these and the strategic α-Ramseys. We need
a few more definitions. Recall the definition of a remarkable set of indiscernibles
from Definition 3.42.
Definition 3.53. A good set of indiscernibles for a structureM is a set I ⊆ M
of remarkable indiscernibles forM such thatM|ι ≺M for any ι ∈ I . ◦
A key result of [Sharpe and Welch, 2011] involves a translation procedure between
indiscernibles and measures. The following result is translating from a measure to
indiscernibles and is a special case of [Sharpe and Welch, 2011, Lemma 2.9]:
12Here we use that N CK .
13This is where we are using that we are below 0¶.
14Note that τ is not necessarily a winning strategy  all we know is that it is winning against this
particular strategy σ.
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Theorem 3.54 (Sharpe-Welch). Let κ be an uncountable cardinal, α > κ, and fix
A ⊆ α and a ⊆ κ. LetM := 〈Jα[A],∈, A〉 and m := 〈Jκ[a],∈, a〉. Assume the
following:
(i) m ∈M;
(ii) M and m are both amenable structures;
(iii) M is a weak κ-model with κ being its largest cardinal;
(iv) There exists a countably complete weakly amenableM-measure µ on κ.
Then there exists a good set of indiscernibles I ∈ µ for m. 
The converse translation procedure, going from a good set of indiscernibles to a
measure, is then the following, being part of Lemma 2.18 in [Sharpe and Welch, 2011]:
Theorem 3.55 (Sharpe-Welch). Let κ be an uncountable cardinal, a ⊆ κ and
define m := 〈Jκ[a],∈, a〉. Assume that
(i) m is amenable;
(ii) m |= ZFC;
(iii) There exists a good set of indiscernibles I ∈ [κ]κ for m.
Then there exists an ordinal α > κ and A ⊆ α such thatM := 〈Jα[A],∈,A〉 is
an amenable weak κ-model with κ being its largest cardinal, m ∈M and there
exists a countably complete weakly amenableM-measure µ on κ. 
Definition 3.56 (Sharpe-Welch). Define the indiscernible game GIγ(κ) in γ many
rounds as follows15
I M0 M1 M2 · · ·
II I0 I1 I2 · · ·
Here Mα is an amenable structure of the form (Jκ[A],∈, A) for some A ⊆ κ,
Iα ∈ [κ]κ is a good set of indiscernibles for Mα and the Iα’s are ⊆-decreasing.
Player II wins iff they can continue playing through all the rounds. ◦
Definition 3.57 (Sharpe-Welch). A cardinal κ is γ-very Ramsey if player II has a
winning strategy in the game GIγ(κ). ◦
15This game is denoted by Gr(κ, γ) in [Sharpe and Welch, 2011].
99 of 130
Chapter 3. Filters & Games 3.3. The general case
The next couple of results concern the connection between the strategic α-Ramseys
and the α-very Ramseys. We start with the following:
Theorem 3.58 (N.). Every (ω+1)-Ramsey is an ω-very Ramsey stationary limit of
ω-very Ramseys.
Proof. Let κ be (ω+1)-Ramsey. We will describe a winning strategy for player II
in the indiscernible gameGIω(κ). If player I playsM0 = (Jκ[A0],∈, A0) inGIω(κ)
then let player I in Gκ+ω+1(κ) play
H0 := HullHκ+ (Jκ[A0] ∪ {M0, κ, A0}) ≺ Hκ+ .
Let player I now follow a strategy in Gκ+ω+1(κ) which starts off withH0 and ensures
that, whenever ~Mα ∗ ~µα is consistent with player I’s strategy, then µα ∈ Mα+1
for all α ≤ ω. Since player II is not losing in Gκ+ω+1(κ) there is a play ~Mα ∗ ~µα in
which player I follows this strategy just described and where player II wins – write
H(α)0 :=Mα and µ
(α)
0 := µα for the models and measures in this play.










By the choice of player I’s strategy we get that µ(ω)0 is both weakly amenable, and it is
also countably complete by the rules of Gκ+ω+1(κ) (it is even normal). Now Theorem









0 -measure on κ.
Let player II play I0 in GIω(κ). Let nowM1 = (Jκ[A1],∈, A1) be the next play







0 we must have that I0 ∈ µ
(n0)
0 for some n0 < ω. In the
(n0+1)’st round of Gκ
+
ω+1(κ) we change player I’s strategy and let player I play
H1 := HullHκ+ (Jκ[A0] ∪ {M0,M1, κ, A0, A1, 〈H(k)0 , µ
(k)
0 | k ≤ n0〉}) ≺ Hκ+
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and otherwise continue following some strategy, as long as the measures played
by player II keep being elements of the following models. Our play of the game
Gκ+ω+1(κ) thus looks like the following so far:
I H(0)0 · · · H
(n0)
0 H1
II µ(0)0 · · · µ
(n0)
0
Now player II in Gκ+ω+1(κ) is not losing at round n0, so there is a play extending the
above in which player I follows their revised strategy and in which player II wins.
As before we get a set I ′1 ∈ µ
(n1)
1 of good indiscernibles for M1, where n1 < ω.
Since I0 ∈ µ(n0)0 ⊆ µ
(n1)
1 we can let player II in GIω(κ) play I1 := I0 ∩ I ′1 ∈ µ
(n1)
1 .
Continuing like this, player II can keep playing throughout all ω rounds of GIω(κ),
making κ ω-very Ramsey.
As for showing that κ is a stationary limit of ω-very Ramseys, letM≺ Hκ+ be a
weak κ-model with a weakly amenable countably completeM-normalM-measure
µ on κ, which exists by Theorem 3.46 as κ is (ω+1)-Ramsey. Then by elementarity
M |= pκ is ω-very Ramseyq and since κ being ω-very Ramsey is absolute between
structures having the same subsets of κ it also holds in the µ-ultrapower, meaning
that κ is a stationary limit of ω-very Ramseys by elementarity. 
The above proof technique can be generalised to the following:
Theorem 3.59 (N.). For limit ordinals α, every coherent <ωα-Ramsey is ωα-very
Ramsey.
Proof. (Sketch) This is basically the same proof as the proof of Theorem 3.58.
We do the “going-back” trick in ω-chunks, and at limit stages we continue our non-
losing strategy in Gκ+ωα(κ) by using our winning strategy, which we have available
as we are assuming coherent <ωα-Ramseyness. We need α to be a limit ordinal
for this to work, as otherwise we would be in trouble in the last ω-chunk, as we
cannot just extend the play to get a countably complete measure, which we need to
use the proof of Theorem 3.58. 
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As for going from the α-very Ramseys to the strategic α-Ramseys we got the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 3.60 (N.). For γ any ordinal, every coherent <γ-very Ramsey16 is coher-
ent <γ-Ramsey.17
Proof. The reason why we work with <γ-Ramseys here is to ensure that player
II only has to satisfy a closed game condition (i.e. to continue playing throughout all
the rounds). If γ = β+1 then set ζ := β and otherwise let ζ := γ. Let κ be ζ-very
Ramsey and let τ be a winning strategy for player II in GIζ(κ). LetMα ≺ Hθ be
any move by player I in the α’th round of Gζ(κ). Let Aα ⊆ κ encode all subsets of
κ inMα and form now
Nα := (Jκ[Aα],∈, Aα),
which is a legal move for player I in GIζ(κ), yielding a good set of indiscernibles
Iα ∈ [κ]κ for Nα such that Iα ⊆ Iβ for every β < α. Now by Theorem 3.55 we
get a structure Pα with Nα ∈ Pα and a Pα-measure µ̃α on κ, generated by Iα.18
Set µα := µ̃α ∩Mα and let player II play µα in Gζ(κ).
As the µα’s are generated by the Iα’s, the µα’s are ⊆-increasing. We have thus
created a strategy for player II in Gζ(κ) which does not lose at any round α < γ,
making κ coherent <γ-Ramsey. 
The following result is then a direct corollary of Theorems 3.59 and 3.60:
Corollary 3.61 (N.). For limit ordinals α, κ is ωα-very Ramsey iff it is coherent
<ωα-Ramsey. In particular, κ is λ-very Ramsey iff it is strategic λ-Ramsey for any
λ with uncountable cofinality. 
16Here the coherency again just means that the winning strategies σα for player II in GIα(κ) are
⊆-increasing.
17Here a “coherent <γ-very Ramsey cardinal” is defined from γ-very Ramseys in the same way as
coherent <γ-Ramsey cardinals is defined from γ-Ramseys. When γ is a limit ordinal then coherent
<γ-very Ramseys are precisely the same as γ-very Ramseys, so this is solely to “subtract one” when
γ is a successor ordinal  i.e. a coherent<(γ+1)-very Ramsey cardinal is the same thing as a γ-very
Ramsey cardinal.
18By generated here we mean that X ∈ µ̃α iff X contains a tail of indiscernibles from Iα.
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We can now use this equivalence to transfer results from the α-very Ramseys over to
the strategic versions. The completely Ramsey cardinals are the cardinals topping
the hierarchy defined in [Feng, 1990]. A completely Ramsey cardinal implies the con-
sistency of a Ramsey cardinal, see e.g. Theorem 3.51 in [Sharpe and Welch, 2011].
We are going to use the following characterisation of the completely Ramsey cardi-
nals, which is Lemma 3.49 in [Sharpe and Welch, 2011]:
Theorem 3.62 (Sharpe-Welch). A cardinal is completely Ramsey if and only if it
is ω-very Ramsey. 
This, together with Theorem 3.58, immediately yields the following strengthening
of Theorem 3.46:
Corollary 3.63 (N.). Every (ω+1)-Ramsey cardinal is a completely Ramsey sta-
tionary limit of completely Ramsey cardinals. 
The above Theorem 3.60 also yields the following consequence:
Corollary 3.64 (N.). Every completely Ramsey cardinal is completely ineffable.
Proof. From Theorem 3.62 we have that being completely Ramsey is equivalent
to being ω-very Ramsey, so the above Theorem 3.60 then yields that a completely
Ramsey cardinal is coherent <ω-Ramsey, which we saw in Theorem 3.30 is equiv-
alent to being completely ineffable. 
Now, moving to the uncountable case, Corollary 3.61 yields that strategic ω1-Ramsey
cardinals are ω1-very Ramsey, and Theorem 3.50 in [Sharpe and Welch, 2011] states
that ω1-very Ramseys are measurable in the core model K , assuming 0¶ does not
exist, which then shows the following theorem. We also include the original direct
proof of that theorem, due to Welch.
Theorem 3.65 (Welch). Assuming 0¶ does not exist, every strategic ω1-Ramsey
cardinal is measurable in K .
103 of 130
Chapter 3. Filters & Games 3.3. The general case
Proof. Let κ be strategic ω1-Ramsey, say τ is the winning strategy for player II in
Gω1(κ). Jump to V [g], where g ⊆ Col(ω1, κ+) is V -generic. Since Col(ω1, κ+)
is ω-closed, V and V [g] have the same countable sequences of V , so τ is still a
strategy for player II in Gω1(κ)V [g], as long as player I only plays elements of V .
Now let 〈κα | α < ω1〉 be an increasing sequence of regular K-cardinals cofi-
nal in κ+, let player I in Gω1(κ) playMα := HullHθ(K|κα) ≺ Hθ and player II
follow τ . This results in a countably complete weakly amenable K-measure µω1 ,
which Theorem 1.49 then shows is actually an element of K , making κ measurable
in K . 
A natural question is whether this behaviour persists when going to larger core
models. It turns out that the answer is affirmative: every strategic ω1-Ramsey car-
dinal is also measurable in Steel’s core model below a Woodin19, a result due to
Schindler which we include with his permission here. We will need the following
special case of a theorem by Schindler.20
Theorem 3.66 ([Schindler, 2006a] 3.1). Assume that there exists no inner model
with a Woodin cardinal, let µ be a measure on a cardinal κ, and let π : V →
Ult(V, µ) ∼= N be the ultrapower embedding. Assume that N is closed under
countable sequences. Write KN for the core model constructed inside N . Then
KN is a normal iterate of K , i.e. there is a normal iteration tree T on K of
successor length such thatMT∞ = KN . Moreover, we have that πT0∞ = π K . 
Theorem 3.67 (Schindler). Assuming there exists no inner model with a Woodin
cardinal, every strategic ω1-Ramsey cardinal is measurable in K .
Proof. Fix a large regular θ  2κ. Let κ be strategic ω1-Ramsey and fix a winning
strategy σ for player II in Gω1(κ). Let g ⊆ Col(ω1, 2κ) be V -generic and in V [g]
fix an elementary chain 〈Mα | α < ω1〉 of weak κ-models Mα ≺ HVθ such that




Note that V and V [g] have the same countable sequences since Col(ω1, 2κ) is
<ω1-closed, so we can apply σ to the Mα’s, resulting in an Mω1-measure µ on κ.
19See Section 1.4.
20That paper assumes the existence of a measurable as well, but by [Jensen and Steel, 2013] we can
omit that here.
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Let j : Mω1 → Ult(Mω1 , µ) be the ultrapower embedding. Since we required that
ωMα ⊆ Mα+1 we get that Mω1 is closed under ω-sequences in V [g], making µ
countably complete in V [g]. As we also ensured that HVκ+ ⊆Mω1 we can lift j to
an ultrapower embedding π : V → Ult(V, µ) ∼= N with N transitive.
Since V is closed under ω-sequences in V [g] we get by standard arguments
that N is as well, which means that Theorem 3.66 applies, meaning that
π K : K → KN
is an iteration map with critical point κ, making κ measurable in K . 
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4 | Ideal absoluteness
Historically, the idea of considering elementary embeddings existing only in generic
extensions has been around for a while, but it all started as an analysis of ideals.
Precipitous ideals were introduced in [Galvin et al., 1978] and further analysed in
[Jech et al., 1980], being ideals that give rise to well-founded generic ultrapowers.
In this chapter we will introduce the ideally measurable cardinals, essentially
just switching perspective from the ideals themselves to the cardinals they are on.
We then proceed to show how these cardinals relate to “pure” generic cardinals, be-
ing proper class versions of the faintly measurable cardinals that we have considered
throughout Chapter 2. We start with a definition of the latter.
Definition 4.1 (GBC). A cardinal κ is generically measurable if there is a generic
extension V [g], a transitive class N ⊆ V [g] and a generic elementary embedding
π : V → N with critπ = κ. ◦
Note that, trivially, every generically measurable cardinal is faintly measurable. The
corresponding ideal version of this is then the following:
Definition 4.2. A cardinal κ is ideally measurable if there exists an ideal I on
P(θ) such that the generic ultrapower Ult(V, I) is well-founded in the forcing
extension V P, where P := PV (κ)/ I . ◦
It should also be noted that [Claverie and Schindler, 2016] generalised the concept of
ideally measurables to ideally strong cardinals by introducing the concept of ideal
extenders to capture the strongness properties.
Throughout this chapter we will be interested in how properties of the forcings
affect the large cardinal structure of a critical point of a generic embedding. We
thus define the following:
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Definition 4.3. Let θ be a regular uncountable cardinal, κ < θ a cardinal and
Φ(κ) a poset property1. Then κ is Φ(κ) faintly θ-measurable if it is faintly θ-
measurable, witnessed by a forcing poset satisfying Φ(κ). Similarly, κ is Φ(κ)
generically measurable if it is generically measurable with the associated forcing
satisfying Φ(κ). ◦
Definition 4.4. A poset property Φ(κ) is ideal-absolute if whenever κ satisfies that
there is a Φ(κ) forcing poset P such that, in V P, there is a V -normal V -measure µ
on κ, then there is a normal ideal I on κ such that P(κ)/ I is forcing equivalent
to a forcing satisfying Φ(κ). ◦
Note that this is almost saying that Φ(κ) ideally measurables are equivalent to Φ(κ)
generically measurables, but the only difference is that these definitions require well-
foundedness of the target model.
If Φ(κ) implies ω-distributivity then we do get well-foundedness for free, how-
ever: any witness to the ill-foundedness of the ultrapower is an ω-sequence in the
generic extension, so ω-distributivity implies that this sequence is in V as well,
which is contradicting V -normality of the measure.
A typical ideal that we will be utilising is the following:
Definition 4.5. Let κ be a regular cardinal, P a poset and µ̇ a P-name for a V -
normal V -measure on κ. Then the induced ideal is
I(P, µ̇) := {X ⊆ κ |
∣∣∣∣X̌ ∈ µ̇∣∣∣∣B(P) = 0},
where B(P) is the Boolean completion of P. ◦
Note that if the generic measure µ is V -normal then I(P, µ̇) is also normal. This
ideal will witness our first ideal-absoluteness result, which is a simple rephrasing of
a folklore result.
1Examples of these are having the κ-chain condition, being κ-closed, κ-distributive, κ-Knaster,
κ-sized and so on. Formally speaking, Φ(κ) is a first-order formula ϕ(κ) which is true iff there is a
poset P such that κ is a cardinal and some first-order formula ψ(κ,P) is true.
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Proposition 4.6 (Folklore). “The κ+-chain condition” is ideal-absolute.
Proof. Assume P has the κ+-chain condition such that there is a P-name µ̇ for a
V -normal V -measure on κ. Let I := I(P, µ̇)  we will show that P(κ)/ I has
the κ+-chain condition. Assume not and let 〈Xα | α < κ+〉 be an antichain of
P(κ)/ I , which by normality of I we may assume is pairwise almost disjoint. But
this then makes 〈
∣∣∣∣X̌α ∈ µ̇∣∣∣∣B(P) | α < κ+〉 an antichain of P of size κ+,  . 
We next move to distributivity. This property is especially interesting in the context
of our generic large cardinals, as an ideal I on some cardinal κ is ω-distributive
precisely if it is precipitous2, so that carrying an ω-distributive ideal coincides with
our definition of ideally measurable.
Theorem 4.7 (N.). “<λ-distributivity” is ideal-absolute for all regular λ ∈ [ω, κ+].
Proof. Assume that P is a <λ-distributive forcing such that there exists a P-name
µ̇ for a V -normal V -measure on κ. Let I := I(P, µ̇)  we will show that P(κ)/ I
is <λ-distributive.
Let γ < λ and let ~A be a γ-sequence of maximum antichains Aα ⊆P(κ)/ I
such that Aβ refines Aα for α ≤ β. We have to show that there is a maximal
antichain A which refines all the antichains in ~A.
Now define for every α < γ the sets
A∗α := {
∣∣∣∣X̌ ∈ µ̇∣∣∣∣B(P) | X ∈ Aα}.
Note that A∗α is an antichain in P. They are also maximal, because if p ∈ P was
incompatible with every condition in A∗α then, letting X := 4{κ− Y | Y ∈ Aα},
we have that p is compatible with
∣∣∣∣X̌ ∈ µ̇∣∣∣∣B(P), so that X ∈ I+. But X is
incompatible with everything in Aα, contradicting that Aα is maximal.
By<λ-distributivity of P we get an antichainA∗ which refines all the antichains
in ~A∗. But note that for every p ∈ A∗, if we define sp(α) to be the unique a ∈ Aα
such that p ≤ a, then it holds that p ≤ ||∆sp ∈ µ̇||B(P),
3 so that ∆sp ∈ I+. Now
A := {∆sp | p ∈ A∗} gives us a maximal antichain which refines all the antichains
2See [Jech et al., 1980] and [Foreman, 1983].
3Here we are using that λ ≤ κ+ to ensure that the diagonal intersection is in the measure.
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in ~A. 
In an unpublished paper, Foreman proved the following:
Theorem 4.8 (Foreman). Let κ be a regular cardinal such that 2κ = κ+, and let
λ ≤ κ+ be an infinite successor cardinal. If player II has a winning strategy in
G−λ (κ) then κ carries a κ-complete normal precipitous ideal I such that P(κ)/ I
has a dense <λ-closed subset of size κ+.
Here we improve that result by not relying on the CH-assumption, reaching the
conclusion for all regular infinite λ, and also showing (κ, κ)-distributivity of the
ideal forcing. The argument follows the same overall structure as the original, with
more technicalities to achieve the stronger result.
Theorem 4.9 (Foreman-N.). Let κ be a regular cardinal and λ ≤ κ+ regular
infinite. If player II has a winning strategy in G−λ (κ) then κ carries a κ-complete
normal ideal I such that P(κ)/ I is (κ, κ)-distributive and has a dense <λ-
closed subset.
Proof. Set P := Add(κ+, 1) if 2κ > κ+ and P := {∅} otherwise. If κ is measur-
able then the dual ideal to the measure on κ satisfies all of the wanted properties,
so assume that κ is not measurable. Fix a wellordering <κ+ of HVκ+ and a P-name
π for a sequence 〈N γ | γ < κ+〉 ∈ V P such that
• N γ ∈ V for every γ < κ+;
• N γ+1 ≺ HVκ+ is a κ-model for every γ < κ
+;
• N δ =
⋃
γ<δN γ for limit ordinals δ < κ+;
• N γ ∪{N γ} ⊆ N β for γ < β < κ+;
• P(κ)V ⊆
⋃
γ<κ+ N γ .
Define now the auxilliary game G(κ) of length λ as follows.
I α0 α1 · · ·
II p0,M0, µ0, Y0 p1,M1, µ1, Y1 · · ·
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Here 〈αγ | γ < λ〉 is an increasing continuous sequence of ordinals bounded in
κ+, ~p is a decreasing sequence of P-conditions satisfying that
pγ pM̌γ = π(α̌γ) ∧ µ̌γ is a M̌γ-normal M̌γ-measure on κ̌q
such that Yγ = ∆ξ<κX
µγ




κ+ is the<κ+-least enumeration of µγ .
4
We require that the µγ ’s are ⊆-increasing, and player II wins iff she can continue
playing throughout all λ rounds. Let µλ :=
⋃
ξ<λ µξ be the final measure of the
play.
To every limit ordinal η < κ+ define the restricted auxilliary game G(κ)  η
in which player I is only allowed to play ordinals <η with the sequence bounded
in η. Note that a strategy τ for player II is winning in G(κ) if and only if it is
winning in G(κ)  η for all η < κ+, simply because all sequences of ordinals played
by player I are bounded in κ+.
Note that µλ is precisely the tail measure on κ defined by the Yγ ’s; i.e. that
X ∈ µλ iff there exists a δ < λ such that |Yδ −X| < κ. From this it is simple to
see that G(κ) is equivalent to G−λ (κ), so player II has a winning strategy τ0 in G(κ).
For any winning strategy τ in G(κ)  η and to every partial play p of G(κ)  η
consistent with τ , define the associated hopeless ideal5
Iτp  η := {X ⊆ κ | For every play ~αγ ∗ τ extending p in G(κ)  η,
X is not in the final measure}




〈〉  η is normal and (κ, κ)-distributive, for every win-
ning strategy τ in G(κ) for player II.
Proof of claim. For normality, if 〈Zγ | γ < κ〉 is a sequence of elements of I
such that Z := ∇γZγ is I-positive, then there exists a play of G(κ)  η in which
player II follows τ such that Z lies in the final measure. If we let player I play
sufficiently large ordinals in G(κ)  η we may assume that 〈Zγ | γ < κ〉 is a
subset and an element of the final model as well, meaning that one of the Zγ ’s
also lies in the final measure,  .
4We use that P is κ-closed to get the pγ ’s as well as to ensure thatMγ , µγ ∈ V .
5This terminology is due to Matt Foreman.
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We now show (κ, κ)-distributivity. Let U ⊆P(κ)/ I be an unrooted tree
of height κ such that every level Uα is a maximal antichain of size ≤ κ. We
have to show that there is a maximal antichain A consisting of limit points of
branches of U . Pick X ∈ U and let p be a play of G(κ)  η consistent with τ
with limit modelM and limit measure µ, such that X ∈ µ.
By letting player I in p play sufficiently large ordinals, we may assume that
U ⊆ M, using that |U| ≤ κ, and also that bX := U ∩µ ∈ M. This means that
dX := ∆bX ∈ P(κ)/ I is a limit point of the branch bX through U , so that
A := {dX | X ∈ U} is a maximal antichain of limit points of branches of U ,
making P(κ)/ I (κ, κ)-distributive. a
Fix some limit ordinal η < κ+. We will recursively construct a tree T η of height
λ which consists of subsets X ⊆ κ, ordered by reverse inclusion. In the following
we will talk of player II’s moves as subsets of κ – here we are referring to the code
of the move. During the construction of the tree we will inductively maintain the
following properties of T η α for α ≤ λ:
• Tree strategy: For every γ < α there is a winning strategy τηγ for player II
in G(κ)  η such that for every β < γ, the β’th move by τηγ is an element of
T ηβ and τ
η
γ is consistent with τηβ for the first β-many rounds.
• Unique pre-history: Given any β < α and Y ∈ T ηβ there is a unique partial





for τ being any winning strategy for player II in G(κ)  η satisfying that p is
consistent with τηβ .
• Cofinally many responses: Let β+ 1 < α and Y ∈ T ηβ , and set p to be the
unique partial play of G(κ)  η given by the unique pre-history of Y . Then
the T η-successors of Y consists of player II’s τηβ -responses to τ
η
β -partial plays
extending p such that player I’s last move in these partial plays are cofinal in
η.6
• Positivity: If β < α and Y ∈ T ηβ then Y is I
τηγ
X -positive for every γ < β
and every X ∈ T η  γ + 1 with X ≤T η Y .7
6The reason why we are dealing with the restricted auxilliary games is to achieve this property.
7This actually follows from the cofinally many responses, but we include it here for transparency.
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• Almost disjointness property: Every level T ηβ consists of pairwise almost
disjoint sets.8
• Hopeless ideal coherence: I
τηβ
〈〉 ∩P(Y ) = I
τηβ
Y ∩P(Y ) for every β < α
and Y ∈ T ηβ .
Note that what we are really aiming for is achieving the hopeless ideal coherence,
since that enables us to ensure that ifX,Y ∈ T η andX ⊆ Y then reallyX ≥T η Y
 i.e. that we “catch” both X and Y in the same play of G(κ)  η. This is crucial to
show the <λ-closure of T . The rest of the properties are inductive properties we
need to ensure this.
Set T η0 := {κ}. Assume that we have built T η α+ 1 satisfying the inductive
assumptions9 and let Y ∈ T ηα  we need to specify what the T η-successors of
Y are. Since κ is weakly compact and not measurable it holds by Proposition
6.4 in [Kanamori, 2008] that sat(Iτ
η
α
Y ) ≥ κ+, so we can fix a maximal antichain
〈XYγ | γ < η〉 of I
τηα
Y -positive sets. By κ-completeness of I
τηα
Y we can by Exercise
22.1 in [Jech, 2006] even ensure that all of the XYγ ’s are pairwise disjoint.
To every γ < η we fix a partial play p of even length of G(κ)  η consistent
with τηα such that the last ordinal βYγ in p played by player I is greater than or equal
to γ and XYγ has measure one with respect to the last measure in p. We then define
the T η-successors of Y to be player II’s τηα-responses to the βγ ’s (which are subsets
of the XYγ ’s modulo a bounded set and are therefore pairwise almost disjoint).
For limit stages δ < λ we apply τ0 to the branches of T η  δ to get T ηδ .
We now have to check that the inductive assumptions still hold; let us start with
the tree strategy. Assume that we have a partial play p of length 2 ·α+1 of G(κ)  η,
i.e. the last move in p is by player II, consistent with τηα ; write ξp for player I’s last
move in p and Yp for player II’s response to ξp, which is also the last move in p.
We can then pick a ζ < η such that βYpζ > ξp by the cofinally many responses
property and let τηα+1(p) be player II’s τ
η
α-response to the partial play leading up to
β
Yp
ζ . After this (α+ 1)’th round we just set τ
η
α+1 to follow τ0. It is clear that τ
η
α+1
satisfies the required properties.
Before we move on to checking the remaining inductive assumptions, let us
pause to get some intuition about the tree strategies. In the definition of τηα+1 above,
8Two subsets X,Y ⊆ κ are almost disjoint if |X ∩ Y | < κ.
9In particular, we assume that τηα is defined.
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we took a partial play consistent with τηα , applied τ0 for a while, took note of player
II’s last τ0-response and then included only that response in our new τηα+1 partial
play. This means that to every τηα-partial play there is an ostensibly much longer
τ0-partial play into which τηα embeds; so we can look at the τηα-partial plays as being
“collapsed” τ0-partial plays.
Given the above tree strategy, T ηα+1 clearly satisfies the cofinally many re-
sponses property and the positivity property, simply by construction. For the unique
pre-history, let Y ∈ T ηα+1 and assume it has two distinct immediate T η-predecessors
Z0, Z1 ∈ T ηα. But then Y ⊆ Z0 ∩ Z1 and Y is I
τηα
Z0
-positive by the positivity as-
sumption, contradicting that Z0 and Z1 are almost disjoint by the almost disjoint-
ness property. Given the unique pre-history we then also get the almost disjointness
property.
Claim 4.11. T η α+ 2 satisfies the hopeless ideal coherence property.
Proof of claim. Let Y ∈ T ηα+1  we have to show that
I
τηα+1
〈〉 ∩P(Y ) = I
τηα+1
Y ∩P(Y ). (1)





Y , so let Z ∈ I
τηα+1
Y ∩P(Y ) and assume for a
contradiction that Z is Iτ
η
α+1
〈〉 -positive. Letting ~αξ ∗ ~Yξ be a play of G(κ)  η
consistent with τηα+1 such that Z is in the final measure, the definition of τ
η
α+1
yields that Yα ∈ T ηα+1. As Z ∈ I
τηα+1
Y we have to assume that Y 6= Yα, so that
the almost disjointness property implies that
|Y ∩ Yα| < κ. (2)
By the choice of ~αξ ∗ ~Yξ there is some δ ∈ (α, λ) such that |Yδ − Z| < κ, i.e.
that Yδ is a subset of Z modulo a bounded set, since the Yα’s generate the final
measure of the play. But then Yδ ⊆ Yα by the rules of G(κ)  η, and also that
|Yδ − Y | < κ since Z ⊆ Y . But this means that Y ∩ Yα is I
τηα+1
Y -positive since
Yδ is, contradicting (2). This shows (1). a
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This finishes the construction of T ηα+1. For limit levels δ < λ we define τ
η
δ as
simply applying τ0 to the branches of T η  δ  showing that the inductive assump-
tions hold at T ηδ is analogous to the above arguments, so we are now done with the




α <αHκ+ and define10 Iη := Iτ
η
〈〉 .




η and the tree T :=
⋃
η<κ+ T
η . We showed in Claim 4.10 that
I is κ-complete, normal and (κ, κ)-distributive.
We claim that T is dense in P(κ)/ I .11 Let X be an I-positive set, making
it Iη-positive for some η < κ+, meaning that there is a play ~αγ ∗ τη of G(κ)  η
such that X is in the final measure, which means that |Yδ −X| < κ for some large
δ < λ and in particular that Yδ −X ∈ I . But Yδ ∈ T η ⊆ T by definition of τη ,
which shows that T is dense.
It remains to show that T is <λ-closed. If λ = ω then this is trivial, so assume
that λ ≥ ω1. Let β < λ and let 〈Zα | α < β〉 be a ⊆-decreasing sequence
of elements Zα ∈ T . We can fix some η < κ+ such that Zα ∈ T η for every
α < β by regularity of κ+, and since the Zα’s are ⊆-decreasing they must also be
≤T η -increasing by the hopeless ideal coherence for T η12.
Let Z̃ ∈ T η be player II’s τη-response to the unique partial play of G(κ)  η
corresponding to the branch containing the Zα’s, and pick Z ∈ T η such that∣∣∣Z − Z̃∣∣∣ < κ and Z ≥T η Zα for all α < β, again by the density claim and
the hopeless ideal coherence. Then Z witnesses <λ-closure of T .13 
With a bit more work we can from this result then derive the following equivalences.
Corollary 4.12 (N.). Let κ be a regular cardinal and λ ∈ [ω1, κ+] be regular.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) κ is <λ-closed faintly power-measurable;
(ii) κ is <λ-closed ideally power-measurable;
(iii) κ is (κ, κ)-distributive <λ-closed faintly measurable;
(iv) κ is (κ, κ)-distributive <λ-closed ideally measurable;
10Note that the tree strategy property above ensures that the strategies do line up, so that τη is a
well-defined strategy as well.
11This means that given any I-positive set X there is a Y ∈ T such that Y −X ∈ I .
12This is the only place in which we are using hopeless ideal coherence.
13We are using that λ is regular to get Z .
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(v) Player II has a winning strategy in Gλ(κ).
Proof. (v) ⇒ (iv) is Theorem 4.9 above14 and (iv) ⇒ (iii) + (ii), (iii) ⇒ (i)
and (ii)⇒ (i) are trivial, so we show (i)⇒ (v).
Assume κ is <λ-closed faintly power-measurable, so there is a <λ-closed forc-
ing P and a V -generic g ⊆ P such that, in V [g], there exists a transitive class N
and a κ-powerset preserving elementary embedding π : V → N . Write µ for the
induced weakly amenable V -normal V -measure on κ. Now, back in V , define a
strategy σ for player II in Gλ(κ) as follows.
Whenever player I plays some model Mα then we let player II respond with
a filter µα such that, for some pα ∈ P, pαpµ̌α = µ̇ ∩ M̌αq  such a filter exists
because µ is weakly amenable. We require the pα’s to be decreasing, which is pos-
sible by <λ-closure. Now, all the µα’s are clearly Mα-normal Mα-measures on κ,
which makes σ a winning strategy. 
Note that the above results all relied on λ being uncountable to achieve well-
foundedness of the generic ultrapower. If we simply ignore this well-foundedness
aspect then we get the following similar equivalence in the λ = ω case, which then
also includes completely ineffable cardinals.
Corollary 4.13 (N.). Let κ be a regular cardinal. Then the following are equiv-
alent:15
(i) There exists a forcing poset P such that, in V P, there is a weakly amenable
V -normal V -measure on κ;
(ii) There exists a (κ, κ)-distributive forcing poset P such that, in V P, there is
a V -normal V -measure on κ;
(iii) κ carries a normal (κ, κ)-distributive ideal;
(iv) Player II has a winning strategy in G−ω (κ);
(v) κ is completely ineffable.
14Here well-foundedness of the generic ultrapower is automatic since λ has uncountable cofinality.
15Points (i) and (ii) look a lot like the definition of faintly power-measurable and (κ, κ)-distributive
ideally measurable, but here we are not requiring the ultrapowers to be well-founded, so that would
be stretching the definition of being measurable.
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Proof. (iv)⇔ (v) was shown in Theorem 3.30, and (iii)⇒ (ii) and (ii)⇒ (i)
are trivial. (i)⇒ (iv) is as (i)⇒ (v) in Corollary 4.12, and (iv)⇒ (iii) is Theo-
rem 4.9. 
As an immediate consequence we then get another ideal-absoluteness result.
Corollary 4.14. “(κ, κ)-distributive <λ-closed” is ideal-absolute for all regular
λ ∈ [ω, κ+]. 
We get the following similar results for the Cohen games16.
Theorem 4.15 (N.). Let κ and λ ≤ κ be regular infinite cardinals such that 2<θ <
κ for every θ < λ. If player II has a winning strategy in C−λ (κ) then κ carries a
λ-complete ideal I such that P(κ)/ I is forcing equivalent to Add(λ, 1).
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 4.9 closely. Set P := Col(λ, 2κ). Fix a
wellordering <κ+ of Hκ+ and a P-name π for a sequence 〈N γ | γ < λ〉 ∈ V P
such that
• N γ ∈ V for every γ < λ;
• κ+1 ⊆ N γ and |N γ −Hκ|V < λ for every γ < λ;
• If δ < λ is a limit ordinal then N δ =
⋃
γ<δN γ , N δ ≺ Hκ+ and it holds
that N δ |= ZFC−;




Define the auxilliary game G(κ) as in the proof of Theorem 4.9 but where player I
plays ordinals αη < λ and where we use the above N γ ’s. Here we only need <λ-
closure of P to get an equivalence between G(κ) and C−λ (κ), since |N γ −Hκ|
V < λ
for all γ < λ.
To every limit ordinal η < λ we define the restricted auxilliary game G(κ)  η
as in the proof of Theorem 4.9, and to every winning strategy τ in G(κ)  η and
16Theorem 4.15 is the reason for naming the C-games “Cohen games”.
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partial play p of G(κ)  η consistent with τ define the associated hopeless ideal
Iτp  η := {X ⊆ κ | For every play ~αγ ∗ τ extending p in G(κ)  η,
X is not in the final measure}.
Now, if κ is measurable then we trivially get the conclusion,17 so assume κ is not
measurable. Then sat(κ) ≥ λ since 2<θ < κ for every θ < λ,18 so that we can
continue exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.9 to construct (λ-sized) trees T η and








η , T is a dense <λ-closed subset of P(κ)/ I of size λ, so that
P(κ)/ I is forcing equivalent to Add(λ, 1). 
Corollary 4.16 (N.). Let κ and λ ∈ [ω1, κ] be regular such that 2<θ < κ for
every θ < λ. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) κ is <λ-closed faintly measurable;
(ii) κ is <λ-closed ideally measurable;
(iii) κ is <λ-closed λ-sized faintly measurable;
(iv) κ is <λ-closed λ-sized ideally measurable;
(v) Player II has a winning strategy in Cλ(κ).
Proof. (iv) ⇒ (iii) + (ii), (ii) ⇒ (i) and (iii) ⇒ (i) all trivial, and (i) ⇒ (v)
is like (i)⇒ (v) in Corollary 4.12, and (v)⇒ (iv) is Theorem 4.15. 
Again, if we ignore well-foundedness then we get the same equivalence in the λ = ω
case:
Corollary 4.17 (N.). Let κ be regular infinite. Then the following facts hold:
(i) Player II has a winning strategy in C−ω (κ); and
(ii) κ carries an ideal I such that P(κ)/I is forcing equivalent to Add(ω, 1).
Proof. Player II has a winning strategy in C−ω (κ) as we are simply measuring
finitely many sets without any demand for well-foundedness, showing (i). Since
17Take I(Add(λ, 1), µ̌) for µ the measure on κ.
18See Proposition 16.4 in [Kanamori, 2008].
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2<n < κ for all n < ω as κ is infinite, Theorem 4.15 then implies (ii). 
Corollary 4.18 (N.). The property “<λ-closed λ-sized” is ideal-absolute for all
regular λ ∈ [ω, κ] such that 2<θ < κ for all θ < κ. 
With this corollary, our journey has come to an end. An ending, which is nothing
but an oxymoron in one of these perennial mathematical journeys, so instead con-
sider the following final chapter my baton to you, dear reader.
Natten bøjer sig i vækst;
Og dagene vasker dit ansigt.
Du træder gennem søvnen;
Og åbner en dør til solen.
Dér, ikke i dit eget lys;
Bærer du kroppen;
Strømmet igennem af blod.
Dér er du menneske nu;
Og du går for at finde din tid.
 Michael Strunge
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5 | Further questions
Here we record many open questions related to the content of the preceeding chap-
ters, broadly separated by topic.
5.1 Relations between virtuals
The analysis in Chapter 2 showed several implication and separation results be-
tween the virtual large cardinals. A few of these relations remain open, however.
Question 5.1. Are virtually θ-strong cardinals, virtually θ-supercompact cardinals
and virtually θ-Magidor-supercompact cardinals all equivalent, for any uncountable
regular cardinal θ?
Question 5.2. Let θ be an uncountable cardinal.
(i) Is every virtually θ-measurable cardinal also virtually θ-prestrong? What if
we assume V = L[µ] or V = K , with K being the core model below a
Woodin cardinal?
(ii) Is every virtually θ-strong cardinal virtually θ-supercompact? Are they equicon-
sistent?
5.2 Berkeleys
Question 1.7 in [Wilson, 2018] asks whether the existence of a non-Σ2-reflecting
weakly remarkable cardinal always implies the existence of an ω-Erdős cardinal.
Here a weakly remarkable cardinal is a rewording of a virtually prestrong cardi-
nal, and Lemmata 2.5 and 2.8 in the same paper also shows that being ω-Erdős is
equivalent to being virtually club Berkeley and that the least such is also the least
virtually Berkeley.1
1Note that this also shows that virtually club Berkeley cardinals and virtually Berkeley cardinals
are equiconsistent, which is an open question in the non-virtual context.
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Furthermore, they also showed that a non-Σ2-reflecting virtually prestrong car-
dinal is equivalent to a virtually prestrong cardinal which is not virtually strong. We
can therefore reformulate their question to the following equivalent question.
Question 5.3 (Wilson). If there exists a virtually prestrong cardinal which is not
virtually strong, is there then a virtually Berkeley cardinal?
[Wilson, 2018] showed that their question has a positive answer in L, which in
particular shows that they are equiconsistent. Applying our Theorem 2.10 we can
ask the following related question, where a positive answer to that question would
imply a positive answer to Wilson’s question.
Question 5.4. If there exists a cardinal κ which is virtually (θ, ω)-superstrong for
arbitrarily large cardinals θ > κ, is there then a virtually Berkeley cardinal?
Theorem 2.43 from Chapter 2 at least gives a partially positive result, noting that the
assumption by definition implies that On is virtually pre-Woodin but not virtually
Woodin.
Corollary 5.5 (N.). If there exists a virtually A-prestrong cardinal for every class
A and there are no virtually strong cardinals, then there exists a virtually Berkeley
cardinal. 
The assumption that there is a virtually A-prestrong cardinal for every class A in
the above corollary may seem a bit strong, but Theorem 2.43 shows that this is
necessary, which might lead one to think that the question could have a negative
answer.
5.3 Indestructibility
Our original goal concerning indestructibility was to see what indestructibility prop-
erties the faintly supercompacts have, whether any analogy with the supercompact
cardinals holds. This still remains open.
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Question 5.6. Do faintly supercompact cardinals have indestructibility properties?
For instance, if κ is faintly supercompact, does it remain supercompact after forcing
with Add(κ, 1)?
We proved several indestructibility properties of the ostensibly stronger notion of
generically setwise supercompacts, and several questions then arise concerning the
nature of these cardinals.
Question 5.7. What is the consistency strength of the generically setwise super-
compact cardinals? The best upper bound is a virtually extendible, as given by
Usuba’s Theorem 2.56, and a lower bound is the trivial faintly supercompact one.
What if we require the cardinal to be inaccessible?
Question 5.8. Is it consistent to have a faintly supercompact cardinal which is not
generically setwise supercompact?
Question 5.9. Assume there exists no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. Can
there then exist generically setwise supercompact cardinals in K?
5.4 Games and small embeddings
Our results in Chapter 3 provide answers to the following questions, which were
posed in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018].
(i) If γ is an uncountable cardinal and the challenger does not have a winning
strategy in the game Gθγ(κ), does it follow that the judge has one?
(ii) If ω ≤ α ≤ κ, are α-Ramsey cardinals downwards absolute to the Dodd-
Jensen core model?
(iii) Does 2-iterability imply ω-Ramseyness, or conversely?
(iv) Does κ having the strategic κ-filter property have the consistency strength of
a measurable cardinal?
Here the “challenger” is player I and the “judge” is player II, so this is asking if every
γ-Ramsey is strategic γ-Ramsey, when γ is an uncountable cardinal. Theorem 3.65
therefore gives a negative answer to (i) for all uncountable ordinals γ. Theorem 3.51
and Corollary 3.52 answer (ii) positively, for α-Ramseys with α having uncountable
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cofinality, and for <α-Ramseys when α is a limit of limit ordinals. Note that (ii) in
the α = ω case was answered positively in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018].
As for (iii), it is mentioned in [Holy and Schlicht, 2018] that Gitman has showed
that ω-Ramseys are not in general 2-iterable by showing that 2-iterables have strictly
stronger consistency strength than the ω-Ramseys, which also follows from The-
orem 3.36 and Theorem 4.8 in [Gitman and Welch, 2011]. Corollary 3.22 shows
that ω-Ramsey cardinals are ∆20-indescribable, and as 2-iterables are (at least) Π13-
definable it holds that any 2-iterable ω-Ramsey cardinal is a limit of 2-iterables, so
that in general 2-iterables cannot be ω-Ramsey either, answering (iii) in the negative.
Lastly, Theorem 3.47 gives a positive answer to (iv).
We conjecture the following two questions to be true. The first is a direct
analogue to Theorem 3.31, and the latter is a suspected analogy between the genuine
n-Ramsey cardinals and the weakly ineffable cardinals.
Question 5.10. If κ is faintly θ-power-measurable, does player II then have a win-
ning strategy in Gθω(κ)?
Question 5.11. Are genuine n-Ramsey cardinals limits of n-Ramsey cardinals? We
conjecture this to be true, in analogy with the weakly ineffables being limits of
weakly compacts. Since “weakly ineffable = Π11-indescribability + subtlety”, this
might involve some notion of “n-iterated subtlety”. The difference here is that n-
Ramseys cannot be equivalent to Π12n+1-indescribables for consistency reasons, so
there is some work to be done.
We showed in Theorem 3.30, see also Corollary 4.13 that completely ineffable car-
dinals could be characterised in terms of player II having a winning strategy in
G−ω (κ). This lends itself to the following question.
Question 5.12. Are there higher analogues of ineffability which are equivalent to
player II having a winning strategy in G−α (κ) for α > ω?
5.5 Ideal absoluteness
One can ask of any poset property whether it is ideal-absolute, but we choose to only
highlight one particular property here. We saw in Corollary 4.12 that <λ-closed
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faintly power-measurables “corresponds to” (κ, κ)-distributive <λ-closed forcings,
and in Corollary 4.13 that completely ineffable cardinals “corresponds to” (κ, κ)-
distributive forcings. In an attempt to find the forcing that corresponds to the faintly
power-measurables, we arrive at the following question.
Question 5.13. For κ a regular cardinal, are the following equivalent?
(i) κ is faintly power-measurable;
(ii) κ is ideally power-measurable;
(iii) κ is (κ, κ)-distributive ω-distributive faintly measurable;
(iv) κ is (κ, κ)-distributive ω-distributive ideally measurable;
(v) Player II has a winning strategy in Gω(κ).
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[Gödel, 1947] Gödel, K. (1947). What is cantor’s continuum problem? The Ameri-
can Mathematical Monthly, 54(9):515–525.
[Hanf and Scott, 1961] Hanf, W. P. and Scott, D. (1961). Classifying inaccessible
cardinals. Notices of the American Mathematical Society, page 445.
[Hauser, 1991] Hauser, K. (1991). Indescribable cardinals and elementary embed-
dings. The Journal of symbolic logic, 56(2):439–457.
[Holy and Schlicht, 2018] Holy, P. and Schlicht, P. (2018). A hierarchy of ramsey-like
cardinals. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 242:49–74.
[Jech, 2006] Jech, T. (2006). Set Theory. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, third millen-
nium edition.
[Jech et al., 1980] Jech, T. J., Magidor, M., Mitchell, W. J., and Prikry, K. L. (1980).
Precipitous ideals. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45(1):1–8.
[Jensen et al., 2009] Jensen, R., Schimmerling, E., Schindler, R., and Steel, J. (2009).
Stacking mice. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 74(1):315–335.
[Jensen and Steel, 2013] Jensen, R. and Steel, J. (2013). K without the measurable.
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 78(3):708–734.
[Kanamori, 2008] Kanamori, A. (2008). The Higher Infinite: Large cardinals in set
theory from their beginnings. Springer Science & Business Media.
[Kanamori and Magidor, 1978] Kanamori, A. and Magidor, M. (1978). The evolution
of large cardinal axioms in set theory. In Higher set theory, pages 99–275. Springer.
126 of 130
Bibliography Bibliography
[Kellner et al., 2007] Kellner, J., Pauna, M., and Shelah, S. (2007). Winning the
pressing down game but not banach-mazur. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
72(4):1323–1335.
[Kellner and Shelah, 2011] Kellner, J. and Shelah, S. (2011). More on the pressing
down game. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 50(3–4):477–501.
[Ketchersid, 2000] Ketchersid, R. (2000). Toward ADR from the Continuum Hy-
pothesis and an ω1-dense ideal. Doctoral dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley.
[Krapf, 2016] Krapf, R. (2016). Class forcing and second-order arithmetic. PhD
thesis, University of Bonn. Available at http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/2017/
4630/4630.pdf.
[Kunen, 1969] Kunen, K. (1969). Inaccessibility properties of cardinals. Doctoral
dissertation, Stanford University.
[Kunen, 1971] Kunen, K. (1971). Elementary embeddings and infinitary combina-
torics. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 36(3):407–413.
[Kunen, 1978] Kunen, K. (1978). Saturated ideals. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
43(1):65–76.
[Larson, 2004] Larson, P. (2004). The Stationary Tower. Notes on a Course by W.
Hugh Woodin, volume 32. American Mathematical Society.
[Larson, 2019] Larson, P. (2019). Extensions of the Axiom of Determinacy.
[Laver, 1978] Laver, R. (1978). Making the supercompactness of κ indestructible
under κ-directed closed forcing. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 29(4).
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